Michael v. Smith, 2016–CA–00929–COA

• Decision Date: 09 January 2018
• Docket Number: NO. 2016–CA–00929–COA,2016–CA–00929–COA
• Citation: 237 So.3d 183
• Parties: Daniel W. MICHAEL, Appellant/Cross–Appellee v. Kellie Michelle SMITH, Appellee/Cross–Appellant
• Court: Mississippi Court of Appeals

237 So.3d 183

Daniel W. MICHAEL, Appellant/Cross–Appellee

v.Kellie Michelle SMITH, Appellee/Cross–Appellant

NO. 2016–CA–00929–COA

Court of Appeals of Mississippi.

January 9, 2018

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: SHAWN M. LOWREY

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE: BARRON CRUZ GRAY

EN BANC.

GRIFFIS, P.J., FOR THE COURT:

¶ 1. Daniel W. Michael appeals the chancellor's entry of a child-visitation schedule that set visitation every other weekend from Saturday through Sunday. Michael argues the chancellor erred by not granting standard visitation of Friday through Sunday, and by imposing on him all costs and travel associated with the visitation. Kelli Michelle Smith, the child's mother, cross-appeals and argues that because Michael's post-trial motion was untimely, the chancellor lacked jurisdiction to rule on the motion and his appeal should therefore be dismissed, as it stems from a void judgment.

¶ 2. We find Michael's appeal is properly before this Court and that the chancellor correctly imposed all costs and travel expenses on Michael, but abused his discretion in restricting visitation. Thus, we affirm in part, and reverse and remand in part.

FACTS

¶ 3. E.M.S.¹ was born to Michael and Smith in August 2013. Michael and Smith were never married. They lived in Laurel, Mississippi, at the time of E.M.S.'s birth. However, by the time this action commenced, Michael had moved to Louisiana. On March 11, 2015, Smith filed a petition in the Jones County Chancery Court to adjudicate paternity and establish custody, support, and visitation. Smith attached a DNA test, dated August 2013, that showed Michael is E.M.S.'s father.

¶ 4. On June 22, 2015, a temporary hearing was held on Smith's petition. The parties stipulated that Michael was E.M.S.'s father. On July 16, 2015, the chancellor entered a temporary order, granting Smith legal and physical custody of E.M.S. Michael was granted two-hour supervised visitations twice each week in Laurel. Smith was ordered to supervise the visitations while E.M.S. became acclimated with Michael. Michael was ordered to pay child support and the child's health insurance.

¶ 5. A trial was held on September 2, 2015, and a final judgment was entered on January 15, 2016. Smith was granted legal and physical custody of E.M.S., and a progressive visitation schedule was set for Michael. The chancellor found that due to the lack of bonding between Michael and E.M.S., Michael was to have visitation, supervised by Smith, beginning on November 28, 2015, on every second and fourth Saturday of each month at Smith's home or other place in Jones County designated by Smith from 10 a.m. to 12 p.m. Beginning on January 9, 2016, the visitation time was expanded from 10 a.m. until 5 p.m. on every second and fourth Saturday, and was to be unsupervised; but visitation was to occur in Jones County. Beginning on April 9, 2016, the visitation was to be unsupervised from 10 a.m. on Saturday until 5 p.m. on Sunday, every second and fourth weekend, in Jones County.

¶ 6. Additionally, Michael was ordered to pay an agreed-upon amount of child support and back child support. Michael was also ordered to pay certain child-care expenses and all of Smith's attorney's fees. All provisions of the temporary order not inconsistent with the final judgment were incorporated into the final judgment.

¶ 7. On January 25, 2016, ten days after the final judgment, Smith filed a Mississippi Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e) motion for reconsideration. Smith sought: (1) the imposition of a specific deadline for Michael to pay the back child support; and (2) a ruling on the payment of health insurance and medical expenses, which were addressed in the temporary order but not the final judgment.

¶ 8. On January 28, 2016, thirteen days after the final judgment, Michael filed a motion for relief from judgment under Mississippi Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(2) and (b)(6). Michael argued that the chancellor improperly restricted visitation and failed to set any holiday visitation. The motion states that counsel had mailed a Rule 59(e)"Motion to Alter or Amend" to the chancery clerk on January 21, 2016, but for "reasons beyond the knowledge of counsel," the motion was not received by the clerk.

¶ 9. Smith subsequently responded to Michael's motion for relief from judgment and argued that the motion failed to clearly state the relief sought and, thus, was not a proper Rule 60(b) motion. Smith claimed that Michael's motion was, on its face, a Rule 59(e) motion to alter or amend the judgment, which was required to be filed within ten days of the entry of the final judgment. Since the motion was filed thirteen days after the entry of the final judgment, Smith argued Michael's motion was time-barred.

¶ 10. On April 18, 2016, the chancellor held a hearing on the post-trial motions. At the outset of the hearing, Smith immediately moved to withdraw her motion for reconsideration, saying that all claims in the motion had been "worked out between the parties." Thus, the hearing proceeded only on Michael's motion for relief from judgment. The parties presented arguments on whether the motion was one under Rule 59 or 60, with the chancellor ultimately telling Michael to present both motions.

¶ 11. On April 20, 2016, the chancellor sent the parties a letter, stating that Michael's motion would be granted, "subject to [certain] provisions." The chancellor incorrectly stated that he believed Michael's post-trial motion—filed thirteen days after the entry of the final judgment—was a timely Rule 59(e) motion, since Mississippi Rule of Civil Procedure 6(e) allows three additional days to respond to documents served by mail.² As to the final judgment, the chancellor stated that, "[c]learly, [he] erred" when he "restricted [Michael's] visits to Jones County ... and failed to address other visitation to which [Michael] was entitled."

¶ 12. On May 27, 2016, the chancellor entered an amended judgment on the parties' post-trial motions. The chancellor denied Smith's Rule 59 motion as moot, since it had been withdrawn. Additionally, the chancellor granted Michael unsupervised visitation, not limited to Jones County, every other weekend from 10 a.m. on Saturday through 5 p.m. on Sunday, and set a standard holiday– and summer-visitation schedule. Michael was ordered to be responsible for the costs and transportation associated with visitation. All other portions of the final judgment not dealing with visitation remained in effect.

¶ 13. On June 22, 2016, Michael filed a notice of appeal. On appeal, Michael raises two issues: (1) the chancellor abused his discretion in ordering visitation from Saturday through Sunday rather than Friday through Sunday; and (2) the chancellor abused his discretion in ordering Michael to be responsible for all costs and travel for visitation. Additionally, Smith raises two issues on cross-appeal: (1) the chancellor lacked jurisdiction to rule on Michael's Rule 59(e) motion, as it was untimely; and (2) Michael's appeal should be dismissed, as it stems from a void judgment.

ANALYSIS

Smith's Cross–Appeal

¶ 14. We first address Smith's cross-appeal, as it questions the chancellor's jurisdiction to enter the amended judgment and attacks the validity of Michael's notice of appeal. Smith argues that the chancellor erroneously considered Michael's Rule 59(e) motion, and, consequently, the amended judgment is void, and this appeal should be dismissed. Smith's argument raises a question of law, which we review de novo. In re M.I. , 85 So.3d 856, 857 (¶ 6) (Miss. 2012).

¶ 15. "The Mississippi Rules of Civil Procedure provide two avenues to move the trial court to reconsider its judgment. The aggrieved party may (1) file a motion for a new trial or to alter or amend under Rule 59 or (2) file for a relief from a final judgment under Rule 60(b)." Loftin v. Jefferson Davis Cty. Sch. Dist. , 142 So.3d 1098, 1100 (¶ 5) (Miss. Ct. App. 2014). "The timing of the motion to reconsider determines whether it is a Rule 59 or Rule 60(b) motion." Id. A Rule 59(e) motion must be filed within ten days of the entry of the final judgment. M.R.C.P. 59(b). This deadline cannot be extended. M.R.C.P. 6(b). A motion to reconsider filed after the ten-day deadline is a Rule 60(b) motion. Motions filed under the reasons set out in Rule 60(b)(1)–(6) must be filed within a reasonable time, and for motions filed under subsections (1)–(3), within six months.

¶ 16. The record shows that although Michael attempted to file a Rule 59(e) motion, it was never received by the chancery clerk. When Michael discovered that his motion had not been filed, the ten-day deadline had passed, and Michael abandoned his attempt to seek relief under Rule 59(e). Instead, he filed a Rule 60(b) motion.

¶ 17. In support of her argument that the chancellor erroneously ruled on the untimely Rule 59(e) motion and not the Rule 60(b) motion, Smith cites the chancellor's letter to counsel sent after the post-trial-motions hearing, which states that the chancellor considered Michael's Rule 59(e) motion to be timely and well taken. However, this statement does not appear in the chancellor's amended judgment, nor was it otherwise incorporated into the amended judgment. Rather, the amended judgment states that the chancellor "reviewed [Michael's] post-trial motion"—without specifying which one—and "finds it well taken[.]"

¶ 18. The chancellor's statement in the letter and Smith's argument do not acknowledge that Michael's January 28, 2016 Rule 60(b) motion was the only post-trial motion that Michael actually filed. While the Rule 59(e) motion was attached to the Rule 60(b) motion, Michael acknowledged that the Rule 59(e) motion was never filed, and he did not move to extend the time for filing it, as the chancellor would not have been permitted to grant such relief. See M.R.C.P. 6(b) (stating that the time to file a Rule 59(e) motion may not be extended).

¶ 19. Michael's Rule 60(b) motion sought relief from judgment under subsections 60(b)(2) and (6). Rule 60(...