Michael v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec.

• Docket Number: 1:21-cv-00395-SAB
• Decision Date: 31 August 2022
• Parties: STEPHANIE LYNN MICHAEL, Plaintiff, v. COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of California

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STEPHANIE LYNN MICHAEL, Plaintiff, v. COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY, Defendant.

No. 1:21-cv-00395-SAB

United States District Court, E.D. California

August 31, 2022

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF'S SOCIAL SECURITY APPEAL

(ECF NOS. 29, 30)

I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff Stephanie Lynn Michael (“Plaintiff”) seeks judicial review of a final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security (“Commissioner” or “Defendant”) denying her concurrently submitted applications for Social Security benefits pursuant to Title II and Title XVI of the Social Security Act. The matter is currently before the Court on the parties' briefs, which were submitted without oral argument, to Magistrate Judge Stanley A. Boone.^[1] For the reasons set forth below Plaintiff's appeal shall be denied.

II.

BACKGROUND^[2]

On April 22, 2017, Plaintiff concurrently filed applications for Social Security benefits under Title II and Supplemental Security Income (“SSI”) under Title XVI, alleging disability beginning April 1, 2016. (Admin. Rec. (“AR”) 271-79, collectively ECF Nos. 26-1 and 26-2.) The claims presently at issue allege disability based on fibromyalgia, degenerative disc disease of the cervical spine and lumbar spine with sciatica and radiculopathy, neuropathy, migraines/headaches, irritable bowel syndrome with diarrhea, bilateral optic nerve cupping, obesity, degenerative joint disease and bursitis of the left hip, obstructive sleep apnea, major depressive disorder and dysthymia, anxiety, borderline personality disorder, adjustment disorder and obsessive-compulsive disorder.^[3] (See AR 28 (citing AR 373-74) (Plaintiff's administrative hearing brief).) At the time Plaintiff's application was filed, Plaintiff was thirty-eight years old with a high school education and a diploma for pharmacy technician work from the Institute of Technology, and was able to communicate in English. (See AR 33, 53-55.)

Plaintiff's claims were initially denied on October 16, 2017, and denied upon reconsideration on January 19, 2018. (AR 202-08.) On October 28, 2019, Plaintiff, represented by attorney Malinda Davies, appeared via videoconference for an administrative hearing before Administrative Law Judge Cynthia K. Hale (the “ALJ”). (AR 78-102.) Vocational expert (“VE”) Daniel Best also testified at the hearing. On January 6, 2020, the ALJ issued a decision denying benefits. (AR 17-41.) On August 11, 2020, the Appeals Council denied Plaintiff's request for review, making the ALJ's decision the final decision of the Commissioner. (AR 611.)

Plaintiff initiated this action in federal court on March 11, 2021, and seeks judicial review of the denial of her application for benefits. (ECF No. 1.) The Commissioner lodged the operative administrative record on May 27, 2022. (ECF No. 26.) On July 7, 2022, Plaintiff filed an opening brief.^[4] (ECF No. 29.) On July 28, 2022, Defendant filed a brief in opposition. (ECF No. 30.) No reply brief was filed and the matter has been deemed submitted.

III. LEGAL STANDARD

A. The Disability Standard

To qualify for disability insurance benefits under the Social Security Act, the claimant must show that she is unable “to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment^[5] which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months.” 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A). The Social Security Regulations set out a five-step sequential evaluation process to be used in determining if a claimant is disabled. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520;^[6]Batson v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 359 F.3d 1190, 1194 (9th Cir. 2004). The five steps in the sequential evaluation in assessing whether the claimant is disabled are:

Step one: Is the claimant presently engaged in substantial gainful activity? If so, the claimant is not disabled. If not, proceed to step two.

Step two: Is the claimant's alleged impairment sufficiently severe to limit his or her ability to work? If so, proceed to step three. If not, the claimant is not disabled.

Step three: Does the claimant's impairment, or combination of impairments, meet or equal an impairment listed in 20 C.F.R., pt. 404, subpt. P, app. 1? If so, the claimant is disabled. If not, proceed to step four.

Step four: Does the claimant possess the residual functional capacity (“RFC”) to perform his or her past relevant work? If so, the claimant is not disabled. If not, proceed to step five.

Step five: Does the claimant's RFC, when considered with the claimant's age, education, and work experience, allow him or her to adjust to other work that exists in significant numbers in the national economy? If so, the claimant is not disabled. If not, the claimant is disabled.

Stout v. Comm'r, Soc. Sec. Admin., 454 F.3d 1050, 1052 (9th Cir. 2006). The burden of proof is on the claimant at steps one through four. Ford v. Saul, 950 F.3d 1141, 1148 (9th Cir. 2020). A claimant establishes a prima facie case of qualifying disability once she has carried the burden of proof from step one through step four.

Before making the step four determination, the ALJ first must determine the claimant's RFC. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(e); Nowden v. Berryhill, No. EDCV 17-00584-JEM, 2018 WL 1155971, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 2, 2018). The RFC is “the most [one] can still do despite [his] limitations” and represents an assessment “based on all the relevant evidence.” 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1545(a)(1), 416.945(a)(1). The RFC must consider all of the claimant's impairments, including those that are not severe. 20 C.F.R. §§ 416.920(e), 416.945(a)(2); Social Security Ruling (“SSR”) 96-8p, available at 1996 WL 374184 (Jul. 2, 1996).^[7] A determination of RFC is not a medical opinion, but a legal decision that is expressly reserved for the Commissioner. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(2) (RFC is not a medical opinion); 20 C.F.R. § 404.1546(c) (identifying the ALJ as responsible for determining RFC). “[I]t is the responsibility of the ALJ, not the claimant's physician, to determine residual functional capacity.” Vertigan v. Halter, 260 F.3d 1044, 1049 (9th Cir. 2001).

At step five, the burden shifts to the Commissioner, who must then show that there are a significant number of jobs in the national economy that the claimant can perform given her RFC, age, education, and work experience. 20 C.F.R. § 416.912(g); Lounsburry v. Barnhart, 468 F.3d 1111, 1114 (9th Cir. 2006). To do this, the ALJ can use either the Medical Vocational Guidelines (“grids”), or call a VE. See 20 C.F.R. § 404 Subpt. P, App. 2; Lounsburry, 468 F.3d at 1114; Osenbrock v. Apfel, 240 F.3d 1157, 1162 (9th Cir. 2001). “Throughout the five-step evaluation, the ALJ is responsible for determining credibility, resolving conflicts in medical testimony, and for resolving ambiguities.' ” Ford, 950 F.3d at 1149 (quoting Andrews v. Shalala, 53 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 1995)).

B. Standard of Review

Congress has provided that an individual may obtain judicial review of any final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security regarding entitlement to benefits. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). In determining whether to reverse an ALJ's decision, the Court reviews only those issues raised by the party challenging the decision. See Lewis v. Apfel, 236 F.3d 503, 517 n.13 (9th Cir. 2001). Further, the Court's review of the Commissioner's decision is a limited one; the Court must find the Commissioner's decision conclusive if it is supported by substantial evidence. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Biestek v. Berryhill, 139 S.Ct. 1148, 1153 (2019). “Substantial evidence is relevant evidence which, considering the record as a whole, a reasonable person might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Thomas v. Barnhart (Thomas), 278 F.3d 947, 954 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting Flaten v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., 44 F.3d 1453, 1457 (9th Cir. 1995)); see also Dickinson v. Zurko, 527 U.S. 150, 153 (1999) (comparing the substantial-evidence standard to the deferential clearly-erroneous standard). “[T]he threshold for such evidentiary sufficiency is not high.” Biestek, 139 S.Ct. at 1154. Rather, “[substantial evidence means more than a scintilla, but less than a preponderance; it is an extremely deferential standard.” Thomas v. CalPortland Co. (CalPortland), 993 F.3d 1204, 1208 (9th Cir. 2021) (internal quotations and citations omitted); see also Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 1279 (9th Cir. 1996). Even if the ALJ has erred, the Court may not reverse the ALJ's decision where the error is harmless. Stout, 454 F.3d at 1055-56. Moreover, the burden of showing that an error is not harmless “normally falls upon the party attacking the agency's determination.” Shinseki v. Sanders, 556 U.S. 396, 409 (2009).

Finally, “a reviewing court must consider the entire record as a whole and may not affirm simply by isolating a specific quantum of supporting evidence.” Hill v. Astrue, 698 F.3d 1153, 1159 (9th Cir. 2012) (quoting Robbins v. Soc. Sec. Admin., 466 F.3d 880, 882 (9th Cir. 2006)). Nor may the Court affirm the ALJ on a ground upon which she did not rely; rather, the Court may review only the reasons stated by the ALJ in her decision. Orn v. Astrue, 495 F.3d 625, 630 (9th Cir. 2007); see also Connett v. Barnhart, 340 F.3d 871, 874 (9th Cir. 2003). Nonetheless, it is not this Court's function to second guess the ALJ's conclusions and substitute the Court's judgment for the ALJ's; rather, if the evidence “is susceptible to more than one rational interpretation, it is the ALJ's conclusion that must be upheld.” Ford, 950 F.3d at 1154 (quoting Burch v. Barnhart, 400 F.3d 676, 679 (9th Cir. 2005)).

IV. SUMMARY OF RELEVANT RECORD

A. Hearing Testimony

Plaintiff alleges she has chronic severe pain without activities, and that any activity...