Mfrs. & Merchants' Inspection Bureau v. Buech

• Decision Date: 11 January 1921
• Citation: 181 N.W. 125,173 Wis. 433
• Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court
• Parties: MANUFACTURERS' & MERCHANTS' INSPECTION BUREAU v. BUECH ET AL. PINKERTON ET AL. v. BUECH ET AL. FERRIS v. BUECH ET AL.

173 Wis. 433

181 N.W. 125

MANUFACTURERS' & MERCHANTS' INSPECTION BUREAU

v.BUECH ET AL.

PINKERTON ET AL.

v.BUECH ET AL.

FERRIS

v.BUECH ET AL.^a1

Supreme Court of Wisconsin.

Jan. 11, 1921.

Appeal from Circuit Court, Milwaukee County; G. N. Risjord, Judge.

Actions by the Manufacturers' & Merchants' Inspection Bureau against Robert Buech and others, together with actions by William A. Pinkerton and Allen Pinkerton, doing business under the name of Pinkerton's National Detective Agency, against the same defendants, and by John E. Ferris against the same defendants. Demurrers were sustained to the several complaints, and an order vacating a restraining order was set aside, and plaintiffs appeal. Reversed, and cause remanded, with directions.

The complaints in the cases are substantially the same, and allege that the plaintiffs made application to the police and fire commission of the city of Milwaukee pursuant to the provisions of chapter 444 of the Laws of 1919 for approval of applications to engage in the business of private detective for hire, but that the members of the commission, acting arbitrarily, capriciously, and in entire disregard of the evidence presented to it and of the facts, refused to grant its approval. A general demurrer was filed by defendants to the complaint in each case.

Upon a hearing the circuit court entered an order vacating and setting aside an order theretofore made, restraining the defendants from issuing or applying for the issuance of any warrant for the arrest of the plaintiffs, their agents or employés, for violating the provisions of chapter 444 of the Laws of Wisconsin for the year 1919, and also sustaining the demurrer to the plaintiff's complaint, with leave to amend within 20 days.Lamfrom, Tighe & Wallach, of Milwaukee (Marvin W. Wallach and Leon B. Lamfrom, both of Milwaukee, of counsel), for appellant Manufacturers' & Merchants' Inspection Bureau.

Roehr & Steinmetz, of Milwaukee (Julius E. Roehr, of Milwaukee, of counsel), for appellants Pinkerton.

Lines, Spooner & Quarles, of Milwaukee, for appellant Ferris.

W. C. Zabel, Dist. Atty., D. W. Sullivan, First Asst. Dist. Atty., and Wm. L. Tibbs, Sp. Asst. Dist. Atty., all of Milwaukee, for respondents.

SIEBECKER, C. J. (after stating the facts as above).

[1] The remedy by injunction is properly invoked by the plaintiffs in this action to protect them in their property rights and against prosecution in criminal proceedings under invalid statutes. “It is well settled that where property rights will be destroyed unlawful interference by criminal proceedings under a void law or ordinance may be reached and controlled by a decree of a court of equity.” Dobbins v. Los Angeles, 195 U. S. 223, 25 Sup. Ct. 18, 49 L. Ed. 169;Bonnett v. Vallier, 136 Wis. 193, 116 N. W. 885, 17 L. R. A. (N. S.) 486, 128 Am. St. Rep. 1061; Income Tax Cases, 147 Wis. 150, 133 N. W. 148;Wadhams Oil Co. v. Tracy, 141 Wis. 150, 123 N. W. 785, 18 Ann. Cas. 779.

[2] The subject embraced in chapter 444, Laws of 1919 (section 163--12m, Stats.), is a proper one for legislative regulation within the police power. Lehon v. Atlanta, 242 U. S. 53, 37 Sup. Ct. 70, 61 L. Ed. 145;Fox v. Smith, 123 App. Div. 369, 108 N. Y. Supp. 181.

“Under the power reserved to the state to regulate the relative rights and duties of persons within its territory, it may lawfully require examination to determine the general fitness of a person engaging in vocations directly connected with public safety or person and property.” 17 R. C. L. § 62.

The occupations, trades and calling subject to license and regulations are most extensive in range and variety. For a partial list of them, see 17 R. C. L. on pages 548, 549, § 63.

[3] Chapter 444, Laws of 1919, provides regulations of private detective agencies, and prescribes penalties for its violation. Section 1 provides that such business shall not be conducted by any person, copartnership or corporation without first having obtained a license to do so from the secretary of state. Section 2 enacts that:

“Any person, copartnership or corporation intending to act as a private detective for hire or reward or to conduct the business of private detectives or detective agency or advertise said business shall present to the secretary of state and file in his office a written application duly signed and verified * * *” by the applicant in person, or the copartners, or by the specified officer if applicant is a corporation, “* * * and if such person, copartnership or corporation intends to establish an office in any city in this state such application must be approved in each instance by the fire and police commission of those cities having a fire and police commission, but in those cities where there is no fire and police commission by the chief of police of said city and, in addition thereto, by not less than five reputable citizens, freeholders of the county where the applicant or applicants propose to establish such office.”

The application must, among other things, state the city of the proposed place of business, “and such further facts as will show the good character, competency and integrity of such applicant.” Section 3 provides that the secretary of state shall issue to the applicant a license if he shall find him to be of good character, competency, and integrity, upon the payment of $2,000 license fee and the furnishing of the required bond. The complaint charges that the plaintiff duly applied to the fire and police commission of the city of Milwaukee for approval of their application to the secretary of state for such license, but that the commissioners wrongfully and arbitrarily refused to approve the application. The appellants admit that the standard of qualifications prescribed by the act to be applied by the secretary of state in determining whether or not an applicant for such a license is a proper person to be licensed to conduct the business of private detective for hire is an appropriate regulation. It is claimed: (1) That no standard or test of qualifications of such an applicant is provided for upon which the fire and police commission or the chief of police of a city are to act for approving a written application for such a license, and that such commissioners and chief of police are therefore vested with an arbitrary power in giving or withholding their approval of the written application for such a license, and that this renders the legislation invalid as violative of plaintiff's constitutional rights, in that it deprives them of due process of law and of the equal protection of the law; (2) that the act attempts to confer legislative power on a municipal agency and officer; (3) that plaintiffs are deprived of the right of judicial review of the wrongful acts of such municipal agency or officer; and (4) that the act is discriminatory between persons seeking to pursue the same vocation.

The test and standard of qualifications prescribed by the statute for obtaining the license is that the applicant shall be a person of good character, competency, and integrity. This standard is an ascertainable and known one, and is readily understood as a matter of common knowledge when applied to the subject to which it refers. It is one frequently employed in legislative regulations for licensing vocations, and has been applied in many instances in the legislation of this and other states. It is strenuously asserted that the provisions of section 2 of this act do not prescribe any standard of qualification upon which the fire and police commission or chief of police are to act in granting or withholding approval of the written application for such a license to the secretary of state, and that the provisions of the act permit them to deny their approval in an arbitrary manner. A reading of the whole act and a study of the relations...