Michigan Employment Sec. Commission v. Vulcan Forging Co.
| Decision Date | 01 October 1963 |
| Docket Number | Nos. 74,s. 74 |
| Citation | 134 N.W.2d 749,375 Mich. 374 |
| Parties | MICHIGAN EMPLOYMENT SECURITY COMMISSION, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. VULCAN FORGING COMPANY, Defendant-Appellant, and Henry Czarnata, Employment Security Appeal Board, Defendants. MICHIGAN EMPLOYMENT SECURITY COMMISSION, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. VULCAN FORGING COMPANY, Defendant-Appellant, and Laurent Bruneau, Employment Security Appeal Board, Defendants. MICHIGAN EMPLOYMENT SECURITY COMMISSION, Plaintiff-Appellee. v. VULCAN FORGING COMPANY, Defendant-Appellant, and Jerry McIntosh, Employment Security Appeal Board, Defendants. MICHIGAN EMPLOYMENT SECURITY COMMISSION, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. VULCAN FORGING COMPANY, Defendant-Appellant, and Floyd Henderson, Employment Security Appeal Board, Defendants. MICHIGAN EMPLOYMENT SECURITY COMMISSION, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. VULCAN FORGING COMPANY, Defendant-Appellant, and Charles Tyno, Employment Security Appeal Board, Defendants. VULCAN FORGING COMPANY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. MICHIGAN EMPLOYMENT SECURITY COMMISSION, Defendant-Appellee, and Nick Sineveck, Employment Security Appeal Board, Defendants. , |
| Court | Michigan Supreme Court |
Long, Ryan, Franseth & Spicer, Detroit, Paul Franseth, Detroit, of counsel, for appellant.
Frank J. Kelley, Atty. Gen., Robert A. Derengoski, Sol. Gen., John Long, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee.
Before the Entire Bench.
I do not agree that Dach 1 has been overruled by implication, nor that it should be overruled expressly. It should control here. Malone 2 was correctly distinguished from Dach in the Malone opinion.
In disposition hereof I would, as to all claimants but Sineveck, vacate the order of the circuit judge and affirm the decision of the appeal board for I agree with its finding that the vacation period which extended into September was not within the contract designated time. Hence for that period the claimants, if otherwise eligible, were entitled to benefits.
As to claimant Sineveck, I would vacate the decisions of the circuit court, the appeal board, the referee and the determination and redetermination of the Commission, for under Dach since his whole vacation time was within the contract designated period he is entitled to no benefits.
Reversed and remanded to the circuit court with directions to enter orders consonant herewith. No costs, a public question.
This is an appeal by Vulcan Forging Company from a decision of the circuit court for Wayne county involving six consolidated appeals to that court from decisions of the appeal board of the employment security commission. In five of the cases the circuit court ordered payment of unemployment compensation benefits for a two-week period during which Vulcan's plant was shut for vacation but for which the five claimants received no vacation pay because they lacked the requisite seniority specified for entitlement to such vacation pay by the collective bargaining agreement between their union and Vulcan. In the sixth case, the circuit court ordered payment of one-half the weekly benefit rate, in accordance with section 27 of the act, C.L.S.1961, § 421.27 (Stat.Ann.1960 Rev. § 17.529), the weekly vacation pay received by the claimant being more than one-half, but less than, the weekly unemployment compensation benefit rate provided by the act.
There was a time, prior to P.A.1951, No. 251, when section 29 of the employment security commission act, C.L.1948, § 421.29 (Stat.Ann.1950 Rev. § 17.531), expressly disqualified an employee from unemployment compensation benefits for any week with respect to which he received any vacation pay. Had this appeal arisen prior to P.A.1951, No. 251, we would be obliged to reverse the circuit judge's ruling, at least with respect to the sixth claimant who received some vacation pay, in the face of such an express statutory disqualification. The act as amended in 1951 and thereafter, however, expressly includes among the unemployed entitled to unemployment compensation benefits those employees, such as claimants herein, not otherwise disqualified, who during any week perform no services and with respect to which they receive no remuneration or who during any week of less than full-time work receive remuneration less in amount than the weekly unemployment compensation benefit rate. In the face of such express statutory language of entitlement, was are obliged to affirm the trial judge's decision. The statutory language to which we refer appears in C.L.S.1961, § 421.48 (Stat.Ann.1960 Rev. § 17.552), and was first added to the act by P.A.1951, No. 251, which significantly also repealed the section 29 disqualification for paid vacations. It now reads as follows:
Our conclusion is buttressed by the second paragraph of the amended section which, among other things, provides that vacation pay received for such periods of unemployment is considered remuneration in determining whether an employee is unemployed and in determining the amount of unemployment compensation benefits, under section 27 of the act, to which he is entitled. The second paragraph of section 48, to which we refer, reads as follows:
'All amounts paid to a claimant by an employing unit or former employing unit for a vacation or a holiday, and amounts paid in the form of retroactive pay, or in lieu of notice, shall be deemed remuneration in determining whether an individual is unemployed under this section and also in determining his benefit payments under section 27(c), for the period designated by the contract or agreement providing for the payment, or if there is no contractual specification of the period to which such payments shall be allocated, then for the period designated by the employing unit or former employing unit: Provided, however, That payments for a vacation or holiday made, or the right to which has irrevocably vested, after 14 days following such vacation or holiday, and payments in the form of termination, separation, severance or dismissal allowances, and bonuses, shall not be deemed wages or remuneration within the meaning of this section.'
The third and last paragraph of section 48, added by P.A.1954, No. 197, reads as follows:
'An individual shall not be deemed to be unemployed during any leave of absence from work granted by an...
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