Michigan Air Line Ry. v. Barnes

Decision Date06 October 1880
Citation44 Mich. 222,6 N.W. 651
CourtMichigan Supreme Court
PartiesMICHIGAN AIR-LINE RAILWAY v. BARNES and others.

An award of damages in proceedings for the condemnation of lands need not specify what damages are allowed for each separate cause, but may be in general terms. Objections in such proceedings, to be reviewed on appeal, must be specified. Form of award in this case to mortgagee and owners of equity of redemption held proper. The award of a jury in proceedings for condemnation of lands will not be disturbed for irregularities in the admission of evidence, unless it is apparent that the ruling is not only inaccurate, but that it was a cause of substantial injustice to the appellant. An objection that "the award is against the law and the evidence in the case," is insufficient to raise any question.

Appeal from Oakland circuit court.

Henry M. Cheever, Chas. E. Miller, and Edwin F Conely, for appellants.

E.R. Wilcox, A.B. Maynard, and E.W. Meddaugh, for petitioner.

GRAVES J.

This case comes up on appeal by respondent Barnes, in a proceeding to condemn property under the railroad law approved May 1 1873. The jury who made the finding were attended by the circuit judge, and their report was confirmed by the circuit court. The first objection is that the taking includes premises fronting on a street, and that the jury allowed nothing for damages on that account. For aught that appears the objection is gratuitous. The conclusion is not a proper inference from the record. The jury were required "to ascertain and determine the damages or compensation which ought justly to be made," and they reported the result in general terms, and this was sufficient. It was not necessary to specify what damage was allowed for each separate cause. There is no implication from the award that the jury omitted any ground of allowance depending on street advantages. In the absence of circumstances indicating that facts evident to the jury, and bearing on the amount of damage, were not fairly taken into account, the presumption is that they were. The charge against the petition and award of lack of due certainty in describing the property, contains the same defect it assumes to suggest.

The "objections" are required to be "specified," and the appellate court is confined to the specifications; all other objections are to be deemed waived. The obvious meaning is that the error and defects complained of shall be pointed out with such particularity that the attention of the appellee and of the court will be at once precisely directed to them. In case that is done there is no room for misapprehending the questions. The subjects of controversy are at once understood by all alike and when they come to be decided the points ruled are certainly and clearly defined. The charge in question is general. It is called an objection, but there are no specifications. The petition and award are to be explored to find out, if practicable, the points aimed at by the objection. They are not "specified" or explained. But if we disregard this want of sufficiency in the notice of appeal, and resort to appellants' brief for a specification of their objections, no serious fault is disclosed. The jury made a personal inspection, and seem to have had no difficulty, and we are not able to find the want of certainty imputed. The effect of the first description is to allow a strip 30 feet in width, on each side of a given line, across the entire premises, except that in crossing the parcel 30 feet wide, derived by Barnes from Fox, there is allowed, on the south side of such given line, a strip 25 feet in width instead of 30. The description of the adjoining piece on the north seems to be well enough. The exterior line is made to start at the east termination of the northerly outside line of the other parcel, and it is also made to close there. The courses and distances given determine the shape and quantity, and fix the position.

The second objections to the form of the award of damages and compensation are untenable. The amount allowed to appellants is evident. The nature of their interest has been admitted from the first. There has been no question about it. Their position is as owners. Mary A. Paton and Isaac Lounsberry were found to be interested as mortgagees, and the fact has not been disputed. The jury, by their award, first expressed the sum of their allowance to all, and then specified how much of that sum was for Mary A. Paton, and how much of it for Isaac Lounsberry; the necessary result being that what remained of the largest amount, after deducting the two smaller ones due to the mortgage interests, was found for appellants as...

To continue reading

Request your trial
1 cases
  • Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific Railway Company v. Farwell
    • United States
    • Nebraska Supreme Court
    • January 3, 1900
    ... ... Co. v ... Dunlap, 47 Mich. 456; Springfield v. Dalby, 139 ... Ill. 34; Michigan Air Line R. Co. v. Barnes, 44 ... Mich. 222; Harper v. Lexington & O. R. Co. 2 Dana ... [Ky.], ... ...

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT