Michaels v. Chappell
| Decision Date | 12 December 2014 |
| Docket Number | CASE NO. 04cv0122-JAH (JLB) |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of California |
| Parties | KURT MICHAELS, Petitioner, v. KEVIN CHAPPELL, Warden of California State Prison at San Quentin, Respondent. |
DEATH PENALTY CASE
(1) DENYING RESPONDENT'S REQUEST TO DISMISS CERTAIN CLAIMS ON THE BASIS OF STATE PROCEDURAL BARS;
On October 24, 2013, Petitioner filed a brief in support of the Group Three Claims (Claims 1, 19, 22, 24, 27-31, 45-53, 55-73, and 75 of the First Amended Petition). (Doc. No. 126.) On February 4, 2014, Respondent filed a brief in response, asserting that the claims at issue were either procedurally barred, not cognizable on federal habeas review, or did not entitle Petitioner to habeas relief under AEDPA, and requesting that the Court deny the First Amended Petition without evidentiary development. (Doc. No. 137.) On March 7, 2014, Petitioner filed a Reply. (Doc. No. 139.) The Court held oral arguments on November 12, 2014.
For the following reasons, and based on the arguments presented in the pleadings and at oral arguments, the Court DENIES Respondent's request to dismiss claims on the basis of procedural default, DENIES Petitioner's request for relief on the merits and DENIES an evidentiary hearing, discovery, or other evidentiary development on the Group Three Claims.
By an information filed on February 21, 1989, Petitioner Kurt Michaels was charged with the murder and robbery of JoAnn Clemons and burglary of her home during the early hours of October 2, 1988. Petitioner was convicted on June 6, 1990 of one count of first-degree murder (Cal. Penal Code § 187), one count of robbery (Cal. Penal Code § 211) and one count of burglary (Cal. Penal Code § 459). In addition, the jury found Petitioner guilty of four special circumstance allegations- murder for financial gain (Cal. Penal Code § 190.2(a)(1)), murder by lying in wait (Cal. Penal Code § 190.2(a)(15)), murder in the commission of a robbery (Cal. Penal Code § 190.2(a)(17)(i)), and murder in the commission of a burglary (Cal. Penal Code § 190.2(a)(17)(g)).
On June 21, 1990, the jury returned a sentence of death for the murder and six years imprisonment each for the robbery and burglary counts. The sentence on the enhancements was stayed. On July 31, 1990, the trial court denied Petitioner's motion for a new trial and motion to modify the sentence.
On automatic appeal (hereinafter "direct appeal") of his conviction and judgment to the California Supreme Court, Petitioner filed an opening brief on February 10, 1997. Petitioner also filed a reply brief on March 30, 1998 and a supplemental opening brief on June 21, 1999. The California Supreme Court affirmed the conviction and sentence on July 18, 2002. People v. Michaels, 28 Cal. 4th 486 (2002). On September 18, 2002, the California Supreme Court denied Petitioner's request for a rehearing, and on May 27, 2003, the Supreme Court of the United States denied his petition for a writ of certiorari.
On June 22, 1998, Petitioner filed a habeas petition with the California Supreme Court. Petitioner also filed a reply on April 12, 2001, and a supplemental reply on October 30, 2003. Petitioner was not granted an evidentiary hearing and his petition was denied on December 23, 2003.
On January 16, 2004, Petitioner filed a request with this Court for appointment of counsel andto stay the execution of his death sentence. This Court ordered the execution stayed on February 12, 2004, and appointed counsel on September 17, 2004. Thereafter, this Court approved a stipulation executed by the parties requiring Petitioner to file his federal habeas petition on or before August 16, 2005. On August 16, 2005, Petitioner filed his Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus with this Court, raising seventy-seven (77) claims for relief. After hearing and adjudicating issues of exhaustion and stay and abeyance, in an order dated September 27, 2006, the Court stayed the federal petition and held the case in abeyance pending the exhaustion of several claims.
On August 19, 2009, the California Supreme Court denied Petitioner's state exhaustion petition. On October 19, 2009, Petitioner filed his First Amended Petition ["FAP" or "Petition"] in this Court, the operative pleading in this action, raising the same 77 claims presented in the original Petition. (Doc. No. 71.) On January 19, 2010, Respondent filed an Answer. (Doc. No. 72.) On May 4, 2010, the Court issued an Order setting a briefing schedule for Groups One and Two of the claims contained in the federal petition. (Doc. No. 86.) After briefing and argument, the Court issued an Order on the Group One Claims on February 4, 2013, and an Order on the Group Two Claims on January 22, 2014. (Doc. Nos. 119, 135.) On October 24, 2013, Petitioner filed a brief ["Pet. Brief"] in support of the Group Three Claims, consisting of all of the claims not previously enumerated as part of either Group One or Two. (Doc. No. 126.) On February 4, 2014, Respondent filed a brief in Response [ ] to Petitioner's brief. (Doc. No. 137.) On March 7, 2014, Petitioner filed a Reply. (Doc. No. 139.)
The Court refers the parties to the statement of evidence issued by the California Supreme Court in Michaels, 28 Cal. 4th at 500-08. The California Supreme Court's factual findings are presumptively reasonable and entitled to deference in these proceedings. See Sumner v. Mata, 449 U.S. 539, 545-47 (1981). In order to provide a context for the discussion of Petitioner's habeas claims, the Court previously provided a summary of evidence presented during the guilt and penalty phases in the Group Two Order. (See Doc. No. 135 at 3-23.)
In his Answer, Respondent alleges multiple affirmative defenses to the claims and sub-claimscontained in the Group Three Claims. The Court addressed several of these defenses1 in the February 4, 2013 Order on the Group One Claims, will address several of the defenses2 in this section, and will address the remainder of the defenses3 in the merits discussion of each claim.
Generally, when a state court's rejection of a federal claim "rests on a state law ground that is independent of the federal question and adequate to support the judgment," a habeas petitioner has procedurally defaulted his claim. Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 729 (1991). To be adequate, the state procedural rule "must have been 'firmly established and regularly followed' by the time as of which it is to be applied." Fields v. Calderon, 125 F.3d 757, 760 (9th Cir. 1997), quoting Ford v. Georgia, 498 U.S. 411, 424 (1991). "For a state procedural rule to be 'independent,' the state law basis for the decision must not be interwoven with federal law." La Crosse v. Kernan, 244 F.3d 702, 704 (9th Cir. 2001), citing Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1040-41 (1983) and Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255, 265 (1989). If found to be both adequate and independent, "federal habeas review of the claims is barred unless the prisoner can demonstrate cause for the default and actual prejudice as a result of the alleged violation of federal law, or demonstrate that failure to consider the claims will result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice." Coleman, 501 U.S. at 750.
In the first state habeas petition, the California Supreme Court denied Group Three Claims 27 (raised as Claim XV) and 50 (raised as Claim XI) on the merits, and alternately denied those claims with citation to several state procedural bars. The state court held that "[t]o the extent it repeats an issue raised on appeal, claims [sic] XI is barred pursuant to In re Harris (1993) 5 Cal. 4th 813, 826 and In re Waltreus (1965) 62 Cal.2d 218, 225."4 (Lodgment No. 16.) The state court also held that "[t]o theextent that it raises an issue that could have been raised on appeal, but was not, claim XV is denied pursuant to In re Harris, supra, 5 Cal. 4th 813, 826 and In re Dixon (1953) 41 Cal.2d 756." (Id.)
In the second state habeas petition, filed for purposes of exhaustion, the state supreme court denied Group Three Claims 22, 30, 49 and 53 on the merits, and alternately denied those claims with citations to several state procedural bars. The California Supreme Court held that these claims were "separately and independently, denied as untimely (In re Robbins (1998) 18 Cal.4th 770; In re Clark (1993) 5 Cal.4th 750) and successive (In re Robbins, supra, at p. 788 fn. 9; In re Clark, supra, at pp. 767-768; In re Horowitz (1949) 33 Cal.2d 534, 546-547." (Lodgment No. 26.)
Additionally, the California Supreme Court stated that Claims 22, 30 and 53 were (Id.) The state supreme court also held that Claim 49 was (Id.) The state supreme court also concluded that to the extent Claim 53 alleged trial court error, it was (Id.)
As discussed in greater detail in the Group One and Group Two Orders, the Petition also contains a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel for failure to raise several claims in the prior proceedings, which could conceivably constitute cause for a procedural default, and prejudice, if the claims are found to have merit. Thus, even if each of the procedural bars at issue are found to be adequate and independent, a determination on whether cause and prejudice exists would require the Court to...
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