Meyers v. Livingston, Adler, Pulda, Meiklejohn & Kelly, P.C.

• Decision Date: 01 April 2014
• Docket Number: No. 18996.,18996.
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: Andrea MEYERS v. LIVINGSTON, ADLER, PULDA, MEIKLEJOHN AND KELLY, P.C.

311 Conn. 282

87 A.3d 534

Andrea MEYERS

v.LIVINGSTON, ADLER, PULDA, MEIKLEJOHN AND KELLY, P.C.

No. 18996.

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

Argued Oct. 22, 2013.

Decided April 1, 2014.

Thomas P. Willcutts, Hartford, for the appellant (plaintiff).

Proloy K. Das, with whom were Bernard F. Gaffney and, on the brief, Richard F. Banbury, Hartford, for the appellee (defendant).

ROGERS, C.J., and PALMER, ZARELLA, EVELEIGH, McDONALD, ESPINOSA and VERTEFEUILLE, Js.

ZARELLA, J.

The principal issue in this appeal is whether allegations that a law firm breached its duty of undivided loyalty to a client and failed to follow the client's instructions regarding the prosecution of a lawsuit sound in breach of contract, to which a six year statute of limitations applies, or in legal malpractice, to which a three year statute of limitations applies. The plaintiff, Andrea Meyers, commenced this action against the defendant, Livingston, Adler, Pulda, Meiklejohn & Kelly, P.C., alleging breach of contract on the ground that the defendant, a law firm, pursued the interests of another client in derogation of the plaintiff's interests and did not follow the plaintiff's wishes and instructions when it represented her in a prior lawsuit against other parties. Notwithstanding the plaintiff's breach of contract allegations, the trial court characterized the allegations as sounding in legal malpractice and granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment, reasoning that the action was barred by the three year statute of limitations applicable to legal malpractice claims. The plaintiff appealed to the Appellate Court, which affirmed the trial court's judgment. Meyers v. Livingston, Adler, Pulda, Meiklejohn & Kelly, P.C., 134 Conn.App. 785, 793, 41 A.3d 674 (2012). On appeal to this court, the plaintiff claims that the Appellate Court improperly affirmed the trial court's judgment because her claim sounded in breach of contract, and, therefore, it was not barred by the three year statute of limitations applicable to legal malpractice claims. The defendant responds that the trial court correctly characterized the plaintiff's claim as sounding in legal malpractice and that the Appellate Court properly affirmed the trial court's judgment. We agree with the defendant and, accordingly, affirm the judgment of the Appellate Court.

The following relevant facts are set forth in the Appellate Court's opinion. “The defendant represented the plaintiff in an action against Shek Hong, Joanne Hong, Hontek Corporation and T.C. Specialty Products, Inc. While representing the plaintiff in that action, the defendant agreed to represent another client, Diane Thibodeau, who had similar claims against the same parties. The defendant joined the claims of the plaintiff and Thibodeau into a single legal action. On December 14, 1999, a settlement of the litigation was reported on the record. The terms of the settlement were reviewed in open court, and the plaintiff was canvassed by the court.¹ In February, 2000, the [Hongs and Hontek Corporation] filed a motion to enforce the settlement agreement because the plaintiff had declined to sign a release. By motion dated February 22, 2000, the defendant sought to withdraw its appearance on behalf of the plaintiff.² On February 25, 2000, the plaintiff executed the settlement agreement and release. The defendant received the settlement check and, after deducting a portion for attorney's fees and/or expenses owed, ultimately remitted the balance to the plaintiff.”

“The plaintiff served [the defendant with] a one count complaint on February 21, 2006. The plaintiff claimed that the defendant was not entitled to [attorney's fees] because its representation was unprofessional. She alleged that the defendant ‘breached its contract duties' to her by bringing about a settlement of the prior action in furtherance of Thibodeau's interests and against the interests of the plaintiff. The defendant filed an answer and special defenses, in which it asserted, inter alia, that the action was barred by the statute of limitations.

“The defendant filed a motion for summary judgment on the ground that the plaintiff's claim sounded in tort and was barred by the applicable three year statute of limitations; General Statutes § 52–577; or, in the alternative, that it was barred by the six year statute of limitations for contract claims. General Statutes § 52–576. The court initially denied the defendant's motion, finding that the action, which was served on February 21, 2006, was initiated within the statute of limitations for contract claims, which began to run on February 25, 2000, when the plaintiff executed the settlement agreement in the underlying action.

“In January, 2010, the court granted the defendant's motion to reargue the denial of its motion for summary judgment. At reargument, the defendant argued that the plaintiff's complaint sounded in tort, not contract. The court vacated its prior ruling in which it had denied the defendant's motion for summary judgment and granted the motion for summary judgment, reasoning that the complaint sounded in tort and that the three year limitations period applicable to tort actions had run. The court additionally found that if it were a contract action, it still [had] not [been] commenced within the six year statute of limitations because the statute began to run on December 14, 1999, the date on which the alleged injury was inflicted, more than six years before the action was brought in February, 2006.

“In June, 2010, the plaintiff filed a motion to reargue the court's granting of the defendant's motion for summary judgment. After reconsideration of the parties' arguments, the court denied the relief requested and affirmed its decision granting the defendant's motion for summary judgment. The court determined that the complaint claimed both legal malpractice and breach of contract and that because the plaintiff was fully aware of her claims by December 14, 1999, but did not bring the action until 2006, her claim was barred by both the three year legal malpractice and six year contract statutes of limitations.” (Footnotes altered.) Meyers v. Livingston, Adler, Pulda, Meiklejohn & Kelly, P.C., supra, 134 Conn.App. at 786–88, 41 A.3d 674.

The plaintiff appealed to the Appellate Court, which affirmed the trial court's judgment. Id., at 793, 41 A.3d 674. Judge Beach, writing for the majority, concluded that the trial court properly had determined that the plaintiff's claim did not sound in breach of contract because it was not based on an allegation that the defendant had not obtained a specific result or performed a specific task. Id., at 791, 41 A.3d 674. Rather, the gravamen of the complaint was that the defendant had breached its professional duties, which fit squarely within the definition of a legal malpractice claim and thus was governed by the three year statute of limitations applicable to such claims. Id., at 792–93, 41 A.3d 674.

Judge Lavine concurred separately, concluding that the complaint sounded in legal malpractice and breach of contract, and that both of the applicable statutes of limitations had expired. See id., at 794, 41 A.3d 674 ( Lavine, J., concurring). In his view, the contract claim had accrued more than six years prior to the plaintiff's commencement of the action in 2006 because the plaintiff was aware, prior to December 14, 1999, that Thibodeau had been joined with her as a plaintiff despite the plaintiff's objection, that the plaintiff would be required to settle for less money even though her case was stronger than Thibodeau's, and that the defendant's awareness of this conflict of interest had caused it to terminate its representation of the plaintiff. ³ See id., at 793–94, 41 A.3d 674 ( Lavine, J., concurring).

Judge Bishop, like Judge Lavine, concluded that the complaint sounded in both legal malpractice and breach of contract and that the statute of limitations had run on the legal malpractice claim. See id., at 796, 797 n. 2, 41 A.3d 674 ( Bishop, J., dissenting). He concluded, however, that a determination could not be made as to whether the statute of limitations had run on the contract claim because a question of fact remained as to when the claim had accrued. See id., at 799–800, 41 A.3d 674 ( Bishop, J., dissenting). Judge Bishop thus concluded that the judgment should be reversed and the case remanded for further proceedings so that the trial court could make the factual findings necessary to resolve that issue. Id., at 799–801, 41 A.3d 674 ( Bishop, J., dissenting).

We subsequently granted the plaintiff's petition for certification to appeal from the Appellate Court's judgment.⁴Meyers v. Livingston, Adler, Pulda, Meiklejohn & Kelly, P.C., 305 Conn. 920, 920–21, 47 A.3d 881 (2012). On appeal to this court, the plaintiff claims that the allegations in the complaint, the evidence adduced in support of the summary judgment motion, and the applicable case law establish that her claim sounds in breach of contract rather than in legal malpractice and that she commenced the action before the applicable statute of limitations had run. We disagree with the plaintiff that her claim sounds in contract, and, therefore, we do not reach the issue of whether the claim was brought within the six year statute of limitations applicable to contract claims.

As a preliminary matter, we set forth the standard of review. “Summary judgment shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, affidavits and other proof submitted show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.... The scope of our appellate review depends upon the proper characterization of the rulings made by the trial court.... When ... the trial court draws conclusions of law, our review is plenary and we must decide whether its conclusions are legally and logically correct and find support in the facts that appear in the...