Michigan Paneling MacHine and Manufacturing Co. v. Parsell

• Decision Date: 02 April 1878
• Citation: 38 Mich. 475
• Court: Michigan Supreme Court
• Parties: Michigan Paneling Machine and Manufacturing Company v. Eugene Parsell

38 Mich. 475

Michigan Paneling Machine and Manufacturing Company v. Eugene Parsell

Supreme Court of Michigan

April 2, 1878

Submitted February 1, 1878

Error to Genesee.

Replevin. Plaintiff brings error.

Judgment reversed, with costs, and a new trial ordered.

Willard M. Lillibridge and Henry M. Cheever for plaintiff in error. A principal is not bound by the admissions of his agent unless they relate to the subject matter of the agency and are within the scope of his authority (Woods v. Banks, 14 N. H 101; Gooch v. Bryant, 13 Me. 386; Burnham v Ellis, 39 Me. 319; Batchelder v. Emery, 20 N. H., 165; Winter v. Burt, 31 Ala. 33; Runk v. Ten Eyck, 24 N. J. Law, 756; Fogg v. Child, 13 Barb. 246), and are made at the time of a transaction within the range of his powers. Yocum v. Barnes, 8 B. Mon., 496; Lamb v. Barnard, 16 Me. 364; Thomas v. Sternheimer, 29 Md. 268; Baring v. Clark, 19 Pick. 220; Cooley v. Norton, 4 Cush. 93; Brehm v. G. W. R. R. Co., 34 Barb. 256; Dick v. Lindsay, 2 Grant's Cas., 431; Austin v. Chittenden, 33 Vt. 553; an agent's admissions as to his ownership of property in his possession are not admissible (Standefer v. Chisholm, 1 Stew. & P., [Ala.] 449) when they do not accompany any authorized act done for the principal, but are made afterwards and in his absence, Turnpike Co. v. Thorp, 13 Conn. 173; Craig v. Gilbreth, 47 Me. 416; Austin v. Chittenden, 33 Vt. 353; Davis v. Henderson, 20 Wis. 520; the agent's authority must be shown by proving his right to make such admissions, or that the admissions were recognized by his principal, Hatch v. Squires, 11 Mich. 185; in an action against an officer for levying on property claimed by plaintiff as his, the debtor's declarations as to the ownership are inadmissible unless made in plaintiff's presence, Russell v. Clark, 38 Me. 332; Turner v. Belden, 9 Mo. 797. One is not estopped by his acts or declarations unless it appears that they were in the light of existing circumstances, and that the party making them meant to deceive or was culpably negligent in not asserting his rights (Boggs v. Merced, 14 Cal. 279; Brown v. Wheeler, 17 Conn. 345; Rangeley v. Spring, 21 Me. 130; Cummings v. Webster, 43 Me. 192; Preston v. Mann, 25 Conn. 118; Whiteacre v. Culver, 8 Minn. 133; Heath v. Derry Bank, 44 N. H., 174) and that the party to whom the admissions were made had changed his course to his own injury because of them, Copeland v. Copeland, 28 Me. 525: Califf v. Hillhouse, 3 Minn. 311; Taylor v. Zepp, 14 Mo. 482; Martin v. Angell, 7 Barb. 407; Com. v. Moltz, 10 Penn. St., 527; Eldred v. Hazlett, 33 Penn. St., 307; Shaw v. Beebe, 35 Vt. 205; Wooley v. Edson, 35 Vt. 214; Hunley v. Hunley, 15 Ala. 91; Reeves v. Matthews, 17 Ga. 449; Young v. Foute, 33 Ill. 43; Carland v. Day, 4 E. D. Smith, 251; Catlin v. Grote, 4 id. 296; Burdick v. Michael, 32 Mich. 246; Truesdail v. Ward, 24 Mich. 117; a corporation was not estopped from recovering goods taken on an execution against a third person, by the fact that their agent pointed them out as belonging to the debtor, N. Y. etc. Co. v. Richmond, 6 Bosw. 213; verbal admissions as to property in suit, tending to show a sale to the other party, cannot estop one from showing the true nature of his right, Isaac v. Williams, 3 Gill 278; the fact that one has allowed another to use and control property will not estop him from claiming it as his own, though it has been sold as the property of the one to whom it was intrusted, McDermott v. Barnum, 16 Mo. 114; an agent's false declaration will not bind the principal, unless by the latter's silence or acquiescence others have been misled, Green v. Dockendorf, 13 Minn. 70; silence does not operate an estoppel if there was no duty to speak, Taylor v. Ely, 25 Conn. 250.

Long & Gold and Wm. Newton for defendant in error. Possession of personalty is evidence of ownership, and the declarations of the party in possession are competent evidence, 1 Greenl. Ev., § 34; Magee v. Scott, 9 Cush. 150; Fish v. Skut, 21 Barb. 333; Millay v. Butts, 35 Me. 139; Linscott v. Trask, 35 Me. 150; Jackson v. Bard, 4 Johns. 234; silence may work an estoppel, Ford v. Loomis, 33 Mich. 121; Sebright v. Moore, id., 92.

OPINION

Cooley, J.

The plaintiffs replevied from the defendant a paneling machine, and the question in controversy related to the ownership of this machine, at the time the suit was brought. The plaintiff gave evidence of having purchased it of one Rice, through John Warren his agent, and also of having purchased the right to manufacture and use machines of the kind in the counties of Genesee, Saginaw and Bay, under the letters patent which had been issued therefor. A contract between the plaintiff of the first part and John Warren and Lester Cross of the second part was then proved, under which Warren and Cross were constituted agents for the plaintiff in the sale of rights to manufacture and use said machine in the counties aforesaid, and were to have the machine delivered to them for the purposes of the agency, and were to re-deliver the same at Detroit when requested. It was then shown that Warren had possession of the machine at Flint, and that from him it passed into the possession of defendant.

The defense was that the machine was the property of Warren, and had been seized by the defendant as sheriff on an attachment issued against Warren in favor of one Roberts. The evidence of Roberts was put in that while Warren was at Flint in possession of the machine, he Roberts, supposing him to be the owner thereof, trusted him for board to the sum of four hundred dollars and upwards, to recover which the attachment suit was instituted. The defendant then offered to prove by several witnesses that while Warren thus had the machine in possession he represented himself to be the owner thereof. This evidence was objected to, but received by the court, and the witness Roberts and one Howland testified to such representations. There was also some evidence that Warren once spoke of the machine as "his machine" in the presence of Leavitt, the president of the plaintiff, and of Roberts, but Leavitt denied ever hearing such a remark. When the evidence was in, plaintiff requested the court to submit to the jury the following special questions:

1. Did the plaintiff purchase the machine of Rice?

2. Did the plaintiff ever sell the machine to any one, and if so, to whom?

3. Did Warren have the machine in question at Flint, under and by virtue of the contract of the plaintiff with Warren and Rice?

The court declined to submit these questions, and proceeded to instruct the jury among other things that if they should find that Leavitt, the president of the plaintiff, was in Flint and heard Warren say, in the presence of Roberts, that the machine was his, and kept silent, and said nothing about it, and Warren continued to give Roberts credit, then the plaintiff would be estopped from claiming title in this case as against the attachment of Roberts. The plaintiff's counsel requested the court to limit this instruction to that portion of the credit which accrued after the alleged statement was made, but the court declined to do so. The defendant had a verdict upon which judgment was entered.

I. In support of the admission of Warren's declarations that he was owner of the machine, our attention is directed to those cases in which the declarations of one in possession of land when they are made, are permitted to be proved in a suit to which one who subsequently succeeds to his right is a party. Such cases were considered at some length in the case of Cook v. Knowles, ante, p. 316, and we shall not review them here. In general such declarations can only be received in disparagement of the party's title; not in support of it; they may be shown to characterize a possession and thus make out an adverse holding, because for this purpose they would be a part of the res gestae; but they are never received as evidence of title in favor of the party making them. It is true that the declarations of an agent, when acting within the scope of his agency, and when made in connection with some transaction as such, are receivable, as part of the res gestae, but it would be extremely dangerous to hold that the mere possession of chattels by an agent would empower him to admit away the title of his principal. No authority sanctions such a doctrine, and Turner v. Belden, 9 Mo. 797 and Russell v. Clark, 38 Me. 332, which are cited for the plaintiff are to the contrary.

II. If the application by the court of the doctrine of estoppel to the case had been correct, the submission to the jury of the special...