Michels v. Weingartner, 68034
Decision Date | 10 December 1993 |
Docket Number | No. 68034,68034 |
Citation | 864 P.2d 1189,254 Kan. 44 |
Parties | Lea Ann MICHELS, Appellee, v. Stephen Fred WEINGARTNER, Appellant. |
Court | Kansas Supreme Court |
Syllabus by the Court
1. In Kansas, child support payments vest as they accrue because they become final judgments on the dates they become due and unpaid.
2. Absent fraud or other judicially cognizable and harmful circumstances in the procurement of a child support order, a court is without authority to modify or cancel a birth parent's past due child support payments which became due and unpaid prior to the adoption of the child or children by the adoptive parent or parents.
W. Irving Shaw, of Law Offices of W. Irving Shaw, Emporia, argued the cause and was on the brief, for appellant.
Larry J. Putnam, of Patton, Davis & Putnam, P.A., Emporia, argued the cause and was on the brief, for appellee.
Stephen Fred Weingartner appeals from the district court's decision that child support payments which had become due and payable to his former wife, Lea Ann Michels, before her current husband adopted the child were not canceled as a result of the adoption. The Court of Appeals affirmed the district court in Michels v. Weingartner, 18 Kan.App.2d 168, 848 P.2d 1010 (1993). Weingartner's petition for review was granted by this court.
On September 30, 1977, Lea Ann Michels was granted a divorce from Stephen Fred Weingartner in case No. D-166-77 in the district court of Lyon County. Michels was given custody of their one-year-old son, Stephen Ronald Weingartner. Weingartner was ordered to pay $150 per month "as support for the minor child of the parties."
The adoption was granted and a decree of adoption was filed in the district court on May 29, 1990.
Weingartner concedes that since June 1986 he has made no regular payments and only one incidental payment of $50 to Michels for child support. Michels claims that the arrearage totals $6,400, and she seeks that amount plus interest.
In October 1991, Lea Ann Michels filed in case No. D-166-77 a Motion for Judgment and Order to Examine Defendant, Stephen Weingartner. At that time she sought judgment against him for one-half the medical expenses incurred for the boy from September 1986 through February 1990. When Michels filed a notice of hearing of the motion, she included "the determination [of] delinquent child support" as a subject for the proceeding.
Following the hearing, the district court judge signed a journal entry, which was filed on April 1, 1992. With regard to delinquent child support, the district court took "judicial notice of the adoption case file numbered 90-A-06" and concluded that "[t]he child support judgments accruing prior to the date of the adoption are enforceable."
The district court also stated that it rejected Weingartner's estoppel theory. His estoppel theory, in a nutshell, is:
Weingartner appeals, asserting that a natural parent whose parental rights and obligations are terminated by the adoption of that child is relieved of the obligation to make child support payments that accrued before the adoption. He contends that the boy's adoption by Greg Michels severed his parental rights and relieved him of all duties and obligations to the child. He relied on State ex rel. Secretary of SRS v. Clear, 248 Kan. 109, 804 P.2d 961 (1991), for support of his contention before the district court and the Court of Appeals.
The Court of Appeals discussed Clear and quoted it for the principle that the severance of parental rights relieves duties and obligations. 18 Kan.App.2d at 170-71, 848 P.2d 1010. Following its discussion of Clear, the Court of Appeals expressly embraced the rationale of Hopkins v. Yarbrough, 168 W.Va. 480, 284 S.E.2d 907 (1981). 18 Kan.App.2d at 172, 848 P.2d 1010.
In Clear, the mother, Barbara Clear, was divorced from Steven Clear in 1978, and she was awarded custody of their children. He was ordered to pay $200 per month for child support, but paid only $50 between 1978 and 1986. In 1986 the children were determined to be children in need of care and were placed in the custody of their grandmother, who received AFDC payments as a result. "In January of 1989, SRS filed a petition pursuant to K.S.A. 39-755 seeking reimbursement from Barbara Clear for the money paid to [the grandmother] in AFDC payments since 1986." 248 Kan. at 111. At the hearing in April 1989, the district court found that "under K.S.A.1989 Supp. 39-718b, Clear owed SRS $3,904 for unreimbursed assistance paid to the maternal grandmother by SRS for the support of the minor children since 1986." 248 Kan. at 111, 804 P.2d 961.
Also at the hearing, Clear executed a written consent form to relinquish and surrender her children to SRS. The district court granted her request to relinquish her parental rights. 248 Kan. at 111, 804 P.2d 961. At the hearing "SRS did not object to the district court's granting Clear's voluntary relinquishment of her parental rights, but only objected to the district court's finding that, after a voluntary relinquishment of her parental rights, Clear was not liable to reimburse SRS for any assistance expended on the children after the relinquishment." (Emphasis added.) 248 Kan. at 111-12, 804 P.2d 961.
SRS's position was that despite relinquishment of parental rights, as long as SRS was obligated to support the children, the parent would be obligated as well. 248 Kan. at 112, 804 P.2d 961. It was SRS's advocacy of an obligation which would continue after the relinquishment which was at issue and which the district court and this court rejected. The Court of Appeals did not distinguish Clear, nor did it find Clear to be controlling. Instead, it seems either to have been uncertain of the scope of Clear or to have rejected what it believed the rule of Clear to be in favor of the rule of the foreign cases. The uncertainty apparently was based on the following language quoted by the Court of Appeals:
" 'Our adoption statutes contemplate a complete severance of the child's ties and relationship with his or her natural parents. The natural parent is relieved of all duties and obligations to the child....
....
" '... A person who has relinquished parental rights through adoption, a voluntary termination of parental rights, or an involuntary severance of parental rights is no longer a parent. These statutory procedures contemplate a complete severance of the child's ties and relationship with his or her natural parents. The parent whose rights have been severed is relieved of all duties and obligations to the child.
" 18 Kan.App.2d at 171, 848 P.2d 1010.
The emphasis added by the Court of Appeals seems to suggest that the Court of Appeals believed that the relinquishment extinguished Clear's obligation to reimburse the assistance paid by SRS both before and after April 1989. We note that Weingartner relies on the above-quoted language for support of his contention that his obligation to pay past due support terminated at the time of the adoption.
Weingartner's reliance upon Clear is misplaced. The above-quoted language from Clear does not support his position. Clear's liability for the assistance paid by SRS prior to relinquishment was not an issue on appeal. There was no cross-appeal by Clear from the district court's determination that she owed $3,904 for assistance paid before the April 1989 relinquishment. At issue in Clear were the AFDC payments which were made following the relinquishment by Barbara Clear of her children. Clear does not speak to the child support obligations accruing prior to the termination of parental rights and, therefore, is compatible with the Court of Appeals' holding in the present case.
Cases from other jurisdictions, including those considered by the Court of Appeals, which have come to the attention of the court are unanimous in holding that past due child support payments are not extinguished by an adoption decree. The cases discussed by the Court of Appeals are C. v. R., 169 N.J.Super. 168, 404 A.2d 366 (1979); and Hopkins v. Yarbrough, 168 W.Va. 480, 284 S.E.2d 907. Some cases not discussed...
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