Michael v. Stanley

Decision Date15 March 1892
Citation23 A. 1094,75 Md. 464
PartiesMICHAEL v. STANLEY.
CourtMaryland Court of Appeals

Appeal from Baltimore court of common pleas.

Action by Henry Stanley by his next friend against William G Michael. Judgment for plaintiff. Defendant appeals. Reversed.

J Alex. Preston and Alex. Preston, for appellant.

H S. Cummings and W. T. McGuinn, for appellee.

ALVEY C.J.

Stanley the appellee in this case, brought this action against the appellant to recover for an injury alleged to have been suffered by reason of defective machinery at which he was required to work, in the saw-mill of the appellant. The accident occurred on the 18th of January, 1891, and at that time the plaintiff was 18 years of age, wanting 2 months. The defendant was the owner of a steam saw-mill, on the west side of Union dock, in the city of Baltimore, in which he operated four circular saws for the purpose of sawing up kindling and fire-wood, in proper lengths for use. Charles Moore was engineer and general superintendent, and Charles Collins, a young man of 19 years of age, was assistant engineer, and sawed wood and worked generally about the mill. The plaintiff, some time in September or October, 1890, was told by Collins he could get a job at the mill; and the plaintiff thereupon went to the mill, saw Moore, and the latter put the plaintiff to work handing up wood to be sawed. The plaintiff had never worked a circular saw, or worked in a saw-mill, before that time. That he was paid four dollars a week by the defendant, and that the regular sawyers received five and five and a half dollars a week. That he received no instructions in sawing, and continued to hand up the wood in the mill until December. According to the testimony, and there is no dispute upon the question, the operation of sawing a stick of wood into any given number of pieces is quite simple, and requires no special skill in the operator. The most is required is care to avoid allowing the hands being struck by the revolving saw. The stick is presented to the saw, and pressed to it by hand on each side of the saw, until the stick is cut in two, and this is repeated until the stick is cut into as many pieces as desired. On the occasion of the accident the plaintiff was directed by the superintendent, Moore, to go to saw No. 1, and operate it while the regular sawyer was engaged in attending to the boiler. This was near about 12 o'clock, at which time the hands went to dinner. In presenting or holding a stick of wood to the saw, the plaintiff's left hand came in contact with the revolving saw, and three of his fingers on the left hand were cut off. This occurred as he was sawing the last piece of wood that he had to saw.

The plaintiff was the principal witness to testify in support of his case. He says that he was not hired to saw, but to hand up or pile the wood; and that when he was directed to go to the saw to supply the place of the regular sawyer, who was engaged at the boiler, he objected, upon the ground that he was not paid the price of a regular sawyer; but that he went to the saw, because he was afraid that he would be discharged if he did not do as he was told to do. He says that the saw had two teeth broken out of it, and that it was dull, and that it was also cracked, and had a hole drilled in it to keep the crack from extending. He says, however, that neither the crack nor the hole had anything to do with producing the injury; but that the injury was produced by the defect in the saw in having the two teeth out, and because it was dull. He says the saw jumped where the teeth were out, and in that way his hand was caught. He admits that he knew perfectly well of the defects in the saw, as did the superintendent, and that he had said that he did not want to be put to work on that saw. He also admits that he had acted as sawyer in the mill some 10 or 15 times before the injury; and that upon one occasion, some two or three weeks after he entered the employment, he had his hand cut by one of the saws while sawing. He therefore not only had the opportunity of learning how to saw, by daily observation of the operation for months, but he had some practical personal experience in the operation itself, and a decided admonition of the danger attending the work, and of the necessity for care. On cross-examination of the plaintiff, he was asked whether he had not been told by a person present at the time, and just before the accident happened, that he was sawing too fast. To this the plaintiff answered by simply repeating the question; "That I was sawing too fast? Counsel: Yes. Answer by plaintiff: It was so near 12 o'clock that I kept on sawing. He got so much, he said, 'Hold on until I get this wood out.' I said, 'We have to shut down at 12 o'clock.' " The witness refused to testify that the wood was being sawed for him, and that he was taking it away as it was sawed, and that he hallooed to the plaintiff "to look out, and take his time, but that the plaintiff sawed on in his own way." The plaintiff's brother was employed in the mill at the time, in handing up the wood to be sawed, and, in giving his testimony for the plaintiff, he described the way in which the accident occurred, thus: "I was handing up the wood at the time, and he was sawing the wood in six pieces. Just as he was cutting the last piece, the saw being dull, he had to shove it too hard, and he cut his fingers. The saw kinder jumped out and cut his fingers on the last piece."

The foregoing are the material facts proved on the part of the plaintiff, and upon which the case was submitted to the jury upon certain instructions granted at the instance of the plaintiff. All the prayers for instructions on the part of the defendant were rejected; and among these was one to the effect that there was no evidence legally sufficient of any such negligence on the part of the defendant, in the discharge of his legal obligations to the plaintiff, as would entitle the plaintiff to recover in this action. We have examined all the testimony in this case with great care, and, in view of what would seem to be the well-settled legal doctrine applicable to cases like the present, we are clearly of opinion that there is no ground shown upon which the plaintiff can recover. And in...

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