Micek v. Mayo Clinic

• Decision Date: 12 November 2021
• Docket Number: 21-CV-0436 (PJS/ECW)
• Parties: HEATHER MICEK and JASON MICEK, individually and on behalf of minors K.M.M. and K.N.M., Plaintiffs, v. MAYO CLINIC, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Minnesota

HEATHER MICEK and JASON MICEK, individually and on behalf of minors K.M.M. and K.N.M., Plaintiffs,
v.
MAYO CLINIC, Defendant.

No. 21-CV-0436 (PJS/ECW)

United States District Court, D. Minnesota

November 12, 2021

Elliot L. Olsen, SIEGEL BRILL, P.A.; Casey Matthiesen and Teresa F. McClain, ROBINS KAPLAN LLP, for plaintiffs.

John B. Casserly and Andrea P. Hoversten, GERAGHTY, O'LOUGHLIN & KENNEY, PA, for defendant.

ORDER

Patrick J. Schiltz, United States District Judge

Plaintiff Heather Micek gave birth to twin girls (K.M.M. and K.N.M.) in 2011. Both girls were born with permanent disabilities on account of a condition known as twin-to-twin transfusion syndrome (“TTTS”). Heather and her husband (Jason Micek) brought this medical-malpractice action on their own behalf and on behalf of their daughters, alleging that Heather's obstetrician failed to properly diagnose and treat her TTTS. But the Miceks (who are citizens of Wisconsin) have not sued either the obstetrician (who is also a citizen of Wisconsin) or the clinic that employed him (which is also a citizen of Wisconsin). Instead, the Miceks have sued only the clinic's parent company, defendant Mayo Clinic (“Mayo”) (which is a citizen of Minnesota). The

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Miceks allege that, because they are citizens of Wisconsin and Mayo is a citizen of Minnesota, this Court has diversity jurisdiction over this action.

This matter is before the Court on Mayo's motion to dismiss for failure to join an indispensable party and for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. ECF No. 12. For the reasons that follow, Mayo's motion is denied.

I. BACKGROUND

Heather became pregnant with twin girls in 2011 and began receiving prenatal care from Dr. James Walker in Menomonie, Wisconsin. Compl. ¶ 11; Walker Aff. ¶¶ 4-5. According to the Miceks, Dr. Walker negligently failed to diagnose and treat Heather's TTTS and, as a result, their daughters were born with permanent disabilities. Compl. ¶¶ 1, 33. Heather, Jason, their daughters, and Dr. Walker are all citizens of Wisconsin.

At the time that he was treating Heather, Dr. Walker was employed by Mayo Clinic Health System-Red Cedar, Inc. (“Red Cedar”). Walker Aff. ¶¶ 6-7. Red Cedar is a wholly owned subsidiary of Mayo and Mayo Clinic Health System-Northwest Wisconsin Region, Inc. (“NWWR”). Degen Aff. ¶ 6. NWWR, in turn, is a wholly owned subsidiary of Mayo. Degen Aff. ¶ 3. In January 2018, Red Cedar merged into NWWR. Alcott Aff. ¶ 4; Degen Aff. ¶ 4. Red Cedar and NWWR are incorporated and

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have their principal places of business in Wisconsin. Degen Aff. ¶¶ 2, 6. Mayo is incorporated and has its principal place of business in Minnesota. Alcott Aff. ¶ 2.

Dr. Walker maintains professional liability insurance and participates in the Wisconsin Injured Patients and Families Compensation Fund (“Fund”), which provides excess insurance to health-care providers under certain circumstances. Walker Aff. ¶¶ 9-11; Wis.Stat. § 655.27(1).

The Miceks have brought this federal lawsuit against Mayo alone. The Miceks have also filed a state-court action in Wisconsin against Dr. Walker and NWWR. ECF No. 36.

II. ANALYSIS

A. Standard of Review

Mayo has moved to dismiss this action under Rule 12(b)(7), which “permits dismissal of a complaint for failure to join a party under Rule 19 ....” Fort Yates Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 4 v. Murphy ex rel. C.M.B., 786 F.3d 662, 671 (8th Cir. 2015) (citation and quotation marks omitted). “For the purposes of a Rule 12(b)(7) motion, the court must accept the complaint's allegations as true, and may also consider matters outside the pleadings when determining whether Rule 19 requires [joinder of an absent party].” Omega Demolition Corp. v. Hays Grp., Inc., 306 F.R.D. 225, 227 (D. Minn. 2015). “The party seeking dismissal bears the burden of demonstrating that the complainant failed

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to join a necessary party to the lawsuit under Rule 19.” Wilwal v. Nielsen, 346 F.Supp.3d 1290, 1300 (D. Minn. 2018).

Mayo has also moved to dismiss this action for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1). Because Mayo makes a factual attack on this Court's jurisdiction, the Court need not accept the allegations in the complaint as true, but can instead receive evidence and make factual findings. Disability Support All. v. Heartwood Enters., LLC, 885 F.3d 543, 547 (8th Cir. 2018); Osborn v. United States, 918 F.2d 724, 729 n.6 (8th Cir. 1990).

B. Joinder

The Court turns first to joinder. According to Mayo, this lawsuit must be dismissed because Dr. Walker and NWWR-to which the Court will refer collectively as the “Wisconsin non-parties”-are indispensable parties under Rule 19, and their joinder is not feasible because it would destroy diversity jurisdiction.

Mayo's motion raises three questions. First, are the Wisconsin non-parties “required” under Rule 19(a)(1)? Second, if they are required, is joinder feasible? And third, if joinder is not feasible, should the action continue in their absence or should the action instead be dismissed under Rule 19(b)? See Monacelli v. Kemper Lesnik Hosp., Inc., No. 17-CV-4713 (WMW/LIB), 2018 WL 11219908, at *2 (D. Minn. July 13, 2018); Omega Demolition, 306 F.R.D. at 228; Fed.R.Civ.P. 19. “Determining whether an entity is an

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indispensable party is a highly-practical, fact-based endeavor.” Fort Yates, 786 F.3d at 671 (citation and quotation marks omitted).

To begin, then, the Court must determine if the Wisconsin non-parties are required parties under Rule 19(a)(1). A person is a required party if:

(A) in that person's absence, the court cannot accord complete relief among existing parties; or

(B) that person claims an interest relating to the subject of the action and is so situated that disposing of the action in the person's absence may:

(i) as a practical matter impair or impede the person's ability to protect the interest; or (ii) leave an existing party subject to a substantial risk of incurring double, multiple, or otherwise inconsistent obligations because of the interest.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 19(a)(1). The Court will first address Rule 19(a)(1)(A) and Rule 19(a)(1)(B)(ii), and then turn to Rule 19(a)(1)(B)(i).

1. Rule 19(a)(1)(A)

Rule 19(a)(1)(A) asks whether, in the absence of the Wisconsin non-parties, this Court can provide complete relief to the existing parties-that is, to the Miceks and Mayo. See Cedar Rapids Bank & Tr. Co. v. Mako One Corp., 919 F.3d 529, 534-35 (8th Cir. 2019) (“[T]he focus [of Rule 19(a)(1)] is on relief between the parties and not on the speculative possibility of further litigation between a party and an absent person.”

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(citation and quotation marks omitted)); Gwartz v. Jefferson Mem'l Hosp. Ass'n, 23 F.3d 1426, 1428 (8th Cir. 1994). The answer is clearly “yes.”

On the one hand, if the Miceks prevail, ^[1] the Court will enter (and Mayo will pay) a money judgment that will fully compensate the Miceks for their injuries.^[2] That is complete relief for the Miceks. On the other hand, if Mayo prevails, the Miceks will be

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barred (through the doctrine of claim preclusion) from suing Mayo again. That is complete relief for Mayo. No matter the outcome, then, the Court can accord complete relief to the existing parties.

2. Rule 19(a)(1)(B)(ii)

Rule 19(a)(1)(B)(ii) asks whether, in the absence of the Wisconsin non-parties, an existing party will incur “double, multiple, or otherwise inconsistent obligations.” The risk “of being subject to multiple or inconsistent obligations must be real, and not a mere possibility.” People for Ethical Treatment of Animals, Inc. v. Perdue, 464 F.Supp.3d 300, 315 (D.D.C. 2020) (citation and quotation marks omitted).

The risk of multiple or inconsistent obligations almost always arises when the absent party is a prospective plaintiff. In that circumstance, the defendant may be at risk of being sued multiple times and having multiple judgments entered against it. In this case, however, the Wisconsin non-parties are all prospective defendants. All of the prospective plaintiffs-Heather, Jason, and their two daughters-are parties, and thus there is no possibility that an absent party will later sue Mayo and cause it to “pay[] damages more than once.” Gwartz, 23 F.3d at 1430.

Mayo argues that if it loses this case, it may have to bring suits for contribution or indemnification, and such suits could result in inconsistent judgments. But Rule 19(a)(1)(B)(ii) contemplates inconsistent obligations, not inconsistent judgments, and

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those concepts are “distinct.” Am. Ins. Co. v. St. Jude Med., Inc., 597 F.Supp.2d 973, 978 (D. Minn. 2009); see also EEOC v. Cummins Power Generation Inc., 313 F.R.D. 93, 102-03 (D. Minn. 2015). An inconsistent obligation arises when a party cannot “comply with one court's order without breaching another court's order concerning the same incident.” St. Jude, 597 F.Supp.2d at 978 (citation and quotation marks omitted).

Inconsistent adjudications, “by contrast, occur when a defendant successfully defends a claim in one forum, yet loses on another claim...