Miami Beach First Nat. Bank v. Edgerly

• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Florida
• Writing for the Court: O'CONNELL; THOMAS, C. J., TERRELL, DREW and THORNAL, JJ., and McCRARY; ROBERTS
• Citation: 82 A.L.R.2d 927,121 So.2d 417
• Parties: MIAMI BEACH FIRST NATIONAL BANK, a banking corporation organized under the laws of the United States, Petitioner, v. R. J. EDGERLY and Elizabeth Edgerly, Respondents.
• Decision Date: 08 June 1960

Page 417

121 So.2d 417 82 A.L.R.2d 927 MIAMI BEACH FIRST NATIONAL BANK, a banking corporation organized under the laws of the United States, Petitioner,
v.
R. J. EDGERLY and Elizabeth Edgerly, Respondents. Supreme Court of Florida. June 8, 1960.

Page 418

Blackwell, Walker & Gray, Miami, for petitioner.

Anderson & Nadeau, Miami, for respondents.

O'CONNELL, Justice.

On motion of the petitioner, Miami Beach First National Bank, the District Court of Appeal, Third District, has certified that its decision in this cause, reported as Edgerly v. Schuyler, Fla.App.1959, 113 So.2d 737, is one which passes upon a question of great public interest 'because the decision involves an important new point of law relating to certain rights of depositors in banking institutions.' We therefore have jurisdiction to consider the cause on certiorari. See Susco Car Rental System of Florida v. Leonard, Fla.1959, 112 So.2d 832.

Petitioner, both in its motion to certify a question of great public interest filed in the district court and in its brief filed with this Court, urges that the question to be answered by this Court is:

'Whether, in the absence of fraud on the part of a bank, the statute of limitations begins to run against the depositor's cause of action to recover on a check bearing a forged endorsement upon receipt of the depositor's statement and return of the cancelled checks.'

In its opinion the district court stated the question to be [113 So.2d 740]:

'When does a cause of action accrue to a depositor against his bank for the wrongful payment of a check upon a forged endorsement?'

We think the answer to both questions is the same and that the decision of the district court correctly answered them, saying in 113 So.2d at page 741 of its opinion:

'* * * the period of the statute of limitations begins to run from the discovery of the forgery by the depositor unless it can be demonstrated to the satisfaction of the trier of fact that at an earlier time the depositor would have discovered the forgery if he had exercised ordinary business care. The determination of the time for the beginning of the period of the statute of limitations becomes a question of fact * * *.'

The district court then held that the limitation prescribed in § 95.11(5)(e), F.S.A., was applicable to an action such as here involved.

The facts of this cause are set forth in the opinion of the district court under review. We will not delve into them here except to say that the cause originated as a suit on a $20,000 promissory note brought by the Edgerlys against the Schuylers and Schmuklers, as makers and endorsers of the note. During the course of the proceedings

Page 419

in the trial court the defendants, or one of them, denied execution of the note and denied receipt of a $20,000 check drawn by the Edgerlys on the petitioner-bank, payable to Sam Schuyler, who denied endorsing the check. The bank was made a party defendant and charged with having wrongfully paid the check and charged it to the Edgerlys' account, on a forged endorsement. The bank was not joined in the suit until more than five years after the payment by it of the check on the allegedly forged endorsement. The trial judge held that the action against the bank was barred by the statute of limitations and granted summary judgment in favor of the bank.

The district court reversed the trial court for the reasons given in that portion of its opinion above quoted.

We are convinced, after careful study of the briefs and authorities cited by the parties, and after independent research made by us, that the rules of law announced by the district court are sound and fair. We hereby approve them.

While it may seem to...