Micha v. Sun Life Assurance of Can., Inc.

Decision Date22 August 2016
Docket NumberNo. 16-55053.,16-55053.
Citation874 F.3d 1052
Parties John Paul MICHA, M.D., an individual Plaintiff, v. SUN LIFE ASSURANCE OF CANADA, INC., a Delaware corporation, Defendant/Cross-Defendant/Appellee, Group Disability Benefits Plan For Gynecologic Oncology Associates Partners, Llc, a California limited liability company, Defendant/Cross-Claimant/Appellant.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit

Marc S. Schechter and Corey F. Schechter, Butterfield Schechter LLP, San Diego, California, for Defendant/Cross-Claimant/Appellant.

Michael B. Bernacchi and Keiko J. Kojima, Burke Williams & Sorensen LLP, Los Angeles, California, for Defendant/Cross-Defendant/Appellee.

Before: Michael R. Murphy,** Kim M. Wardlaw, and Marsha S. Berzon, Circuit Judges.

Concurrence by Judge Berzon

OPINION

MURPHY, Circuit Judge:

I. INTRODUCTION

This court generally employs the five-part test set out in Hummell v. S.E. Rykoff & Co. , 634 F.2d 446 (9th Cir. 1980), to determine the appropriateness of awarding or denying a 29 U.S.C. § 1132(g)(1) ERISA-based request for appellate attorney's fees.1 See Credit Managers Ass'n of S. Cal. v. Kennesaw Life & Accident Ins. Co. , 25 F.3d 743, 752 (9th Cir. 1994) ; Operating Eng'rs Pension Trusts v. B & E Backhoe, Inc. , 911 F.2d 1347, 1356–57 (9th Cir. 1990). The question presented here is whether in analyzing a party's request for appellate attorney's fees within the Hummell rubric, a court must consider the entire course of the litigation. The decision in Sokol v. Bernstein , 812 F.2d 559, 561 (9th Cir. 1987), compels an affirmative answer to that question. Accordingly, exercising jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, this court REVERSES the district court's denial of appellate attorney's fees and REMANDS the matter to the district court for calculation of a reasonable award of fees and costs.

II. BACKGROUND

In Micha v. Group Disability Benefits Plan , we affirmed a § 1132(g)(1) award of litigation attorney's fees in favor of Group Disability Benefits Plan ("Group Disability") for Gynecologic Oncology Associates Partners, LLC ("GOA"). 597 Fed.Appx. 905, 906–08 (9th Cir. 2014). Micha concluded (1) Group Disability achieved "some success on the merits"2 and (2) the district court did not abuse its discretion in concluding the five Hummell factors weighed in Group Disability's favor. Id. at 907 (quotations omitted). Micha specifically recognized that

[w]hen, in the course of the underlying litigation, the district court informed [Sun Life Assurance Company ("Sun Life") ] it had serious concerns regarding Sun Life's handling of [Dr. John] Micha's claim for disability benefits, Sun Life settled the suit. When it did so, Sun Life fully vindicated Group Disability's interests in the lawsuit.

Id.3

Micha emphasized that the fee award in Group Disability's favor was a "remnant of discarded precedent" and noted that because of a significant, intervening change in this court's case law, our unpublished disposition was "likely of no practical significance to anyone other than the parties on appeal." Id. at 906 n.1.4 Sun Life filed a Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, asserting the unpublished disposition in Micha would have wide-ranging repercussions.5 But see id. Sun Life's petition for certiorari claimed Micha would (1) increase litigation over fee awards and (2) expand the class of individuals entitled to an award of attorney's fees, not only with regard to ERISA but also through "similar attorney's fees claims being filed in federal courts outside of the ERISA context." Group Disability filed an opposition to the petition and the Supreme Court denied Sun Life's request for certiorari. ––– U.S. ––––, 135 S.Ct. 2894, 192 L.Ed.2d 926 (2015).

Seeking a § 1132(g)(1) award of appellate attorney's fees for prevailing in Micha , Group Disability filed a Motion to Transfer Consideration of Attorney Fees on Appeal to the District Court for Determination. See Ninth Cir. R. 39-1.8 ("Any party who is or may be eligible for attorneys fees on appeal to this Court may ... file a motion to transfer consideration of attorneys fees on appeal to the district court ... from which the appeal was taken."). The panel granted the motion and before the district court Group Disability asked that its request for appellate attorney's fees be resolved with the five-factor test set out in Hummell .6 The district court concluded that despite having achieved some success on the merits by prevailing on appeal, Group Disability was not entitled to appellate attorney's fees under the Hummell factors. The district court reasoned as follows: (1) Sun Life did not act in bad faith or with culpability as to the prior appeal because that appeal presented a novel issue (i.e., whether a nominal defendant could recover from a co-defendant based on the success of the plaintiff's case); (2) Sun Life's ability to pay an award was uncontested, but not determinative; (3) an award of fees would not deter future misconduct because (a) the prior appeal was not taken in bad faith and (b) Micha made clear the "facts of this case are unlikely to be repeated"; (4) the fourth factor, whether litigation provided a benefit to all plan participants or resolved a novel legal issue, was not implicated by Group Disability's fee request; and (5) the relative merits of the parties' positions on appeal favored Group Disability, but only slightly because Sun Life's prior appeal "was predicated upon fairly debatable legal arguments involving a novel ERISA issue."

As should be clear from this recitation of the district court's reasoning, in analyzing the Hummell factors, the district court focused exclusively on Sun Life's actions and arguments on appeal in Micha and refused to consider Sun Life's conduct in the underlying suit Micha brought for disability benefits.

III. ANALYSIS

A. Forfeited Bases to Reverse the District Court
1. Automatic–Entitlement Rule

Group Disability asserts we should adopt the Seventh Circuit's automatic-entitlement rule and, on that basis, reverse the district court's denial of appellate attorney's fees. See Bandak v. Eli Lilly & Co. Ret. Plan , 587 F.3d 798, 803 (7th Cir. 2009) ("[A]ffirmance entitles an appellee who has properly been awarded an attorney's fee in the district court to an attorney's fee for successfully defending the district court's judgment in the court of appeals. Otherwise the purpose of the initial award—to shift the cost of litigation to the losing party—would be imperfectly achieved." (quoting Sullivan v. William A. Randolph, Inc. , 504 F.3d 665, 672 (7th Cir. 2007) )). We decline to consider this issue because it was never raised in the district court. See Hillis v. Heineman , 626 F.3d 1014, 1019 (9th Cir. 2010).7

2. Prevailing-Party Presumption

Group Disability claims the district court erred when it failed to apply a prevailing-party presumption in resolving its entitlement to appellate attorney's fees. See United Steelworkers of Am. v. Ret. Income Plan for Hourly-Rated Emps. of ASARCO, Inc. , 512 F.3d 555, 564 (9th Cir. 2008) ("[A]s a general rule, the prevailing party on an ERISA claim is entitled to attorney's fees, unless special circumstances would render such an award unjust." (quotation omitted)). This issue was raised for the first time in Group Disability's motion for reconsideration. Citing this court's precedents, the district court refused to consider the issue. See Kona Enters., Inc. v. Estate of Bishop , 229 F.3d 877, 890 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding that a motion for reconsideration "may not be used to raise arguments or present evidence for first time when they could reasonably have been raised earlier in the litigation"). We review for abuse of discretion the denial of a motion for reconsideration. Smith v. Pac. Props. & Dev. Corp. , 358 F.3d 1097, 1100 (9th Cir. 2004). We perceive no abuse of discretion in the district court's refusal to consider an issue that could reasonably have been raised in Group Disability's original motion for appellate attorney's fees.8

B. Hummell 's Multi-Factor Test

Group Disability asserts the district court's analysis of the Hummell factors is infected with legal error and its denial of appellate attorney's fees is manifestly unreasonable. In particular, Group Disability asserts the district court's refusal to consider Sun Life's pre-appeal conduct improperly skewed its analysis of the Hummell factors in favor of Sun Life. An award of attorney's fees is reviewed for abuse of discretion, though "any elements of legal analysis and statutory interpretation which figure in the district court's decision are reviewable de novo ." Fabbrini v. City of Dunsmuir , 631 F.3d 1299, 1302 (9th Cir. 2011) (quotation omitted). Thus, in reviewing a district court's denial of ERISA attorney's fees, this court must reverse if the district court used incorrect legal standards to reach its findings. Hope v. Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers , 785 F.2d 826, 831 (9th Cir. 1986). Furthermore, this court will reverse a denial of fees if "it has a definite and firm conviction that the district court committed a clear error of judgment." United States v. Tucor Int'l, Inc. , 238 F.3d 1171, 1175 (9th Cir. 2001).

The district court erred when it refused to consider the full course of the litigation, specifically including Sun Life's pre-appeal conduct, in applying the Hummell factors to Group Disability's request for appellate attorney's fees.9 See Sokol , 812 F.2d at 561 ("First, the district court found that Bernstein had acted arbitrarily and capriciously and, thus, this appeal would not have arisen had it not been for his initial bad faith in handling the pension.").10 Weighing the five Hummell factors in light of all of Sun Life's conduct, from its wrongful denial of Micha's claim to its filing of a petition for a writ of certiorari, it is clear Group Disability is entitled to appellate attorney's fees.

1. Degree of Culpability or Bad Faith

This factor strongly favors an award of appellate fees and costs to...

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