Michigan C. R. Co. v. Burrows

• Decision Date: 02 November 1875
• Citation: 33 Mich. 6
• Court: Michigan Supreme Court
• Parties: The Michigan Central Railroad Company v. William W. Burrows and others

33 Mich. 6

The Michigan Central Railroad Company v. William W. Burrows and others

Supreme Court of Michigan

November 2, 1875

Heard October 13, 1875

Error to Kalamazoo Circuit.

Edwards & Sherwood and G. V. N. Lothrop, for plaintiff in error to the point that the injury complained of was not the natural and proximate result of the acts charged, and defendants therefore not liable, cited: 3 Mich 39; 14 Mich 489; 3 Hill 333; 6 Duer 375; 19 Barb. 36; 1 Strobh 524; 11 East, 60; 2 Taunt. 314; 1 Esp. 48; 13 M. & W., 738; 7 Pick. 282; 11 Metc. 542; 13 Gray 481; 13 Ala. 490; 14 Wend 255; 23 Wend. 525; 35 N. Y., 210; 20 Penn. St., 175; 62 Penn St., 364; 2 Greenleaf Ev., 256; 2 Pars. Cont., 457; Story on Bail., 586; Angell on Car. 201.

Severens, Boudeman & Turner, for defendants in error, to the same point contra, cited: 30 N. Y., 630, 564; 1 Conn. 487; 12 Conn. 410; 6 Bing. 619, 710; 4 Camp. 112; 3 Lans. 265; 7 Blackf. 497; 3 Mich. 268; 14 Mich. 489; 47 N. Y., 33; 15 Wis. 129; 20 Penn. St., 171; 2 Redf. on R., 8; 3 Kent Com., 210.

Judgment of the court reversed, with costs, and a new trial granted.

OPINION

Marston, J:

Defendants in error brought an action against the railroad company to recover damages claimed to arise from unreasonable delay on the part of the company in carrying apples from Vandalia in this state to Chicago.

It appeared that plaintiffs in the court below shipped, November 10, 1871, four car loads of apples, consigned to their agents at Minneapolis, in the state of Minnesota; that the apples were transferred by defendants at Chicago to the next carrier November 17, and arrived at Minneapolis on the evening of November 22, badly injured by frost, having been frozen while in transit from Chicago on or after November 21.

It also appeared and was not disputed, that the tracks of the railroad company were in good condition; that the company had abundant rolling stock of every kind to do all its business, and that it had no difficulty in moving, storing and taking care of freight previous to October 8, 1871; that on the 8th of October a fire originated on the west side of the city of Chicago, and that about three hundred acres of the city were burned on that and the next day; that the depots belonging to the company caught fire from the surrounding buildings and were destroyed, as were also the tracks within three thousand feet of the depots, and also the tracks in the freight depots, thus rendering it impossible for the company to receive any freight, having neither freight houses to receive it in, nor tracks to handle it on; that the company immediately made all possible efforts to temporarily replace their tracks and buildings, drawing for such purposes their force of men from the east and west ends of their road.

It further appeared, and was not disputed, that large numbers of people in Chicago, after the fire, were suffering and destitute, and that in order to relieve their immediate wants, it became necessary to send clothing, provisions, building material, hardware, stoves and other necessary supplies known as relief goods, forward, which made the freight business threefold greater than it had been before the fire; that the company under these circumstances immediately issued orders; as soon as they were able to carry any freight, to give relief goods the preference, next in order fruit and perishable property, and then general merchandise.

It also appeared that at the time the apples in question were received by the defendant its line of road was greatly blocked by an accumulation of freight, occasioned by the causes already stated; that previous to the fire the running time of freight trains from Vandalia to Chicago was about twenty-four hours; that at the time this shipment was made the average running time between the same points was ten days, on account of the fire and great increase of freight; and that the apples were carried in about seven days.

Under the facts as stated, the defendant denied that there was any unreasonable delay on its road, and insisted that having completed the carriage of the fruit over its road, and delivered it to the next carrier in good order, in no event could it be held liable for the alleged injury to the property, occurring while in transit, and in the custody of the next carrier.

Was there, then, under the circumstances stated, any unreasonable delay on the part of the company in the carriage of these apples between Vandalia and Chicago?

Railroad companies are bound to have all reasonable and necessary facilities and appliances for conducting and carrying on the business in which they are engaged in a prompt, skillful and careful manner. It is their duty to keep and maintain their tracks in a good condition and state of repair, to have a sufficient supply of rolling stock to carry, and suitable depots to receive, the usual and ordinary quantity of freight offered them for transportation, or which might reasonably and ordinarily be expected. They are not bound, however, to be prepared for unusual and extraordinary contingencies which no ordinary prudence or foresight could reasonably foresee or anticipate. And where an unusual contingency has arisen, which unexpectedly largely increases the business, or prevents, as in this case, the handling of freight in so prompt and expeditious a manner as the company formerly had been accustomed to do, the company cannot be charged with unreasonable delay for not carrying freight in the same time it had done previous to such contingency. In other words, what would or would not constitute unreasonable delay, cannot be determined by a comparison between the actual time and what had been the average running time between two given points under usual and ordinary circumstances. The proper question would be, what was the average running time under the extraordinary and unusual circumstances existing at the time of the alleged delay; and then to ascertain whether the goods in question had been unreasonably delayed beyond such time.

It appears in this case that the average running time between Vandalia and Chicago when these apples were shipped was ten days, while the time occupied in carrying and transferring the apples did not exceed seven, thus showing not only that there was really no delay in this case, but that these goods were given a preference and were carried through in an unusually prompt and expeditious manner under all the circumstances.

Look at the result of the doctrine contended for by the plaintiffs if carried out. The usual and average time for carrying freight before the fire between Vandalia and Chicago was two days. Owing to the destruction of the company's tracks and depots, and the large and sudden influx of business, ten days was the average time actually required to carry freight between these same points, and it was impossible for the company to carry it in two days. Should the company, under the facts as presented, be liable for unnecessary delay in each case where more than two days were taken to transport freight between those points? To so hold would be to render the company liable in every instance, and that for a delay caused by circumstances over which it had no control.

The position taken by plaintiffs, defendants in error here, would make it the duty of the company to carry and deliver freight with the same rapidity during the time of these extraordinary occurrences that it did previous thereto, and hold it responsible for the delay if it did not. But the company found it impossible, without any fault on its part, so to do. The destruction of the tracks and depots utterly prevented the company from handling freight with its accustomed rapidity, and caused a blockade along the entire line. Circumstances beyond their control prevented, and the law does not seek to hold any one responsible upon the ground of negligence for not doing that which it was practically impossible to do.

It was urged, however, that it was the duty of the company to send forward freight in the same order in which it was received that there should have been no discrimination made, no preference given between the classes of freight received by the company for transportation. After the fire large quantities of goods were being sent forward by relief societies from all parts of the country for the purpose of both preventing and relieving the great suffering and distress which did exist and otherwise would have existed among the people, who had by a great public...