Miami Nat. Bank v. Willens

• Decision Date: 08 January 1963
• Citation: 190 A.2d 438,410 Pa. 505
• Parties: MIAMI NATIONAL BANK, a National Banking Association, Appellant, v. Paul M. WILLENS and Arthur F. Willens.
• Court: Pennsylvania Supreme Court

Page 438

190 A.2d 438

410 Pa. 505

MIAMI NATIONAL BANK, a National Banking Association, Appellant, v. Paul M. WILLENS and Arthur F. Willens.

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

Jan. 8, 1963.

Rehearing Denied May 3, 1963.

Maurice Freedman, Robert H. Arronson, Herbert H. Hadra, Philadelphia, for appellant.

Joseph Skale, Philadelphia, for appellee.

Before BELL, C. J., and MUSMANNO, JONES, COHEN, KEIM, EAGEN, and O'BRIEN, JJ.

COHEN, Justice.

Defendant-appellees, Paul M. Willens and Arthur F. Willens, both residents of Florida, were president and secretary respectively of Peninsular Fiber Glass Products, Inc. On or before August 21, 1959, appellees acting both in their capacity as officers of the corporation and as individuals, made and delivered a $7,000 note to the plaintiff-appellant, Miami National Bank. At the time of this transaction each appellee owned a one-quarter fee simple interest in a property located in Philadelphia. On December 17, 1959, appellees transferred without consideration their respective interests in the property to themselves and their wives as tenants by the entireties. After four monthly payments, the last one being on December 18, 1959, they defaulted on the note. Thereafter, appellant obtained a Florida judgment ¹ against appellees and subsequently instituted a complaint in assumpsit with foreign attachment of the Philadelphia property.

In its complaint appellant avers that appellees conveyed the Philadelphia property with the intent to hinder, delay, and defraud creditors, that this transfer is a fraudulent conveyance under the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act, and that the property is therefore still subject to attachment. The answer filed by appellees specifically denies these allegations. Appellant's motion for judgment on the pleadings was denied by the court below and an appeal was taken to this Court.

In order for a judgment on the pleadings to be granted, all relevant and material averments of fact made by the opposing party must be taken as true. London v. Kingsley, 368 Pa. 109, 81 A.2d 870 (1951). In the instant case, appellees' denial of any intent to hinder, delay, or defraud creditors squarely raises an issue for trial in the absence of any conclusive presumption to the contrary.

Under section 7 of the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act, a conveyance is fraudulent regardless of insolvency when it is made 'with actual intent * * * to hinder, delay, or defraud either present or future creditors.' Act of May 21, 1921, P.L. 1045, No. 379, § 7, 39 P.S. § 357. Our cases have established the principle 'that as between husband and wife fraud is presumptively present when the conveyance is for a nominal consideration and is challenged by creditors', and this rule of law has been held to apply to conveyances covered by section 7 of the foregoing Act. Queen-Favorite Bldg. & Loan Ass'n. v. Burstein, 310 Pa. 219, 222, 165 A. 13, 15 (1933).

In support of its motion for judgment on the pleadings, appellant cites a long string of cases for the proposition 'that a conveyance to a wife without consideration is actual fraud as a matter of law.' Thus, it is appellant's position that the transaction in question must be conclusively presumed fraudulent. The cases cited by appellant do not stand for this proposition. Instead, they hold that such conveyances are only prima facie fraudulent and that such presumption is rebuttable by clear and satisfactory evidence showing that the transaction was made in good faith. E. g., Queen-Favorite Bldg. & Loan Assn. v....