Michael v. Stuber
Decision Date | 28 February 1920 |
Docket Number | 148-1919 |
Citation | 73 Pa.Super. 390 |
Parties | Michael v. Stuber, Appellant |
Court | Pennsylvania Superior Court |
Argued December 1, 1919 [Syllabus Matter] [Syllabus Matter] [Syllabus Matter] [Syllabus Matter] [Syllabus Matter] [Syllabus Matter] [Syllabus Matter] [Syllabus Matter]
Appeal by defendant, from judgment of C.P. Northampton County-1917, No. 59, on verdict for plaintiff in the case of Frank H. Michael v. Jennie M. Stuber.
Replevin to recover possession of an automobile. Before Stewart, P. J.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Superior Court.
Verdict for plaintiff for $ 760 and judgment thereon. Defendant appealed.
At the trial the defendant made the following offer:
The court below filed the following opinion dismissing the defendants motions for a new trial and for judgment non obstante veredicto.
These were motions for a new trial and for judgment non obstante veredicto. They were filed on January 24th last, in time, but the brief was not furnished until last week. Counsel must bear in mind section 193 of the Rules of Court provides that a brief in support of a motion shall be delivered to the trial judge not later than the second Monday after the trial. An intelligent discussion of the case can be secured when this rule is complied with as the matter is fresh in the mind of the judge immediately after the trial. When there is a delay of two months as in this case, it requires more than double the amount of time to get at the facts and the authorities. We will say, however, that in the present case our labor was made as light as possible by the excellent brief that has been furnished by the counsel for the defendant. We have carefully examined our charge and our rulings, and we do not think it is necessary to discuss all the reasons set forth in the motion for a new trial. We shall confine the discussion to the matters particularly insisted on in the brief. Two facts appear in this case; one, that the defendant has an automobile which she has not paid for, and the other, that either the plaintiff or the defendant is guilty of perjury. As to the latter proposition, there can be no dispute. The plaintiff came into court with a lease signed by the defendant. She and her family undertook to destroy the legal effect of the written paper by swearing that a fraud had been practiced upon her by the plaintiff. A jury decided that question in favor of the plaintiff. We are entirely satisfied with their verdict. They are the parties to pass upon that question, and not the court. The only significance of many of the authorities relied upon by the learned counsel for the defendant, such as El Dorado Jewelry Co. v Hopkins, 34 Pa.Super. 446; and El Dorado Jewelry Co. v. Hartung, 36 Pa.Super. 463, is that the question of fraud is for the jury, and that it should be submitted to the jury. The contention of the counsel for the defendant that we must submit the question as to whether she bought the automobile on May 8, 1917, or not to a jury, and all the considerations which he so strenuously argues, under the Sales Act of May, 1915, P. L. 543, are immaterial. In our charge to the jury, after referring to the negotiations between the parties, we said: We believe that statement to be absolutely correct. The confusion in the mind of the defendant's counsel results from the fact that he fails to distinguish between the law relating to sales and delivery of possession as between the parties, and that which governs when the rights of creditors attach. So far as the parties are concerned, the question of the possession of the automobile is governed entirely by their agreement. Where the rights of creditors are concerned, the retention of personal property by the vendor is fraudulent per se. The case of Clow v. Woods, 5 S. & R. 275, is illustrative of the law on that subject. It can be admitted that there was a sale to the defendant, but if the plaintiff's contention is believed by the jury, there is nothing in the law which prevents their converting the original sale into a leasing. In Goss Printing Press Co. v. Jordan, 171 Pa. 474, it was held: " The fact that the original intention of the parties is to make a sale, and that such is the legal effect of their first agreement, does not prevent a change while it is still executory into a bailment with an alternative of future conversion into a sale on the compliance with stipulated conditions." That doctrine was followed in National Cash Register Co. v. Shurber, 41 Pa.Super. 187. That there was a consideration for the lease clearly appears from the authorities. In McNish v. Reynolds, Lamberton & Co., 95 Pa. 483, it was held: " When, at the moment for the performance of a contract by one party both agree to a postponement the new contract is as valid as the old, and the mutual promises, the one to deliver and the other to accept and pay, are ample considerations to sustain the new contract." In Flegal v. Hoover et al., 156 Pa. 276, it was held: " The parties to a contract may at any time rescind it, either in whole or in part, by mutual consent, and the surrender of their mutual rights is sufficient consideration." In Dreifus, Block & Co. v. Salvago Co., 194 Pa. 475, it was held: " The mutual unexecuted undertakings of an existing contract are a sufficient consideration for the cancellation of such a contract and the substitution of a new one with different terms; and it is immaterial if, for a moment during the interval, there is technically a breach of the old agreement, since by the new agreement both parties treat the old one as an existing contract, and mutually agree to a rescission of it." It would have been clear error to have submitted the question to the jury whether the sale of May 8, 1917, was an absolute one or not. That was not the issue. The lease was admittedly signed by the defendant. The fact that there was no seal after her name is immaterial. The plaintiff was the lessor, and a seal was after his name. That is sufficient. The real issue in this case was that which was submitted to the jury at the time of the trial, to wit, was a fraud practiced upon her? She testified that she had not read the paper. What we charged the jury upon that subject is fully justified by Greenfield's Est., 14 Pa. 489, and other authorities. It is, however, contended that admitting that there was a question of fraud, we should have charged the jury that that question should be decided by them according to the weight of the evidence. The complaint is made: ...
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