Meyers v. Meyers
Decision Date | 25 August 2022 |
Docket Number | CAAP-18-0000743 |
Parties | LUKELA S. MEYERS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CHRISTINA K. MEYERS, Defendant-Appellee |
Court | Court of Appeals of Hawai'i |
APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE SECOND CIRCUIT (FC-D NO 15-1-0251)
Lukela S. Meyers, Self-represented Plaintiff-Appellant
OPINION
This appeal arises out of post-judgment proceedings in a divorce case between self-represented Plaintiff-Appellant Lukela S Meyers (Lukela) and Defendant-Appellee Christina K. Meyers (Christina). Following settlement conferences in April 2017, Lukela and Christina signed, and the Family Court of the Second Circuit (Family Court) entered, a July 21, 2017 Stipulated Decree Granting Divorce (Stipulated Divorce Decree) .[1] Almost a year later, on July 20, 2018, Lukela filed a "Motion for Relief from Judgment/Settlement Pursuant to [Hawai'i Family Court Rules (HFCR)] Rule 60(b)" (Rule 60(b) Motion). Lukela argued that events on the morning of July 21, 2017, including statements by the Family Court on the issue of Lukela's inheritance, constituted "surprise" warranting relief under HFCR Rule 60(b)(1), and undue influence and coercion warranting relief under HFCR Rule 60(b) (6) .[2]
Lukela appeals from the September 4, 2018 "Findings of Facts, Conclusions of Laws, and Order Denying [Lukela's] [HFCR] Rule 60(b) Motion for Relief from Judgment Filed July 20, 2018" (FOFs/COLs/Order), entered by the Family Court.[3] Lukela contends that the Family Court erred: (1) "when it found arguments from [Lukela's] briefs untimely"; and (2) "when it found that [Lukela] has not met the burden of establishing that . . . surprise . . . had occurred, justifying the setting aside of the Stipulated Divorce Decree." Lukela also challenges several FOFs and COLs for failing to include certain statements or for other asserted errors .[4] We hold that the Family Court erred in finding that the Rule 60(b) Motion was untimely on the issue of Lukela's inheritance due to the motion not being filed within one year of the April 2017 settlement conferences. However, the error was harmless as to Lukela's arguments based on HFCR Rule 60(b)(1). The Family Court ruled on the merits of the Rule 60(b)(1) arguments and did not abuse its discretion in concluding that Lukela had not established "surprise" justifying the setting aside of the Stipulated Divorce Decree. The Family Court did not, however, separately analyze Lukela's undue influence and coercion arguments based on HFCR Rule 60(b)(6) or set forth the basis for rejecting those arguments. It is therefore unclear whether the Family Court concluded that Lukela's Rule 60(b)(6) arguments were untimely, and the record on appeal is insufficient for us to determine whether the Family Court abused its discretion in denying the requested relief. Accordingly, we affirm in part and vacate in part the FOFs/COLs/Order, and remand this case to the Family Court with instructions.
On June 30, 2015, Lukela filed a Complaint for Divorce in the Family Court.
On April 10, 2017, the Family Court conducted a settlement conference with the parties and their respective attorneys, which continued on April 12, 2017. The parties were unable to reach agreement, and trial was set for July 21, 2017.
Following a hearing on July 21, 2017, the parties and their respective attorneys signed, and the Family Court entered, the Stipulated Divorce Decree.[5] The Stipulated Divorce Decree: (1) dissolved the marriage of Lukela and Christina; (2) acknowledged that Lukela and Christina had no minor children at that time; (3) awarded no spousal support; and (4) divided and distributed Lukela and Christina's assets and debts. The signature page of the Stipulated Divorce Decree included the following paragraph:
No party appealed from the Stipulated Divorce Decree.
On July 20, 2018, Lukela, self-represented, filed the Rule 60(b) Motion. On August 13, 2018, Lukela filed a "Brief In Support of [Lukela's] Rule 60(b) Motion for Relief From Judgment" (Brief in Support of Rule 60(b) Motion). Lukela's brief cited HFCR Rule 60(b)(1) and (6) as bases for relief from the Stipulated Divorce Decree. He asserted that during the April 10 and 12, 2017 settlement conferences, "the parties were instructed that [Lukela] would receive full credit for his inheritance of $110,139.38 received during their marriage as a Category 3 Capital Contribution." Lukela further asserted that on July 21, 2017, the morning of the scheduled trial: (1) he was told by his attorney that Judge Poelman had changed his mind and Lukela would not receive full credit for his inheritance; and (2) Judge Poelman "confirm[ed] he had changed his mind and had already made his decision, [and] encouraged [Lukela] to settle the case, that trial was not necessary." Lukela argued that these events constituted "surprise" warranting relief under HFCR Rule 60(b)(1), and undue influence and coercion warranting relief under HFCR Rule 60(b) (6) .
On August 20, 2018, the Family Court held a hearing on the Rule 60(b) Motion and took the matter under advisement.[6] On September 4, 2018, the Family Court entered the FOFs/COLs/Order denying the Rule 60(b) motion. The Family Court concluded in paragraph 2 of its Order:
Although [Lukela] filed his [Rule 60(b) Motion] on July 20, 2018, one day before the expiration of [the] one year deadline from the date the Stipulated Divorce Decree was entered on July 21, 2017, this court finds that [Lukela] has not met the burden of establishing that mistake[,] inadvertence, surprise, excusable neglect, or newly discovered evidence had occurred, justifying the setting aside of the Stipulated Divorce Decree.
The FOFs/COLs/Order did not separately analyze Lukela's undue influence and coercion arguments based on HFCR Rule 60(b)(6) or articulate the basis for rejecting those arguments.
We review the grant or denial of an HFCR Rule 60(b) motion for abuse of discretion. De Mello v. De Mello, 3 Haw.App. 165, 169, 646 P.2d 409, 412 (1982).
Under the abuse of discretion standard of review, the appellate court is not authorized to disturb the family court's decision unless (1) the family court disregarded rules or principles of law or practice to the substantial detriment of a party litigant; (2) the family court failed to exercise its equitable discretion; or (3) the family court's decision clearly exceeds the bounds of reason.
Wong v. Wong, 87 Hawai'i 475, 486, 960 P.2d 145, 156 (App. 1998) (brackets omitted) (quoting Bennett v. Bennett, 8 Haw.App. 415, 426, 807 P.2d 597, 603 (1991)).
The Hawai'i Supreme Court has recently reiterated:
The trial court has a very large measure of discretion in passing upon motions under [HFCR] Rule 60(b) and its order will not be set aside unless we are persuaded that under the circumstances of the particular case, the court's refusal to set aside its order was an abuse of discretion.
PennyMac Corp. v. Godinez, 148 Hawai'i 323, 327, 474 P.3d 264, 268 (2020) (brackets omitted) (quoting Hawai'i Hous. Auth. v. Uyehara, 77 Hawai'i 144, 147, 883 P.2d 65, 68 (1994)) (Hawai'i Rules of Civil Procedure (HRCP) Rule 60(b)) substantially similar . "The burden of establishing abuse of discretion in denying an [HFCR] Rule 60(b) motion is on the appellant, and a strong showing is required to establish it." Id. (original brackets omitted) (quoting Ditto v. McCurdy, 103 Hawai'i 153, 162, 80 P.3d 974, 983 (2003)).
"The timeliness of a motion brought pursuant to HFCR Rule 60(b) implicates the jurisdiction of the family court." Child Support Enf't Agency v. Doe, 98 Hawai'i 499, 503, 51 P.3d 366, 370 (2002). "The existence of jurisdiction is a question of law that we review de novo under the right/wrong standard." Wagner v. World Botanical Gardens, Inc., 126 Hawai'i 190, 194, 268 P.3d 443, 447 (App. 2011) (brackets omitted) (quoting Captain Andy's Sailing, Inc. v. Pep't of Land & Natural Res., 113 Hawai'i 184, 192, 150 P.3d 833, 841 (2006)).
The family court's findings of fact are reviewed under the clearly erroneous standard and will not be overruled unless:
(1) the record lacks substantial evidence to support the finding, or (2) despite substantial evidence in support of the finding, the appellate court is nonetheless left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake had been made. "Substantial evidence" is credible evidence which is of sufficient quality and probative value to enable a person of reasonable caution to support a conclusion.
LC v. MG, 143 Hawai'i 302, 310, 430 P.3d 400 408 (2018) (quoting Fisher...
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