Miami Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Orange-Crush Co.
| Decision Date | 07 June 1923 |
| Docket Number | 281. |
| Citation | 291 F. 102 |
| Parties | MIAMI COCA-COLA BOTTLING CO. v. ORANGE-CRUSH CO. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of Florida |
Lilburn R. Railey, of Miami, Fla., for complainant.
Kay Adams & Ragland, of Jacksonville, Fla., for defendant.
The complainant claims an exclusive and perpetual right and franchise to manufacture, bottle and sell Ward's orange crush in Dade and Broward counties by virtue of a certain contract or grant made February 4, 1922, by the defendant copy of which is attached to the bill of complaint; that such right has been violated by defendant by declaring said right and franchise at an end, refusing to furnish concentrate from which such orange crush is manufactured; that complainant has complied with all the covenants to be kept by it; and that defendant contemplates entering into a contract with other persons to manufacture, bottle, and sell the product in the said counties. It then prays for an injunction, prohibitive and mandatory. The defendant moves to dismiss on several grounds; the third, fourth, and fifth grounds that there is no mutuality in the contract upon which the claim is based.
The instrument purports to convey a perpetual franchise to the complainant within the counties of Dade and Broward, upon the proviso that the bottler (the complainant) may upon giving written notice to the grantor (the defendant) cancel the franchise at any time desired. The grantor (the defendant) can cancel only in case any of the terms of the franchise are violated by the bottler (the complainant) upon written notice. It is this difference in the rights of the parties to cancellation which destroys the mutuality of the contract on which is based the contention of the defendant.
I understand the law to be, where the consideration for a promise of one party is the promise of the other, there must be absolute mutuality of engagement, so that each party has the right to hold the other party to a positive agreement. In other words, both parties must be bound or neither will be. Apply this principle to the instant case, where the complainant had the right to terminate the agency conferred by the contract at any time by a written notice, and there can be no doubt that the contract is wanting in mutuality as to remedies. Granting for the sake of argument that the present contract is of the class in which injunction would be issued, if each party could have the remedy, yet...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Feldkamp v. Partners
...See Contractpoint Fla. Parks, LLC v. State of Florida, 958 So.2d 1035, 1036 (Fla. 1st DCA 2007) (citing Miami Coca–Cola Bottling Co. v. Orange–Crush Co., 291 F. 102 (S.D.Fla.1923), aff'd, 296 F. 693 (5th Cir.1924)); See also Johnson Enters. of Jacksonville, Inc. v. FPL Grp., Inc., 162 F.3d ......
-
Handi-Van, Inc. v. Broward Cnty.
...of engagement, so that each party has the right to hold the other party to a positive agreement.” Miami Coca–Cola Bottling Co. v. Orange–Crush Co., 291 F. 102, 103 (S.D.Fla.1923), aff'd,296 F. 693 (5th Cir.1924). However, “where there is any other consideration for the contract, mutuality o......
-
Daniels v. Brown Shoe Co.
...vol. V, §§ 2190, 2191; Electric M. & E. Corp. v. United P. & L. Corp. (C. C. A.) 19 F.(2d) 311, 313, 314; Miami Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Orange-Crush Co. (D. C.) 291 F. 102, affirmed (C. C. A.) 296 F. 693; Hutchinson Gas & Fuel Co. v. Wichita Nat. Gas. Co. (C. C. A.) 267 F. 35, 39. The cas......
-
Young v. Johnston
...to fulfill its obligations under the contract, there is no valid contract and neither side may be bound. Miami Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Orange-Crush Co., 291 F. 102 (D.Fla.1923), affirmed, 296 F. 693 (5th Pan-Am Tobacco Corporation, d/b/a Pan-Am Vend-tronics v. Department of Corrections, 4......