Michigan Boulevard Bldg. Co. v. Chicago Park Dist., 32346

• Decision Date: 22 May 1952
• Docket Number: No. 32346,32346
• Citation: 106 N.E.2d 359,412 Ill. 350
• Parties: MICHIGAN BOULEVARD BLDG. CO. v. CHICAGO PARK DIST.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

Page 359

106 N.E.2d 359

412 Ill. 350

MICHIGAN BOULEVARD BLDG. CO. v. CHICAGO PARK DIST.

No. 32346.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

May 22, 1952.

MacLeish, Spray, Price & Underwood, of Chicago (Robert S. Cushman, and John M. Betts, Chicago, of counsel), for appellant.

Philip A. Lozowick, and Kirkland, Fleming, Green, Martin & Ellis, all of Chicago (Joseph B. Fleming, Thomas M. Thomas and Thomas F. Scully, all of Chicago, of counsel), for appellee.

Johnston, Thompson, Raymond & Mayer, of Chicago (Floyd E. Thompson, Albert E. Jenner, Jr., and William B. Davenport, all of Chicago, of counsel), for amicus curiae.

MAXWELL, Justice.

Plaintiff, Michigan Boulevare Building Company, filed a complaint in the circuit court of Cook County seeking a declaratory judgment adjudging that an enabling act and two ordinances adopted pursuant thereto are unconstitutional and void and praying for an injunction to restrain the defendant, Chicago Park District, from constructing an underground parking garage in Grant Park and Michigan Avenue and issuing revenue bonds pledging the revenues therefrom. Plaintiff appeals directly to this court from a decree dismissing the complaint for want of equity.

Plaintiff is the owner of a large office building at the southwest corner of Michigan Avenue and Washington Street in Chicago and has an unobstructed view of Grant Park and Lake Michigan from the Michigan Avenue side of its building. Defendant is a park district and has title to, and control over, certain parks and boulevards in the city of Chicago, including Grant Park.

The Chicago Park District Act was amended by an act approved June 21, 1951, herein referred to as 'the enabling act,' by which sections 25.1 to 25.9 were added. (Ill.Rev.Stat. 1951, chap. 105, pars. 333.23b to 333.23j.) By such amendment the Chicago Park District was authorized to acquire, erect and operate motor-vehicle parking lots, underground garages, parking meters and other revenue-producing facilities incidental to the parking of motor vehicles, and provision was therein made for the Park District to issue and sell bonds, payable solely and only from the revenues derived from the operation of its parking facilities, such bonds to be secured by a pledge of the revenues derived therefrom.

Pursuant to, and acting under, the authority of the enabling act, the Chicago Park District adopted an ordinance approving plans prepared by consulting engineers employed for that purpose for the construction of an underground parking garage in Grant Park and Michigan Avenue, and on the same date it adopted another ordinance authorizing the issuance and sale of $8,500,000 of revenue bonds to pay the cost of such construction.

Plaintiff contends that the enabling act does not authorize the construction of a parking garage on land owned by the defendant and that if such a parking facility is constructed from the proceeds of the sale of revenue bonds the site must also be acquired from such proceeds. It is argued that the revenue from the proposed garage is not derived solely from the garage structure but is derived from the site also and that if the enabling act be construed to authorize the construction of facilities on an already-owned site the act violates section 12 of article IX of the constitution.

An examination of the enabling act fails to support plaintiff's position that it prohibits the construction of parking facilities on any property owned by the Park District. The power to acquire by purchase, gift, or otherwise own, control, erect, improve, extend, maintain and operate motor-vehicle parking facilities, as the commissioners may from time to time find necessity exists therefor, is provided by subparagraph (a) of section 25.1 of the enabling act. Subparagraph (e) of said section authorizes the borrowing of money and issuing bonds for the purpose of 'acquiring, completing, erecting, constructing, equipping, improving, extending, maintaining or operating any or all of its parking facilities'. The powers thus granted are quite general and are intended to cover any conceivable situation under which the commissioners might determine a necessity exists for a parking facility, including the borrowing of money for improving and extending an existing facility, whether or not the site of such facility be acquired throught the proceeds derived from the issue of revenue bonds.

In support of its contention that, if the enabling act authorizes the construction of parking facilities upon existing property of the park district, it is pledging property other than that acquired through the proceeds derived from the sale of revenue bonds and therefore violates section 12 of article IX of the constitution, plaintiff cites City of Joliet v. Alexander, 194 Ill. 457, 62 N.E. 861; and Schnell v. City of Rock Island, 232 Ill. 89, 83 N.E. 462, 14 L.R.A.,N.S., 874.

In each of those cases the municipality executed a mortgage of property owned by the municipality, in addition to the property acquired by sale of the securities, as security for the payment of the obligation. Under such circumstances, it was held that default would result in the loss of property owned by the municipality not acquired throught the sale of revenue securities and thus, the credit of the municipality was pledged for the payment of securities in violation of section 12 of article IX of the constitution.

The holding of the City of Joliet and Schnell cases has been modified. Where no property of a municipality is pledged to secure payment of an indebtedness, it does not violate the constitutional debt limitation to pledge the revenues both from the facility being extended and from the extension. Ward v. City of Chicago, 342 Ill. 167, 173 N.E. 810; Maffit v. City of Decatur, 322 Ill. 82, 152 N.E. 602; Simpson v. City of Highwood, 372 Ill. 212, 23 N.E.2d 62, 124 A.L.R. 1459; Poole v. City of Kankakee, 406 Ill. 521, 94 N.E.2d 416. In the instant case, there is no attempt to pledge or mortgage any existing property, and the site, while valuable, is producing no revenue whatever. There is a distinct difference between the pledging or previously acquired phusical property owned by a municipality and the pledging of revenues which may be partly derived therefrom.

It is next contended that the construction of the proposed parking garage is not a corporate purpose of the Park District. The act creating the park district provides that it has the right to acquire, construct, manage and exercise control over and supervise the operation of all parks, boulevards and driveways and to regulate traffic therein and thereon. Seven drives have been constructed in Grant Park which are used by the public in the enjoyment of the park and by those persons entering and leaving the loop area of the city of Chicago. It is stipulated that presently there is a demand for 5000 parking spaces, in addition to those now available, and that this deficiency in parking space will be 13,000 by the year 1955. Lack of parking space congests and blocks traffic in the park's boulevards and seriously interferes with their use as boulevards and as a means of access to the park and its recreational facilities.

What constitutes a corporate purpose as applied to any municipal corporation depends somewhat upon existing factual conditions. A definition of corporate purpose cannot be static. Changing conditions require that application of the limitations of that legal principle be tempered with due recognition of the existing situation so the purpose for which the public body was organized may be accomplished and enjoyment thereof by the public made possible.

We have recognized the right of cities, under proper statutory authorization, to regulate traffic and the use of streets, to install parking meters adjacent to city streets and provide for off-street parking. City of Bloomington v. Wirrick, 381 Ill. 347, 45 N.E.2d 852; Poole v. City of Kankakee, 406 Ill. 521, 94 N.E.2d 416. The boundaries of the Chicago Park District are coterminus with the boundaries of the city of Chicago, so that in a limited sense it has the same traffic problems in that large metropolitan area. There is no substantial difference between the authority of cities and that of the Park District in regard to the regulation of traffic. The construction of off-street parking, including an underground parking garage, is, in our opinion, within the corporate purposes of the Park District.

Plaintiff denies the authority of the park commissioners to pass the ordinances in question and infers that, to comply with section 9 of article IX of the constitution, the enabling act should have been submitted to the voters at a referendum. The corporate authorities of the Chicago Park District are the commissioners, who are appointed by the mayor of the city of Chicago. The act creating the Chicago Park District was submitted to and approved by the voters and provided that the commissioners exercise control over, and supervise the operation of, all parks, boulevards, ways and other public properties, exercise full powers to manage and control all parks, driveways, boulevards and parkways committed to its care and to establish by ordinances all needful rules and regulations for the government and protection of parks, boulevards and driveways.

Despite the broad grant of power to the commissioners, plaintiff manintains that the construction of the proposed parking facilities is a fundamental change in the powers of the Park District and beyond the field of activities contemplated by the act creating it. This issue is practically identical with the question of corporate purpose previously discussed. Since the proposed construction has been found to be a proper corporate purpose, it follows that the commissioners, as corporate authorities, have the right to pass the necessary enabling ordinances.

Plaintiff charges that since the enabling act applies only to the Chicago Park District that it is a...