Meyers v. Southwest Region Conference Ass'n of Seventh Day Adventists

• Decision Date: 07 May 1956
• Docket Number: No. 42453,42453
• Citation: 88 So.2d 381,230 La. 310
• Parties: Reverend Samuel David MEYERS v. SOUTHWEST REGION CONFERENCE ASSOCIATION OF SEVENTH DAY ADVENTISTS et al.
• Court: Louisiana Supreme Court

Page 381

88 So.2d 381

230 La. 310

Reverend Samuel David MEYERS v. SOUTHWEST REGION CONFERENCE ASSOCIATION OF SEVENTH DAY ADVENTISTS et al.

No. 42453.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

May 7, 1956.

Rehearing Denied June 11, 1956.

Lemle & Kelleher, Carl J. Schumacher, Jr., New Orleans, for defendants-appellants.

Meyer Sabludowsky, Jorda S. Derbes, New Orleans, for relators.

McCALEB, Justice.

Plaintiff, a salaried minister in the employ of the Southwest Region Conference Association of Seventh Day Adventists, an incorporated body organized under the laws of the State of Texas 'for the purpose of supporting public worship and benevolent, charitable, educational and missionary undertakings', sustained severe personal injuries during December of 1952 in an automobile accident near Colfax, Louisiana while making a trip with another minister, Reverend Jeter E. Cox, to attend a conference of the church corporation scheduled in Dallas, Texas. Claiming total and permanent disability as a consequence of the accident, plaintiff seeks recovery of workmen's compensation from the church corporation and its liability insurance carrier, the Indemnity Insurance Company of North America, at the rate of $30 per week for 400 weeks, together with the maximum legal allowance for hospital and medical expenses.

The defendants, while admitting the employment and the occurrence of the accident in the course thereof, resist liability for compensation on several grounds. Initially, they contend that the activities of the church corporation is not a trade, business or occupation within the meaning of our workmen's compensation statute, R.S. 23:1035. Secondly, it is asserted that a minister is not engaged in a hazardous employment and that the operation of a church corporation is not a hazardous trade, business or occupation, notwithstanding that the minister may be required to use an automobile in conducting church work. Thirdly, defendants maintain that, in any event, the workmen's compensation law should not be construed so as to include the operations of church corporations for, to do so, would be violative of the religious freedom provision contained in Section 4 of Article 1 of our Constitution and also the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the Federal Constitution. In addition, defendants deny that plaintiff has been permanently disabled.

In the district court, there was judgment for plaintiff and against both defendants for compensation, as prayed for, and for $1000 medical expenses, it being provided that defendants would be entitled to credit against the judgment in the sum of $6500, which plaintiff had already obtained as damages in a compromise settlement of his tort claim against the other parties involved in the accident. The defendants appealed to the Court of Appeal for the Parish of Orleans and plaintiff answered the appeal, praying that the judgment be amended by eliminating therefrom the credit allowed to defendants. Thereafter, the Court of Appeal reversed the judgment of the district court and dismissed the suit, holding that the accident was not compensable (1) because the church corporation is not engaged in a trade, business or occupation and (2) that, even if it is, its activities are not hazardous since the use of motor vehicles does not constitute an essential feature of its pursuits. See 79 So.2d 595.

We granted certiorari and the case has been submitted for our decision.

The record shows that plaintiff was assigned a parish by the President of the Conference and that his duties consisted of conducting services three times a week, officiating at baptisms and funerals, responsibility for the financial and recreational programs of the church, parochial calls and voluntary, service in church-school activities. Plaintiff owned an automobile which was used in making his calls and the church corporation, in addition to his monthly salary, granted him an allowance for depreciation and for expenses growing out of the use of his automobile and also paid for liability insurance protecting him against loss for his legal liability which might result from the use of his car. The car was used extensively in his employment, covering approximately 1500 miles each month. Accordingly, it would appear that, for all intents and purposes, the use of the automobile was contemplated under his employment and was essential in the performance of his duties.

The primary question to be resolved in the case is whether or not a church corporation, being a charitable and non-profit organization, is a trade, business or occupation within the meaning of our workmen's compensation law. ¹

The Court of Appeal , was of the opinion that 'trade, business or occupation' does not comprehend a charitable or religious organization, since the purpose of the Act is to place the economic burden of employee injury initially on industry and ultimately upon the consumer. From this premise, it reasoned that nonprofitable enterprises were not intended to be covered by the Act. Comments by Professor Wex S. Malone, in his able treatise on Louisiana Workmen's Compensation Law and Practice, and cases from New York, California and South Carolina are said to fortify this conclusion.

The comment of Professor Malone (found on page 34 of his work) is merely a statement of the economic principle upon which workmen's compensation laws rest, i. e., the shifting of the burden of accidental injuries incident to employment from the injured employee onto the public through the employer. But this principle affords no ground for concluding that the compensation law does not apply to employers who do not engage in a trade, business or occupation for profit. ² The Act unlike the laws of some other states (e. g., New York Workmen's Compensation Law prior to its 1928 amendment), does not, either in letter or spirit, limit its scope to businesses conducted for profit. On the contrary, its comprehensive provisions would seem to encompass an unrestricted filed of operation. For example, R.S. 23:1034 includes within the scope of the statute all public employees in the service of the State or other political subdivisions, incorporated public boards, etc. This, alone, manifests that it was never intended by the Legislature that the Act was to be confined to individuals and corporations engaged only in trades or businesses operated for profit.

The Workmen's Compensation Act, as we have many times said, is paternal legislation and is to be given a liberal construction by the Courts. ³ Hence, in determining whether a particular calling is within the purview of the law, the meaning of the language 'trade, business, or occupation' should be considered in its broadest aspect so as to include all types of pursuits and we must assume that, if the Legislature intended to exclude any particular enterprise, it would have specially excepted it.

The term 'business' has no definite or legal meaning. See Black's Law Dictionary, 4th Ed., page 248. It is a general term with widely variegated meanings and has been defined as 'That which busies, or engages time, attention, or labor, as a principal serious concern or interest'. Webster's New International Dictionary, 2d Ed. ⁴

Thus we see that, by giving the term 'trade, business, or occupation' the comprehensive meaning to which it is entitled, no difficulty is encountered in reaching the conclusion that the defendant church corporation is conducting a business. The Supreme Court of Iowa expressed the same view, but more emphatically, in Gardner v. Trustees of Main Street Methodist E. Church, 217 Iowa 1390, 250 N.W. 740, 746, where, in interpreting similar language of the Workmen's Compensation Law of that State, it said:

'To claim that a church has no business is the height of absurdity. The greatest business in this Christian nation is that conducted by its churches. That it is not conducted for pecuniary gain makes it none the less a business.' ⁵

The cases cited by the Court of Appeal are inapposite and do not sustain the conclusion reached by it that the operation of a church corporation is not a trade, business or occupation.

In Dillon v. Trustees of St. Patrick's Cathedral, 234 N.Y. 225, 137 N.E. 311, 312, it was held that the religious corporation was not engaged in a trade, business or occupation within contemplation of the Workmen's Compensation Law of the State of New York because the law of New York, at that time, ⁶ was applicable only to trades, businesses or occupations "carried on by the employer for pecuniary gain, * * *". Workmen's Compensation Law, § 3, subd. 5.

The decisions in Hartford Accident and Indemnity Co. v. Department of Industrial Relations, 139 Cal.App. 632, 34 P.2d 826; Caughman v. Columbia Y.M.C.A., 212 S.C. 337, 47 S.E.2d 788, as well as Zoulalian v. New England Sanatorium and Benevolent Association, 230 Mass. 102, 119 N.E. 686, L.R.A.1918F, 185, all denying compensation to employees of charitable institutions, were based on the premise that, since the compensation acts in those states did not specifically include charitable institutions and since there was no common law liability imposed on such institutions under the doctrine of respondeat superior, such corporations would have had to be specifically included in the statutes in order for them to be liable for workmen's compensation. These rulings, of course, have no pertinence here in Louisiana, or in the majority of the states, where it is well settled that charitable corporations are not exempt from responsibility for personal injuries to third persons and servants under the 'Trust Fund Doctrine'. See 10 Am. Jur. Verbo 'Charities' Sections 153 and 154; Bougon v. Volunteers of America, La.App., 151 So. 797; Unser v. Baptist Rescue Mission, La.App., 157 So. 298 and Lusk v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., La.App., 199 So. 666.

Since we are of the opinion that the church corporation conducts a business within the meaning of the Act, we next...