Michel v. Forde
Decision Date | 26 June 1963 |
Docket Number | No. 19654,No. 2,19654,2 |
Citation | 135 Ind.App. 360,191 N.E.2d 507 |
Parties | Faye MICHEL, Appellant, v. Ruth FORDE, Appellee |
Court | Indiana Appellate Court |
Harry L. Gause, Howard J. DeTrude, Jr., of Armstrong, Gause, Hudson & Kightlinger, Indianapolis, for appellant.
Earl C. Townsend, Jr., John F. Townsend, Townsend & Townsend, Indianapolis, Richard L. Lagrange, Franklin, for appellee.
This appeal comes to us from the Johnson Circuit Court from a judgment rendered on a jury verdict. The issues were formed by a third amended complaint for personal injuries growing out of an automobile collision with a building, and an answer in five paragraphs, under Rule 1-3.
Omitting the formal part, the complaint alleged:
'Comes now the plaintiff and for her cause of action alleges and says:
'1. That at all times mentioned herein New York Street was a paved public highway laid out in an east and west direction in Indianapolis, Marion County, Indiana.
'2. That at all times mentioned herein Sherman Drive was a paved public highway laid out in a north and south direction, intersecting said New York Street substantially at right angles at a point within Indianapolis, Marion County, Indiana.
'3. That on or about April 22, 1958, defendant employed plaintiff to sit with defendant in defendant's husband's 1956 Plymouth automobile while same was being driven by defendant.
'4. That defendant paid plaintiff the sum of Five Dollars ($5.00) per hour for said employment.
'5. That on said date at about 9:45 A. M. defendant operated said 1956 Plymouth automobile with plaintiff sitting in the front seat thereof in a southerly direction along said Sherman Drive and up to its intersection with New York Street.
'6. That at said time and place plaintiff was an employee of defendant acting within the course of her employment in that she was sitting in the car driven by defendant for the purpose of instilling confidence in defendant in her driving.
'7. That plaintiff was not assisting defendant in the operation of the said car.
'8. That when defendant arrived at said intersection defendant carelessly and negligently drove said automobile off of the highway and directly into the property located at 3816 East New York Street.
'9. That at said time and place defendant was careless and negligent in the operation of the vehicle which she was driving in the following respects, to-wit:
* * *
* * *
'WHEREFORE, Plaintiff asks for a jury trial and that she be awarded verdict and judgment against the defendant in the sum of One Hundred Thousand Dollars ($100,000.00), costs, and all other proper relief in the premises.'
The first paragraph of answer was an admission and denial; the second alleged contributory negligence; the third, assumed risk; the fourth, joint control of the vehicle in a joint venture; and the fifth, as follows:
'Comes now the defendant, and for her fifth paragraph of answer, alleges and says:
'That at the time of the collision referred to in plaintiff's complaint the plaintiff was an employee of one Edward Forler, doing business as Indiana Driving School, and at all times referred to in plaintiff's complaint was acting for and on behalf of said school and within the scope of her employment with the said school.
'That the defendant had contracted with the said Indiana Driving School to furnish her driving instructions and the plaintiff was at all times, and at the time of the collision referred to in plaintiff's complaint working for the said driving school, an employee thereof, and was instructing the defendant for and on behalf of said driving school and as its employee.
'That the plaintiff, as such employee, on or about October 30th, 1958 and prior thereto, was bound by and accepted the provisions of the Workmens Compensation Act of the State of Indiana, and having received the benefits of said Workmens Compensation Act and compensation thereunder for the injuries referred to in plaintiff's complaint is precluded from recovering in this action against this defendant.
'That plaintiff's claim for compensation was and is her exclusive remedy.
'WHEREFORE, defendant prays that the plaintiff take nothing by her complaint and for all other proper relief in the premises.'
Upon rendition of judgment for appellee, plaintiff below, on the verdict of the jury, appellant filed a motion for new trial which was overruled. The errors assigned in this court, and relied upon for reversal, include sustaining of the motion to strike out said paragraph of answer to the third amended complaint, and the overruling of the motion for new trial.
Appellee has questioned the sufficiency of appellant's brief but a careful study thereof leads us to conclude that there has been a good faith effort and substantial compliance with the rules of our Supreme Court as to its preparation; and we are able fully to understand the issues and points raised therein. Guthrie v. Blakely et al. (1956), 127 Ind.App. 119, 130 N.E.2d 62, 131 N.E.2d 357.
As revealed by the briefs, the significant facts disclose that appellee was a regular employee of Indiana Driving School and, as such, she was assigned to teach appellant how to drive, for which the said school was paid at the rate of five ($5.00) dollars per hour. After several one and two hours of lessons, appellant passed the examination and there was issued to her a driver's license; however, appellant continued to have a feeling of insecurity and lack of capability properly to drive, and particularly, her husband's automobile which had no driver trainer controls, and the employment was continued for further and additional instructions on April 21, 1958, and on April 22, 1958. This automobile was equipped with a standard, conventional transmission.
On April 22, 1958, when appellee was giving appellant a lesson, or was 'riding with her pupil', appellant drove east on 38th Street in the city of Indianapolis, thence south on Sherman Drive to the intersection with East New York Street, where she stopped to wait for traffic to clear that she might turn left to drive along East New York Street. It appears that appellant permitted the automobile which she then was driving to go too far to the south before she negotiated the turn.
In order to present the evidence concerning the collision itself and how it occurred, as well as to disclose the dominance of appellee, as an instructor, over appellant, this atatement extracted from appellant's brief, as testified to by appellee, follows:
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