Miami Bridge Co. v. Railroad Com'n

• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Florida
• Citation: 20 So.2d 356,155 Fla. 366
• Parties: MIAMI BRIDGE CO. v. RAILROAD COMMISSION.
• Decision Date: 19 December 1944

20 So.2d 356

155 Fla. 366

MIAMI BRIDGE CO. v. RAILROAD COMMISSION.

Florida Supreme Court

December 19, 1944

Rehearing Denied Jan. 26, 1945.

Mitchell D. Price, Zaring & Florence, of Miami, and Keen & Allen, of Tallahassee, for petitioner.

Lewis W Petteway and George L. Patten, both of Tallahassee, for respondent.

Loftin Anderson, Scott, McCarthy & Preston and Tyrus A. Norwood all of Miami, amici curiae.

CHAPMAN, Justice.

It was made to appear by petition of the Miami Beach Railway Company filed before the Railroad Commission of the State of Florida on June 17, 1944, that it was engaged in the operation of a bus line from the City of Miami to the City of Miami Beach, and in so doing was required to cross over a bridge spanning, in part, Biscayne Bay operated by the Miami Bridge Company under the provisions of Chapter 10497, Special Acts of 1925, Laws of Florida. This Act granted a franchise and authorized the Bridge Company to fix a rate or rates chargeable to be paid by the petitioner for the passage of its busses over the bridge operated by it and known as the 'Venetian Way.' Chapter 21743, Laws of Florida F.S.A. § 347.08, granted authority to the State Railroad Commission to regulate the operation and to fix the amount of tolls chargeable by the Miami Bridge Company for the use by the public of the bridge, inclusive of the busses of petitioner.

Petitioner represented that during the Winter season it operated about twenty busses daily over the bridge, which was equivalent to approximately 300 one-way trips per day thereon. Likewise, during the Summer months it operated ten busses over the bridge, which was the average of 150 one-way trips per day; that the rate of fifty cents per round trip demanded for the passage of each bus over the bridge or causeway was unreasonable, arbitrary, excessive and extortionate; that the Miami Bridge Company had previously entered into an agreement with the Venetian Short Way, Inc., operator of jitneys and a carrier of passengers by automobile for hire, the terms of which permitted passage over the bridge at the rate of $1.20 per automobile, irrespective of the trips made or the number of passengers carried; that these automobiles averaged 50 one way trips daily during the winter season and the cost therefor was three cents per trip as compared to twenty-five cents per trip demanded of the petitioner by the Miami Bridge Company.

The petitioner prays that the State Railroad Commission take jurisdiction of the cause under the provisions of Chapter 21743, supra, and after a hearing by the respective parties, make and enter an order fixing a just and reasonable rate for petitioner's busses using the 'Venetian Way.' The Miami Bridge Company, in response to the aforesaid petition, filed five pleas going to the jurisdiction of the State Railroad Commission to hear, consider and adjudicate the tolls and charges, as well as the hours for keeping open for traffic the 'Venetian Way', and simultaneously filed a motion to dismiss the petition.

The first plea in substance alleged that the bridge was built and operated under a franchise granted for a period of ten years to Bay Biscayne Improvement Company by the Board of County Commissioners of Dade County, Florida; that The company owned the right-of-way and the temporary wooden bridge constructed prior to 1925 and when Chapter 10497, Special Acts of 1925, was enacted and bacame effective; the present 'Venetian Way' was constructed since the enactment of Chapter 10497, supra, and financed by a bond issue of $1,000,000; the bridge with all rights, privileges and franchises on July 1, 1926, were conveyed to the Biscayne Bay Bridge Company; that the franchise rights were acquired from Dade County for ten years after 1924 and under Chapter 10497, supra; and that the bridge was operated for approximately seven years after the franchise was granted and was therefore excluded or exempted from the operation of Chapter 21743, supra, as evidence by the language therein viz.:

'Provided, however, that this section shall have no application to toll bridges that may, after June 6, 1927, have been or be constructed by any county, or any political subdivision of any county, or to any toll bridge constructed and operated under any frachise or license granted by the county commissioners of any county.'

The second plea alleged, in substance, that Chapter 21743, supra, cannot be enforced or made operative without impairing vested rights of the Miami Bridge Company and each stockholder, bondholder and contract holder now transacting business with it; that the power and authority to fix tolls and charges for the use of the bridge were granted to it under the several provisions of Chapter 10497, supra; that the courts are powerless to change these rates except when shown to be unreasonable or in amount exceeding the rate allowed by Chapter 10497; that the respondent was the owner of the 'Venetian Way' when Chapter 21743 was enacted and had outstanding a bond indebtedness, contracts and other obligations; that if the State Railroad Commission assumes jurisdiction of this controversy, large expenditures of money in appraisals, bookkeeping system, repairs, etc., made at the cost of the Miami Bridge Company will result in a heavy loss to the stockholders, bondholders and contract holders having acquired vested rights in the 'Venetian Way'; that Section 347.20 Fla.Stats.1941, F.S.A. provides that nothing in this Chapter shall affect or impair any right or privilege belonging to an individual or corporation by virtue of any law of Florida.

The third plea, in substance, alleges that Chapter 10497, supra, provided for the construction of the bridge, fills, approaches and roadways; that the respondent accepted the franchise rights and constructed the bridge at a cost of approximately $1,500,000 by floating bonds, with the entire bridge as security for the payment thereof; that Section 5 of Chapter 10497 authorized the collection of tolls and the schedule was made a part of the Act and charge in excess of the prescribed schedule rate has never been made by the respondent; that acceptance of the franchise rights granted by the State of Florida and a full, clear and detailed performance of each of the terms and conditions thereof constitutes a contract protected by the Federal and State Constitutions; that the only source of revenue for the payment of the outstanding bondholders is the revenue in the form of tolls charged for the use of the bridge on the part of the public; the schedule of rates chargeable was considered by the respondent in the acceptance of the franchise rights, the performance of the terms thereof and the daily tolls or receipts from the use of the bridge were offered as inducements to the purchasers of the bonds; that if a material change in the rate of chargeable tolls is made by an order of the State Railroad Commission, then heavy losses will accrue to the respondent and the many stockholders which in law is equivalent to the violation of the sanctity of the contract.

The fourth plea, in substance, alleged that Chapter 21743, supra, is unconstitutional and void in that the State Railroad Commission is granted the power and authority to fix a schedule of rates chargeable for the use of the bridge; that Section 11 of Article 5 of the State Constitution placed the exclusive original jurisdiction of such controversies or cases in the Circuit Courts of Florida.

Counsel for the Miami Bridge Company, in reference to its fifth plea, say:

'The fifth plea to the jurisdiction of the Railroad Commission alleges that there was no question of public necessity involved; that no person had ever raised any complaint as to the reasonableness or unreasonableness of any rate fixed by the Miami Bridge Company save and except The Miami Beach Railway Company, which is earning a large profit by the use of the bridge owned by the Miami Bridge Company; that the matter raised by the petition filed with the Railroad Commission was purely a private controversy between the Miami Beach Railway Company and the Miami Bridge Company wherein The Miami Beach Railway Company sought to use the Railroad Commission to help them win their law suit. It was contended that it was contrary to public policy and contrary to the law as enunciated by this Honorable Court that the Railroad Commission should intermeddle with private controversies and interfere with any public utility solely for the purpose of settling a dispute in which the public at large is not interested.

'In our pleas we pointed out that there was a public bridge, built and maintained at public expense, immediately south of the Venetian Causeway, and two public bridges immediately north of it. No person was compelled to use the bridge owned by the Miami Bridge Company; the rights of the public were in no way jeopardized by any rate that might have been fixed by the Miami Bridge Company; that the pleadings show that no person ever objected to the rates made by the Miami Bridge Company save and except The Miami Beach Railway Company, which filed its petition with the Railroad Commission.'

On May 18, 1944 the Railroad Commission, by appropriate order entered, sustained on various grounds and for different reasons motions to strike directed to pleas 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5, respectively, of the Miami Bridge Company and therein fixed a date of hearing of the parties and counsel on August 1, 1944. A petition for rehearing was filed and the same denied by the Railroad Commission under date of June 10, 1944. On petition for certiorari presented by the Miami Bridge Company we are requested to quash these orders, although a final judgment has not been entered by the State Railroad Commission. See Section 350.64, Fla.Stats.1941,...