Mich. Dep't of State Police v. Mich. State Police Troopers Ass'n

Docket Number363241
Decision Date28 December 2023
PartiesMICHIGAN DEPARTMENT OF STATE POLICE, Plaintiff/Counterdefendant-Appellee, v. MICHIGAN STATE POLICE TROOPERS ASSOCIATION, Defendant/Counterplaintiff-Appellant.
CourtCourt of Appeal of Michigan — District of US

Ingham Circuit Court LC No. 22-000136-CZ

Before: GLEICHER, C.J., and JANSEN and RICK, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

Defendant/Counterplaintiff the Michigan State Police Troopers Association (MSPTA) appeals as of right an order denying their motion for summary disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(8) (failure to state a claim) and (C)(10) (no genuine issue of material fact), and to enforce an arbitration award that was previously entered in its favor, and granting a motion to vacate the arbitrator's opinion and award. We reverse and remand for entry of an order enforcing the arbitrator's award.

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

This case arises out of the arbitration of a grievance filed by the MSPTA, a labor union, on behalf of the grievant, a Michigan State Police trooper who was terminated after several male coworkers accused her of sexual assault. The events leading to her termination occurred at an MSPTA event. At the event, the grievant was intoxicated and allegedly "wedged her fingers into the anal crevice of a co-worker while he was walking next to his wife," which caused him to jump forward, at which point the grievant tried to grab his genitals. The grievant struck a second male coworker in the genitals, which was caught on surveillance video. She was also caught on surveillance video attempting to grab the anal crease and genitals of a third male coworker, and attempted to use physical manipulation tactics traditionally utilized "for purposes of gaining compliance from citizens" in order to do so. Further surveillance videos also allegedly captured the grievant grabbing the genitals of other male coworkers.

The grievant was suspended with pay pending an investigation. The investigation was in turn suspended because the Grand Traverse County Police initiated a criminal investigation into the incident. The grievant was ultimately charged with two counts of assault and battery and two counts of fourth-degree criminal sexual conduct (CSC-IV). Pursuant to the terms of a collective bargaining agreement (CBA), she was suspended without pay. She pleaded no contest to the two counts of assault and battery, in exchange for the dismissal of the two counts of CSC-IV. The grievant was sentenced to 30 days in jail, and released after 21 days.

Plaintiff/counterdefendant the Michigan Department of State Police (MSP), completed a full investigation of the incident after the grievant was sentenced. The grievant attended an administrative interview on the matter, and was afforded an opportunity to present evidence on her own behalf. The MSP ultimately determined that the grievant violated Sections 4.5 (individual deportment), 4.6 (obedience to law), and 4.25 (compliance with official orders) of the MSP Code of Conduct. The proposed punishment was termination. The grievant's employment was terminated in August 2021.

The MSPTA filed a grievance on the grievant's behalf, and an arbitration hearing was subsequently held. The arbitrator issued an award in February 2022. The arbitrator explained that the dispute between the parties essentially turned on whether termination was an appropriate sanction or whether the grievant should have been subjected to progressive discipline, including suspension without pay, before being terminated. The arbitrator did not believe Trooper Moryc's actions constituted CSC-IV, and observed that Trooper Moryc explained in her administrative interview that she was just playing a game with her coworkers. The arbitrator agreed with the MSP's conclusion that Trooper Moryc's actions violated the MSP Code of Conduct. But regardless, the arbitrator believed that there was not just cause for termination in this case. The arbitrator pointed out that the incident was fueled by the grievant's excessive intoxication, and noted that the MSP had not terminated other employees over offenses committed while drunk. The arbitrator concluded:

[W]hile discipline was appropriate, termination was too severe. It was one incident at a time when [the grievant] was highly intoxicated. It was not premeditated. She otherwise had a good record with no prior discipline. The conduct occurred off-duty, while she was not in uniform. It is my conclusion that considering the totality of the circumstances her conduct was not so serious as to require termination of employment. The parties' contract calls for progressive discipline when appropriate. It is my conclusion that progressive discipline is appropriate in this case.

The arbitrator ordered the grievant to be reinstated and that her punishment be reduced to an unpaid suspension. The arbitrator also ordered that she should be offered back pay from June 1, 2021, to her reinstatement.

The MSP subsequently filed a complaint against the MSPTA, arguing that the arbitrator exceeded the scope of her powers by requiring the MSP to reinstate the grievant's employment. The MSP explained that the arbitrator's award exceeded her authority because, according to the CBA, an arbitrator "shall not substitute his or her judgment for that of the Employer where the Employer is given discretion by the terms of the [CBA]." The MSP also argued that the award violated public policy, noting that MSP employees "are statutorily required to be of good moral character[.]" Thus, the MSP asked the trial court to vacate the award.

The MSP subsequently filed a motion to vacate the arbitrator's award. There, the MSP again argued that the arbitrator exceeded the scope of her powers by setting aside the MSP's decision to terminate her employment. The MSP contended that the CBA gave it the exclusive power to decide the proper punishment for violations of the MSP Code of Conduct, and that the arbitrator could only determine whether just cause existed for the MSP to exercise its disciplinary power. The MSP further argued that the arbitration award violated a well-defined and dominant public policy against sexual harassment in the workplace. It explained that allowing the grievant to continue working for the MSP in spite of committing sexual harassment would exempt MSP from this public policy. Accordingly, the MSP asked the trial court to vacate the arbitration award.

After the MSP filed its motion to vacate, the MSPTA filed a motion for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(8) and (C)(10), and to confirm and enforce the arbitration award. The MSPTA argued that the arbitrator did not exceed the scope of her powers by ordering the MSP to reinstate the grievant, nor was there any public policy rationale to support overturning the award. It also argued that the order was enforceable under the Uniform Arbitration Act (UAA), MCL 691.1681 et seq., noting that under MCL 691.1705(1), if a court confirms an arbitration award, "the court shall enter a judgment that conforms with the order." Further, contrary to the MSP's position, the MSPTA argued that the arbitrator had sole authority to determine whether there was just cause for terminating the grievant, noting that the CBA explicitly stated that "[t]he arbitrator shall have no authority except to pass upon . . . a claim of suspension, discharge, or demotion without just cause." For all of these reasons, the MSPTA asked the Court to grant its motion for summary disposition and motion to enforce the arbitrator's award.

The MSP filed an answer to the MSPTA's motion and again reiterated that the arbitrator exceeded the scope of her authority by reinstating the grievant's employment. The MSP further contended that forcing the organization to keep the grievant as an employee violated public policy. It asked the trial court to deny the MSPTA's motion for summary disposition and motion to enforce the arbitrator's award, and instead grant the MSP's motion to vacate the award. The MSPTA replied, contended that the MSP misrepresented the arbitrator's award and applicable caselaw, and asking again that the trial court enforce the terms of the award and grant its motion for summary disposition.

The trial court heard oral argument on the competing motions, and the parties largely argued consistent with their briefs. The trial court took the parties' arguments under advisement, and later issued its opinion and order vacating the arbitrator's award. According to the court,

Art. 9 § 6 [of the CBA] clearly and unambiguously states that the Arbitrator may not substitute her judgment for the Plaintiffs in areas where the CBA assigns discretion to the Plaintiff, and Art. 8 § 3(c) allows the Plaintiff in this case the clear and unambiguous discretion to determine that an employee who is guilty of rule violations be subject to suspension without pay or discharge. The determination of discipline is thus a discretionary action assigned to the Plaintiff by the plain language of the CBA. This reading of § 3(c) is not contrary to Art. 8 § 8 because those provisions may still come into play in cases where an arbitrator does not find that there is just cause to discipline for all charged violations under the Art. 8 procedures. In this case, however, the employee was found to have violated the Plaintiffs Code of Conduct. The Arbitrator agreed that the employee violated the Plaintiffs Code of Conduct. The Arbitrator agreed that there was just cause for discipline. Under Art. 8 § 3(c), discretion for determining the level of discipline after a finding of just cause remains with the Plaintiff.

The trial court declined to reach the issue of whether the arbitrator's ruling violated public policy. It thus denied the motions for summary disposition and for enforcement of the award, and granted the motion to...

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