Michigan Dept. of Transp v. Tomkins
| Decision Date | 11 June 2008 |
| Docket Number | Docket No. 132983.,Calendar No. 3. |
| Citation | 749 N.W.2d 716,481 Mich. 184 |
| Parties | MICHIGAN DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Rodney TOMKINS and Darcy Tomkins, Defendants-Appellees. |
| Court | Michigan Supreme Court |
Michael A. Cox, Attorney General, Thomas L. Casey, Solicitor General, and Raymond O. Howd and Patrick F. Isom, Assistant Attorneys General, for the plaintiff.
Rhoades McKee (by Scott J. Steiner), Grand Rapids, for the defendants.
Patrick J. Wright, Midland, for the Mackinac Center, Midland, for Public Policy, amicus curiae.
Hubbard, Fox, Thomas, White & Bengtson, P.C. (by Geoffrey H. Seidlein and Stacy L. Hissong), Lansing, for the Michigan Association of County Drain Commissioners, amicus curiae.
Miller, Canfield, Paddock and Stone, P.L.C. (by William J. Danhof and Jeffrey S. Aronoff), Detroit, for the Michigan Municipal League, the Michigan Association of Counties, the Michigan Townships Association, the County Roads Association of Michigan, and the Michigan Municipal Electric Association, amici curiae.
Ackerman Ackerman & Dynkowski (by Alan T. Ackerman and Darius W. Dynkowski), Bloomfield Hills, for other affected landowners.
This case involves a partial taking of defendants' property in connection with the construction of the M-6 highway. We are asked in this case to examine the scope of damages permitted under the phrase "just compensation" in article 10, § 2 of the 1963 Michigan Constitution. In addition to the fair market damages associated with the land taken, defendants also sought damages associated with the dust, dirt, noise, and related general effects of the M-6 project. However, the Uniform Condemnation Procedures Act (UCPA)1 specifically excludes compensation for the "general effects" of a project for which property is taken that are experienced by the general public or by property owners from whom no property is taken.2 The circuit court excluded general effects damages but the Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the UCPA's limitation on damages was unconstitutional because it conflicted with the established constitutional meaning of "just compensation."
Given the paucity of evidence indicating that, before 1963, those sophisticated in the law understood that just-compensation damages included "general effects" damages and contrary indications from pre-1963 caselaw and secondary sources, we conclude that the presumption of the constitutionality of MCL 213.70(2) has not been overcome and hold that it is constitutional. Thus, the circuit court properly relied on MCL 213.70(2) to exclude evidence of "general effects" damages attributable to the M-6 highway. We reverse the Court of Appeals and remand to the circuit court for further proceedings consistent with this decision.
In connection with its construction of the M-6 limited-access freeway serving southern portions of Kent County, plaintiff Michigan Department of Transportation (MDOT) determined that it was necessary to condemn a portion of defendants' two-acre parcel fronting Kenowa Avenue. The M-6 project called for MDOT to construct several bridge overpasses to accommodate existing roads such as Kenowa Avenue that would otherwise have been interrupted by the new freeway. MDOT estimated that it was necessary to take a portion of defendant's land, approximately 49 feet by 120 feet, in order to construct the elevated overpass at Kenowa.
After defendants rejected MDOT's offer of $4,200 for the strip of land, MDOT initiated a condemnation action under the UCPA in July 2001.3 Experts for both parties agreed that the strip of land had a fair market value of $3,800. However, defendants also sought an additional $48,200 in damages to the remaining property that defendants' appraiser attributed to the "dust, dirt, noise, vibration, and smell" of nearby M-6.
On January 23, 2004, MDOT filed a motion in limine or, in the alternative, a motion for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(8) seeking to exclude any evidence of the "general effects" damages. Because the parties' experts agreed on the fair market value of the condemned property, MDOT argued it was entitled to summary disposition if the "general effects" evidence was excluded. In March 2004, the circuit court granted MDOT's motion, relying on MCL 213.70(2), and later entered a final judgment awarding defendants $3,800 as full compensation for the taking as well as statutory attorney fees and interest.
The Court of Appeals reversed the circuit court, holding that the exclusion of "general effects" damages in MCL 213.70(2) was unconstitutional because it impermissibly conflicted with the established constitutional meaning of "just compensation."4 The panel concluded that "any and all factors relevant to market value [must] be taken into consideration when determining the difference in the remaining property's value before and after the taking."5
In addition, the panel, citing Campbell v. United States,6 and decisions from other jurisdictions interpreting Campbell,7 held that in a partial taking, "`[w]here the use of the land taken constitutes an integral and inseparable part of a single use to which the land taken and other adjoining land is put, the effect of the whole improvement is properly to be considered in estimating the depreciation in value of the remaining land.'"8 The Court of Appeals remanded to the circuit court to evaluate whether the overpass construction was "integral and inseparable" to the M-6 project. On remand, the circuit court found that a question of fact existed regarding this issue. Consequently, the Court of Appeals again remanded to the circuit court "to allow the trier of fact to consider the experts' testimony regarding the proper just compensation for the diminution in value of the remainder (that is, the portion of the Tomkins parcel left over after the government taking) that takes into account all relevant factors affecting its market value." It subsequently denied MDOT's motion for reconsideration.
MDOT filed an application for leave to appeal, which this Court granted.9
Questions of constitutional interpretation and statutory interpretation are questions of law reviewed de novo by this Court.10 This Court also reviews de novo a trial court's decision to grant a motion for summary disposition.11
It is axiomatic that statutory language expresses legislative intent. "A fundamental principle of statutory construction is that `a clear and unambiguous statute leaves no room for judicial construction or interpretation.'"12 Where the statute unambiguously conveys the Legislature's intent, "the proper role of a court is simply to apply the terms of the statute to the circumstances in a particular case."13 Statutes are presumed constitutional, and this Court exercises the power to declare a law unconstitutional with extreme caution, never exercising it where serious doubt exists with regard to the conflict.14
When interpreting our state constitution, this Court seeks the original meaning of the text to the ratifiers, the people, at the time of ratification.15 Technical legal terms must be interpreted in light of the meaning that those sophisticated in the law would have given those terms at the time of ratification.16
In Silver Creek, this Court observed that the doctrine of eminent domain, the power of the government to take private property for a public use and with just compensation, is firmly established in both our federal and state constitutions.17 Dating back to the earliest days of statehood, Michigan's various constitutions, including the most recent 1963 iteration, have reserved this power to the state.18 Const. 1963, art. 10, § 2 states, in relevant part, that "[p]rivate property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation. ..."
The Legislature enacted the UCPA in 1980 to make uniform the statutes that govern the exercise and procedure of eminent domain. Consistent with the constitutional mandate to award "just compensation," the UCPA similarly demands that individuals receive "just compensation" when their property is taken by the government.19 When we interpret the UCPA in light of art 10, § 2, we must remember that "to the degree the Constitution has been construed to outline the nature of `just compensation,' the statute must be similarly construed because no act of the Legislature can take away what the Constitution has given."20 Thus, the Legislature, through the UCPA or any other statute, cannot lower the constitutional minimum of "just compensation" established by the people who ratified the 1963 constitution.
In Silver Creek, we recognized that the phrase "just compensation" cannot be interpreted "merely by a careful reading of the phrase."21 Indeed, this Court has held that "the whole of art. 10, sec. 2 has a technical meaning that must be discerned by examining the `purpose and history' of the power of eminent domain."22 "Just compensation" falls into the category of words and phrases that is not capable of definition merely by reference to a dictionary. Rather, it is a phrase freighted with constitutional significance in our jurisprudence, specifically in the law of eminent domain. Thus, we concluded in Silver Creek that, as a technical legal term of art, we are required to give the phrase "just compensation" the same meaning given by those sophisticated in the law when 1963 Const., art. 10, § 2 was ratified in 1963.23 However, we cautioned elsewhere that arriving at a fixed meaning of "just compensation" before 1963 is complicated by the reality that in the past this phrase was "a legal term of art of enormous complexity."24 The aptness of this observation is self-evident in this case.
The provision of the UCPA at issue in this case is MCL 213.70, which sets out the process for determining fair market value. It...
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