Mich. Afscme Council 25 v. Woodhaven-brownstown Sch. Dist.

• Decision Date: 01 December 2010
• Docket Number: COA No. 299945.,Docket No. 141732.
• Citation: 790 N.W.2d 831
• Parties: MICHIGAN AFSCME COUNCIL 25 and its affiliated Local 3552, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. WOODHAVEN-BROWNSTOWN SCHOOL DISTRICT, Defendant-Appellee.
• Court: Michigan Supreme Court

790 N.W.2d 831

MICHIGAN AFSCME COUNCIL 25 and its affiliated Local 3552, Plaintiffs-Appellants,

v.WOODHAVEN-BROWNSTOWN SCHOOL DISTRICT, Defendant-Appellee.

Docket No. 141732.

COA No. 299945.

Supreme Court of Michigan.

Dec. 1, 2010.

Order

On order of the Court, the motion for immediate consideration is GRANTED. The application for leave to appeal the September 3, 2010 order of the Court of Appeals is considered and, pursuant to MCR 7.302(H)(1), in lieu of granting leave to appeal, we VACATE the order of the Court of Appeals and we REMAND this case to the Court of Appeals for expedited plenary consideration.

We do not retain jurisdiction.

MARILYN J. KELLY, C.J. (concurring).

I concur in the order vacating the Court of Appeals order and remanding the case to the Court of Appeals for expedited plenary consideration. I write separately in response to the dissenting statement.

Defendant school district faced a $4 million budget deficit and sought to negotiate with plaintiff, a union representing non-instructional school employees, to obtain concessions to remedy that deficit. When negotiations proved unsuccessful, defendant notified plaintiff that it would issue requests for proposals seeking bids from private contractors. Plaintiff filed an unfair labor practice charge with the Michigan Employment Relations Commission (MERC) claiming that it had not been given an opportunity to bid on an equal basis, as required by the Public Employee Relations Act (PERA), MCL 423.215(3)(f). That charge remains pending and is scheduled for a hearing on December 2, 2010.

Meanwhile, plaintiff also sought an injunction in circuit court prohibiting defendant from terminating its members' employment pending resolution of its charge that defendant violated PERA. The circuit court granted an injunction, concluding that (1) plaintiff was likely to succeed on the merits, (2) plaintiff had shown irreparable harm, and (3) the harm to plaintiff and its members outweighed the harm of an injunction to defendant.

Defendant filed an emergency application for leave to appeal and a motion for immediate consideration in the Court of Appeals. It claimed that the circuit court's injunction was costing it $4,360 per day, the difference between the winning bid and what defendant would have otherwise paid plaintiff under the collective bargaining agreement. The Court of Appeals reversed the circuit court's grant of injunctive relief in a peremptory order. It noted that plaintiff's members could be made whole by legal remedies and that plaintiff had not shown irreparable harm as required for injunctive relief. Judge Fort Hood issued a separate statement indicating that she would have offered the parties a full opportunity to be heard on the merits. Plaintiff subsequently filed an emergency application for leave to appeal in this Court.

Plaintiff argues that the Court of Appeals erred by reversing the circuit court's award of an injunction and that it failed to properly apply the abuse of discretion standard of review. It is obvious that the Court of Appeals gave short shrift to the complex facts and arguments of the parties. Absent a thorough opinion from the Court of Appeals, it is simply impossible for this Court to determine whether that court properly considered all of the relevant background information and evidence. Such consideration is especially important in a case involving the standard of proof necessary to obtain injunctive relief.

Furthermore, the Court of Appeals appears not to have properly applied the governing standard of review. The grant of an injunction is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. ¹ Such an abuse occurs when the trial court selects an outcome that is not within the range of reasonable and principled outcomes. ² The Court of Appeals peremptory order makes findings of fact where it should provide substantive review of the circuit court's findings. Moreover, its conclusory analysis cannot withstand appellate scrutiny.

Finally, plaintiff raises a persuasive argument in reliance on this Court's opinion in MSEA v. Dep't of Mental Health. ³ There, we opined that the loss of health insurance benefits may be adequate to show an irreparable harm sufficient to warrant injunctive relief. Although we questioned this statement in Pontiac Fire Fighters Union Local 376 v. City of Pontiac, ⁴ it remains persuasive authority and will so remain until the Court rules to the contrary. Additionally, the Court of Appeals failed to follow the mandate that an alleged injury must be evaluated in light of the totality of the circumstances. ⁵

In sum, the Court of Appeals applied an improper standard of review, made findings of fact and failed to adequately analyze the issues presented. Accordingly, I concur in the order vacating the Court of Appeals order and remanding the case for expedited plenary consideration.

CORRIGAN, J. (dissenting).

I would deny leave to appeal. The Court of Appeals correctly concluded that plaintiff has failed to establish an irreparable injury warranting a preliminary injunction. By vacating the Court of Appeals peremptory order and remanding for plenary consideration, the majority forces a financially struggling school district to incur ongoing costs of nearly $5,000 a day to pay for public employees that it cannot afford.

Facing a $4 million budget deficit, defendant Woodhaven-Brownstown School District sought to negotiate with plaintiff, a union representing non-instructional school employees, to obtain concessions to address the shortfall. When those negotiations failed, defendant notified plaintiff that it would seek bids from private contractors, as permitted under the Public Employee Relations Act, MCL 423.215(3)(f), and the collective bargaining agreement (CBA). Defendant invited plaintiff to submit a bid and eventually agreed to waive conditions that plaintiff claimed it could not meet, but plaintiff never submitted a bid. Defendant's school board then voted to award the contracts for transportation and custodial services to private companies, which was expected to save the school district over $5 million during the first three years.

Plaintiff filed an unfair labor practice charge with the Michigan Employment Relations Commission, arguing that it was not given an opportunity to bid on an equal basis. That charge remains pending and is scheduled for a hearing in December. Plaintiff also sought an injunction in circuit court to prohibit defendant from terminating its...