Meyett v. Coleman, No. 83-C-957.

• Court: United States District Courts. 7th Circuit. Western District of Wisconsin
• Writing for the Court: CRABB
• Citation: 613 F. Supp. 39
• Parties: John MEYETT, Plaintiff, v. Jacqueline COLEMAN and the State of Wisconsin Department of Industry Labor & Human Relations, Defendants.
• Docket Number: No. 83-C-957.
• Decision Date: 23 January 1985

613 F. Supp. 39

John MEYETT, Plaintiff,
v.
Jacqueline COLEMAN and the State of Wisconsin Department of Industry Labor & Human Relations, Defendants.

No. 83-C-957.

United States District Court, W.D. Wisconsin.

January 23, 1985.

Jeff Scott Olson, Madison, Wis., for plaintiff.

David C. Rice, Asst. Atty. Gen., Madison, Wis., for defendants.

ORDER

CRABB, Chief Judge.

Defendants have moved for dismissal of plaintiff's cause of action based on 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and for the striking of plaintiff's jury demand. Defendants ground both motions upon their contention that Title VII provides an exclusive remedy for sex discrimination in employment and does not permit the bringing of a separate action for the same sex discrimination premised on a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment guarantee of equal protection of the laws.

The question whether Title VII excludes other remedies is one the United States Supreme Court has not answered. The Court has held that 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) cannot be used as a remedy for a violation of Title VII, Great America Savings & Loan v. Novotny, 442 U.S. 366, 99 S.Ct. 2345, 60 L.Ed.2d 957 (1979), and that a federal employee cannot use 42 U.S.C. § 1981 as a remedy for a violation of either Title VII or of the United States Constitution. Brown v. General Services Administration, 425 U.S. 820, 96 S.Ct. 1961, 48 L.Ed.2d 402 (1976).

Defendants contend that the holding in these cases presages a holding that Title VII provides the exclusive remedy for discrimination in employment precluding the use of § 1983. They argue that Congress would not have intended to allow state and local government employees to evade the comprehensive remedial scheme set forth in Title VII by pleading under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and they point to the apparent unfairness in allowing governmental employees but not private employees the right to a jury trial and the opportunity to seek punitive damages.

Although defendants' position is not without merit, I am persuaded against it by the analysis of the Court of Appeals for the

613 F. Supp. 40

Sixth Circuit in Day v. Wayne County Board of Auditors, 749 F.2d 1199 (6th Cir.1984). There the court concluded that Title VII provides an exclusive remedy when the only ground for the § 1983 cause of action is a violation of Title VII, but does not preclude an action brought to enforce rights guaranteed by the Constitution. In Day, the plaintiff was a white male who was found to have been demoted by a governmental agency in retaliation for having filed charges with the Equal Employment Opportunities Commission. The...