Miami Nation of Indians of Indiana, Inc. v. Babbitt

• Decision Date: 24 April 1995
• Docket Number: No. 3:92-CV-586RM.,3:92-CV-586RM.
• Citation: 887 F. Supp. 1158
• Parties: MIAMI NATION OF INDIANS OF INDIANA, INC., et al., Plaintiffs, v. Bruce BABBITT, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Indiana

887 F. Supp. 1158

MIAMI NATION OF INDIANS OF INDIANA, INC., et al., Plaintiffs, v. Bruce BABBITT, et al., Defendants.

No. 3:92-CV-586RM.

United States District Court, N.D.Indiana, South Bend Division.

April 24, 1995.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Arlinda F. Locklear, Jefferson, MD, Richard Dauphinais, Native American Rights Fund, Washington, DC, David L. Kiley, Sr., Albert C. Harker, Kiley Osborn Kiley Harker Rogers Michael and Certain, Marion, IN, for Miami Nation of Indians of Indiana, Inc. Arlinda F. Locklear, Jefferson, MD, Richard Dauphinais, Native American Rights Fund, Washington, DC, Albert C. Harker, Kiley Osborn Kiley Harker Rogers Michael and Certain, Marion, IN, for Raymond White.

Kevin Meisner, Scott Keep, Dept. of Interior, Div. of Indian Affairs, R. Anthony Rogers, U.S. Dept. of Justice, Environmental & Natural Resources Div., General Litigation Section, Washington, DC, for Manuel Lujan, Jr., Dept. of Interior, Bureau of Indian Affairs, Branch of Acknowledgment and Research, U.S.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

MILLER, District Judge.

This cause is before the court on the parties' separate motions for partial summary judgment, the plaintiffs' motion for a hearing on the motions for summary judgment, the plaintiffs' motion for an order directing the government to complete the administrative record ("motion to compel discovery"), and the defendants' motion to strike or deny the plaintiffs' motion to compel discovery. A hearing on the summary judgment motions is unnecessary in light of the parties' excellent briefs, and would only delay the motions' resolution. Accordingly, the plaintiffs' motion for a hearing is denied.

The issues before the court today do not address the eventual decision by the Secretary of the Interior not to acknowledge the Miamis as a tribe, but instead focus on the validity of the regulations under which that decision was made. In today's issues, the Miamis contend that the Secretary of the Interior exceeded his authority in issuing the regulations in 1978, that the regulations are invalid because they omit explanations and definitions and because (the Miamis believe) the Secretary acted arbitrarily and capriciously in adopting the regulations. The Miamis also argue that the regulations do not satisfy constitutional requirements of due process and equal protection. For the reasons that follow, the court disagrees with each of these arguments.

Again, this ruling does not decide whether the Secretary acted properly in refusing to acknowledge the Miamis as a tribe. In light of this decision that the regulations are valid, the court will turn to that issue in the weeks to come.

In addition to denying the plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment and granting the defendants' motion for summary judgment, the court also, for reasons set forth below, grants the defendants' motion to strike and orders the plaintiffs' motion to compel discovery stricken, without prejudice to refile exhibiting compliance with District Rule 37.1.

I.

The court presumes familiarity with the facts concerning this cause and with the court's prior orders, including Miami Nation v. Lujan, 832 F.Supp. 253 (N.D.Ind.1993), and therefore will repeat them only briefly here.

The Miami Indian tribe (the "Miamis") historically lived in the central and northern regions of Indiana. From 1795 to 1840, the Miamis entered into several treaties with the United States. As a result of one of those treaties, the Miamis split into two groups, with one group relocating to Kansas and the other remaining in Indiana. Generally, the United States interacted with the Indiana Miamis as covered under the United States' trust responsibilities. See, e.g., Miami Nation v. Lujan, 832 F.Supp. at 253-255 (discussing history of relations between the Miamis and the United States). In 1897, however, Assistant Attorney General Willis Van Devanter decided that the Indiana Miamis no longer were tribal Indians, and thus no longer were covered by the United States' trust responsibilities. See id. at 255. The Secretary of the Interior (the "Secretary") approved the decision and withdrew acknowledgment of the Indiana Miamis; the Department of the Interior (the "Department") has refused to acknowledge the Indiana Miamis as an Indian tribe since then.

Until 1978, the Department made its decisions whether to acknowledge an Indian tribe on a case-by-case basis. See 25 Fed.Reg. 39,361 (1978). In 1978, the Department promulgated regulations providing a procedure for acknowledging the existence of Indian tribes. See 25 C.F.R. Part 83 (1978)¹ (the "1978 regulations"). On March 25, 1980, the Miamis filed a petition for federal acknowledgment as an Indian tribe pursuant to these regulations. On July 19, 1990, the Assistant Secretary of the Interior published his proposed finding that the Miamis do not meet the political influence and community criteria of the acknowledgment regulations. 55 Fed. Reg. 29,423 (1990). On June 18, 1992, the Assistant Secretary published his final determination that the Miamis do not exist as an Indiana tribe and, therefore, are not entitled to a government-to-government relationship with the United States. 57 Fed.Reg. 27,312 (1992).

The Miamis then filed a four-count complaint in this court. Count 1 sought a ruling that the Secretary of the Interior's decision withdrawing federal recognition of the Indiana Miamis in 1897 was ultra vires; the court ruled that the applicable statute of limitations barred that claim. Miami Nation v. Lujan, 832 F.Supp. at 257. Count 4 of the complaint, which is not presently before the court, seeks review of the Department's application of the acknowledgement regulations to the Miamis.

Counts 2 and 3 of the complaint challenge the validity of the Department's 1978 regulations. In Count 2, the Miamis allege that the defendants exceeded their congressional authorization in issuing the regulations by allegedly imposing stricter requirements upon tribes seeking recognition after 1978 than those imposed before 1978. In Count 3, the Miamis allege that the regulations are invalid because they fail to define key terms or specify a burden of proof, because they provide no mechanism for independent review or administrative appeal, and because the regulations. treat Indian tribes recognized before 1978 differently than those petitioning for tribal status after 1978.

The parties have filed cross-motions for partial summary judgment with respect to Counts 2 and 3. The Miamis seek a declaration that the 1978 regulations (1) exceed the Department of the Interior's statutory authority; (2) are not in accordance with the law, are without rational basis, and are arbitrary and capricious; and (3) violate the due process and equal protection provisions of the Constitution. The defendants seek a ruling that the 1978 regulations (1) are within the Congressional authority of the Secretary of the Interior to have promulgated; (2) have been promulgated in accordance with law and are not arbitrary, capricious, or without rational basis; and (3) do not violate any provision of the United States Constitution.

A party seeking summary judgment must demonstrate that no genuine issue of fact exists for trial and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. If that showing is made and the motion's opponent would bear the burden at trial on the matter that forms the basis of the motion, the opponent must come forth with evidence to show what facts are in actual dispute. A genuine factual issue exists only when there is sufficient evidence for a jury to return a verdict for the motion's opponent. Summary judgment should be granted if no reasonable jury could return a verdict for the motion's opponent.

The parties cannot rest on mere allegations in the pleadings, or upon conclusory allegations in affidavits. The court must construe the facts as favorably to the non-moving party as the record will permit, and draw any permissible inferences from the materials before it in favor of the non-moving party, as long as the inferences are reasonable. The non-moving party must show that the disputed fact is material, or outcome-determinative, under applicable law.

Conery v. Bath Associates, 803 F.Supp. 1388, 1392-1393 (N.D.Ind.1992) (citations omitted).

Both parties agree that there is no material fact in genuine dispute, and that the issues presented in Counts 2 and 3 of the Miamis' complaint can be resolved completely on summary judgment.

II.

The Miamis first contend that the 1978 regulations exceed the authority of the Secretary of the Interior to regulate the acknowledgment of Indiana tribes and are thus ultra vires. The parties first dispute the appropriate level of deference to be given the Secretary's interpretation of his statutory authority to promulgate the 1978 regulations. The Miamis contend that the court owes no deference to the Secretary's interpretation of his authority, while the defendants contend that the court owes the Secretary's interpretation great deference.

A.

In Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-844, 104 S.Ct. 2778, 2781-2782, 81 L.Ed.2d 694 (1984), the Supreme Court stated:

When a court reviews an agency's construction of the statute which it administers, it is confronted with two questions. First, always, is the question whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue. If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter; for the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress. If, however, the court determines Congress has not directly addressed the precise question at issue, the court does not simply impose its own construction on the statute, as would be necessary in the absence of administrative interpretation. Rather, if the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the question for the court is whether the agency's answer is

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