Mich. Gun Owners, Inc. v. Ann Arbor Pub. Sch.
| Decision Date | 27 July 2018 |
| Docket Number | No. 155204,No. 155196,155196 |
| Parties | MICHIGAN GUN OWNERS, INC. and Ulysses Wong, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. ANN ARBOR PUBLIC SCHOOLS and Jeanice K. Swift, Defendants-Appellees. Michigan Open Carry Inc. and Kenneth Herman, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. Clio Area School District, Fletcher Spears III, and Katrina Mitchell, Defendants-Appellees. |
| Court | Michigan Supreme Court |
Makowski Legal Group, PLC (by James J. Makowski ) for plaintiffs in Docket No. 155196.
Collins & Blaha, PC , Farmington Hills, (by William J. Blaha and Julia M. Melkic), for defendants in Docket No. 155196.
Dean G. Greenblatt, PLC, Bloomfield Hills, (by Dean G. Greenblatt ), for plaintiffs in Docket No. 155204.
Giarmarco, Mullins & Horton, PC, Troy, (by Timothy J. Mullins ), for defendants in Docket No. 155204.
Joel Gerring, Okemos, for amici curiae, the Michigan Association of School Boards.
Shifman & Carlson, PC, Farmington Hills, (by Robert J. Gavin and Sean P. Murphy), for amici curiae, Life Skills Center of Pontiac and edtec central, LLC.
White Schneider PC, Okemos, (by Jeffrey S. Donahue and John A. Maise ), for amici curiae, the Michigan Education Association and the Michigan Parent Teacher Association.
Stephen K. Postema for amici curiae, the city of Ann Arbor.
Ferguson Widmayer PC, Ann Arbor, (by Mark A. Hopper ) and White & Case LLP (by Paul B. Carberry ) for amici curiae, the Brady Center to Prevent Gun Violence.
The Law Offices of Steven W. Dulan, PLC, East Lansing, (by Steven W. Dulan ), for amici curiae, the Michigan Coalition for Responsible Gun Owners.
Jacobs and Diemer, PC , Detroit, (by John P. Jacobs ), for amici curiae, the Negligence Section of the State Bar of Michigan.
Julian Davis Mortenson for Engage 18.
BEFORE THE ENTIRE BENCH
The defendants, the Ann Arbor and Clio school districts, each have a policy banning firearms on school property. The plaintiffs, advocacy organizations supporting gun ownership and certain parents of children who attend school in the defendant districts, believe state law preempts these policies by implication. While the Legislature plainly can preempt school districts from adopting policies like the ones at issue if it chooses to, it has not done so here: not only has our Legislature not preempted school districts' regulation of guns by implication, it has expressed its intent not to preempt such regulation. We therefore affirm the Court of Appeals.
The defendant school districts adopted policies prohibiting firearms on school property. Each policy contains an exception for individuals with a concealed pistol license (CPL). To be clear, in practice this means CPL holders can carry a concealed weapon on school property under certain limited conditions, but they cannot openly carry one.1
The plaintiffs filed these lawsuits, seeking a determination that state law preempts by implication the school districts' policies limiting firearms on school grounds. Each district moved for summary disposition. The plaintiffs filed cross-motions for summary disposition or for declaratory relief.
In the Ann Arbor case, the Washtenaw Circuit Court granted the defendants' motion for summary disposition and denied the plaintiffs' motion for summary disposition. In the Clio case, the Genesee Circuit Court denied the defendants' motion for summary disposition and granted declaratory relief to the plaintiffs. In published opinions issued the same day and by the same panel, the Court of Appeals affirmed the Washtenaw Circuit Court and reversed the Genesee Circuit Court. The Court of Appeals held that the districts' policies are not field-preempted, applying the analysis from our decision in People v. Llewellyn , 401 Mich. 314, 257 N.W.2d 902 (1977), and that the policies are not conflict-preempted because they do not conflict with any statute.
The plaintiffs appealed, arguing that the school districts are prohibited from adopting policies banning firearms (beyond those permitted by the concealed-weapon licensing exception) because the state has occupied the field of firearms regulation and that the Court of Appeals' decisions in these cases conflict with its opinion in Capital Area Dist. Library v. Mich. Open Carry, Inc. , 298 Mich. App. 220, 826 N.W.2d 736 (2012) ( CADL ). We directed oral argument on the application in each case and ordered that they be argued and submitted together and directed the parties to brief:
(1) whether, in light of MCL 123.1102, it is necessary to consider the factors set forth in People v. Llewellyn , 401 Mich. 314 (1977), in order to determine whether the school district's policies are preempted; (2) if so, whether the Court of Appeals properly analyzed the Llewellyn factors; and (3) whether the Court of Appeals correctly held that the school district's policies are not preempted. [ 501 Mich. 941, 904 N.W.2d 424 (2017).]
Whether the state has preempted a local regulation, which the state can do expressly or by implication—and in that latter case either because the local regulation directly conflicts with state law or because the state has occupied the entire field of regulation in a certain area—is a question of statutory interpretation that we review de novo. Detroit v. Ambassador Bridge Co. , 481 Mich. 29, 35, 748 N.W.2d 221 (2008) ; Ter Beek v. City of Wyoming , 495 Mich. 1, 8, 846 N.W.2d 531 (2014). That means that we review it independently, with no required deference to the trial court. Millar v. Constr. Code Auth. , 501 Mich. 233, 237, 912 N.W.2d 521 (2018).
The plaintiffs argue that the school districts' policies are preempted by implication. For good reason: There is no indication that any statute preempts the policies expressly. Accordingly, the sole argument in the plaintiffs' applications for leave to appeal in this Court, and their primary argument in their supplemental briefing, is that the districts' policies are field-preempted under our decision in Llewellyn . Field preemption applies if "the state statutory scheme pre-empts the ordinance by occupying the field of regulation which the municipality seeks to enter, to the exclusion of the ordinance, even where there is no direct conflict between the two schemes of regulation." Llewellyn , 401 Mich. at 322, 257 N.W.2d 902. Conflict preemption, by contrast, applies instead if "the ordinance is in direct conflict with the state statutory scheme," id ., such that conformity with both is not possible. The plaintiffs did not advance a conflict-preemption argument in their applications or at oral argument.
Under Llewellyn , a court begins the preemption analysis by determining whether state law "expressly provides that the state's authority to regulate in a specified area of the law is to be exclusive...." Id . at 323, 257 N.W.2d 902. As noted, there is no dispute that state law does not expressly preempt school districts' authority to regulate guns. Under MCL 123.1102, "[a] local unit of government shall not ... enact or enforce any ordinance or regulation pertaining to, or regulate in any other manner the ownership, registration, purchase, sale, transfer, transportation, or possession of pistols [or] other firearms ... except as otherwise provided by federal law or a law of this state." MCL 123.1101(b) then defines "local unit of government" in the act to mean "a city, village, township, or county." In other words, while MCL 123.1102 expressly preempts regulation of firearms by a city, village, township, or county, it does not apply to school districts, which are left out of the Legislature's list.2
The schools districts' policies are also not impliedly field-preempted. Courts are to consider these factors in determining whether the Legislature has impliedly occupied the field so as to preclude local regulation in a certain area:
The Court of Appeals analyzed these factors and determined that the policies were not field-preempted. But the school districts believe this step isn't needed. They contend that we should consider the exclusion of school districts from MCL 123.1101(b) as a definitive expression of the Legislature's intent not to occupy the field. They cite Judge GLEICHER 's partial dissenting opinion in CADL , 298 Mich. App. at 241-251, 826 N.W.2d 736 (advocating this approach). We agree.
In Llewellyn , no statute expressly stated the Legislature's intent to preempt local obscenity regulation, but we found that the state's comprehensive coverage of the field impliedly revealed the Legislature's intent to occupy the field. Llewellyn therefore addressed a different question than the one presented here. Here, an unambiguous statute shows a legislative intent not to occupy the field.
Requiring courts to turn to the Llewellyn factors to consider field preemption even when an unambiguous statute establishes legislative intent to regulate the subject matter only partially would be an internally contradictory exercise and contrary to this Court's general rules of statutory interpretation.3 The Legislature's partia...
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