Miami Shores Village v. Cowart
| Decision Date | 17 December 1958 |
| Citation | 108 So.2d 468 |
| Parties | MIAMI SHORES VILLAGE, a municipal corporation, Appellant, v. Faris N. COWART, Edwin L. Mason, John B. McLeod, Ralph Fossey, and CharlesHall, as members of and constituting the Board of County Commissioners of DadeCounty, Florida, Appellees. |
| Court | Florida Supreme Court |
E. L. Semple, Thomas H. Anderson and Anderson & Nadeau, Miami, for appellants.
Darry A. Davis, Miami, for appellees.
George S. Okell, Miami, for Dade County League of Municipalities.
This is another in a series of cases arising in Dade County since May 21, 1957, questioning the validity of various actions taken by the Board of County Commissioners of Dade County ('the Board' hereafter) under the purported authority of the Home Rule Charter adopted on that date by the voters of Dade County. See Dade County v. Kelly, Fla.1958, 99 So.2d 856; Chase v. Cowart, Fla.1958, 102 So.2d 147; Dade County v. Young Democratic Club of Dade County, Fla.1958, 104 So.2d 636. Under these decisions it is settled that the Charter and the ordinances adopted thereunder 'must be consistent with and must do no violence to the provisions of Article VIII, Section 11, Florida Constitution, pursuant to which the charter is adopted.' Dade County v. Dade County League of Municipalities, Fla.1958, 104 So.2d 512, 516.
The instant suit for a declaratory decree instituted by the appellant, Miami Shores Village, against the appellees, as members of the Board, appears to have been sparked by the Board's adoption of an ordinance establishing a master plan for the control of traffic in both the unincorporated and the incorporated areas of Dade County. The ordinance, known as the Metropolitan Traffic Code, expressly nullified and superseded the traffic ordinances of the municipalities in Dade County and provided that violations of the Code should be tried only in the Metropolitan Court of Dade County.
The issues made and decided in the instant suit were not, however, limited to the validity vel non of the Metropolitan Traffic Code. In addition to upholding the validity of the Code the Chancellor found and declared that the Dade County Home Rule Charter and county ordinances adopted thereunder 'shall in cases of conflict supersede all municipal charters and city ordinances, except in those instances where the charter of Dade County specifically provides otherwise.' The Chancellor also found and declared that § 1.01A(18) of the Home Rule Charter, providing the methods by which a municipality may transfer to the Board a municipal service or function, 'imposes no limitation or restriction upon the (Board) in the exercise of any of the powers enumerated in Section 1.01 of the Charter.' It is this decree that we review on this appeal.
Pertinent here are the following provisions of the so-called Home Rule Amendment to the Florida Constitution, § 11 of Art. VIII, F.S.A., adopted at the 1956 general election:
'(b) May grant full power and authority to the Board of County Commissioners of Dade County to pass ordinances relating to the affairs, property and government of Dade County and provide suitable penalties for the violation thereof; to levy and collect such taxes as may be authorized by general law and no other taxes, and to do everything necessary to carry on a central metropolitan government in Dade County.
'(d) May provide a method by which any and all of the functions or powers of any municipal corporation or other governmental unit in Dade County may be transferred to the Board of County Commissioners of Dade County.
(All emphasis above is supplied, and paragraph designations are as in Florida Statutes 1957, F.S.A.)
In Gray v. Golden, Fla.1956, 89 So.2d 785, 791, this court declined to sustain a decree of the lower court holding, inter alia, that the provisions of the Resolution proposing the Home Rule Amendment were so inconsistent, conflicting and contradictory as to invalidate the entire proposed amendment. In so doing this court said: 'Properly construed we think the proposed amendment defines a comprehensive plan for home rule in Dade County; we think its apparent conflicts may be reconciled within the confines of the proposed amendment.'
On this appeal it is contended on behalf of the appellant Village that the Home Rule Charter, as interpreted by the Board and by the Chancellor in the decree upholding such interpretation, instead of 'reconciling' such inconsistencies, has perpetuated them. It is suggested by amicus curiae, the Dade County League of Municipalities, that if full force and effect is given to § 1.01A(18) of the Charter, the appearent inconsistencies are resolved and a workable plan of metropolitan government emerges which, at the same time, preserves to the municipalities in the county the municipal autonomy guaranteed by § 11(1)(g) of the Home Rule Amendment, quoted above.
The appellees contend that the Home Rule Amendment, and the Charter adopted pursuant thereto by the electors of Dade County, were designed to and did establish a system of metropolitan government described by the Chancellor in his decree as follows:
When interpreted in the light of the purpose sought to be accomplished, we find no conflicts or inconsistencies among the several provisions of the Home Rule Amendment quoted above, nor in the Home Rule Charter adopted by the electors of Dade County pursuant to such constitutional authority. The Home Rule Amendment, § 11(1)(b), supra, authorized the Charter to 'grant full power and authority to the Board of County Commissioners of Dade County to pass ordinances relating to the affairs, property and government of Dade County * * * and to do everything necessary to carry on a central metropolitan government in Dade County.' This means that the Charter...
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...by the courts. State v. Butler, 70 Fla. 102, 69 So. 771 (1915); State v. Keller, 140 Fla. 346, 191 So. 542 (1939); Miami Shores Village v. Cowart, 108 So.2d 468 (Fla.1959); In Re Apportionment Law, Senate Joint Res.No.1305, 263 So.2d 797 (Fla.1973); City of Tampa v. Birdsong Motors, Inc., 2......
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