Michigan State AFL-CIO v. Civil Service Com'n, AFL-CIO

• Decision Date: 21 October 1991
• Docket Number: AFL-CI,CLC,Docket No. 113228,AFL-CIO
• Citation: 191 Mich.App. 535,478 N.W.2d 722
• Parties: MICHIGAN STATE; Local 6000; Michigan Council 25, American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees (AFSCME); Michigan Corrections Organization, Seiu Local 526-M; Michigan State Employees Association (MSEA); Local 31-M Service Employees International Union,, CLC; United Technical Employees Association (UTEA), individually and on behalf of their members who are employees in the State classified civil service; and Marilyn La Clair and Gloria Hajduk-Emmons, Plaintiff-Appellees, v. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, and Martha Bibbs, in her official capacity as the State Personnel Director, Defendants-Appellants.
• Court: Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US

Page 722

478 N.W.2d 722

191 Mich.App. 535

MICHIGAN STATE AFL-CIO; AFL-CIO Local 6000; Michigan Council 25, American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees (AFSCME) AFL-CIO; Michigan Corrections Organization, Seiu Local 526-M; Michigan State Employees Association (MSEA); Local 31-M Service Employees International Union, AFL-CIO, CLC; United Technical Employees Association (UTEA), individually and on behalf of their members who are employees in the State classified civil service; and Marilyn La Clair and Gloria Hajduk-Emmons, Plaintiff-Appellees, v. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, and Martha Bibbs, in her official capacity as the State Personnel Director Defendants-Appellants.

Docket No. 113228.

Court of Appeals of Michigan.

Submitted Jan. 23, 1991, at Detroit.

Decided Oct. 21, 1991, at 9:10 a.m.

Released for Publication Feb. 3, 1992.

Sachs, Nunn, Kates, Kadushin, O'Hare, Helveston & Waldman, P.C. by Theodore Sachs and Andrew Nickelhoff, Detroit, for plaintiffs-appellees.

Frank J. Kelley, Atty. Gen., Gay Secor Hardy, Sol. Gen., and Deborah Anne Devine, Asst. Atty. Gen., for defendants-appellants.

Dykema Gossett by Richard D. McLellan, William J. Perrone, and Cindy M. Wilder, Lansing, amici curiae, for Michigan State Chamber of Commerce.

Mark Brewer, (Paul Denenfeld, of counsel), Detroit, amici curiae, for ACLU Fund of Michigan.

Before GRIFFIN, P.J., and REILLY and BURNS, ^* JJ.

REILLY, Judge.

Defendants appeal as of right from an October 28, 1988, circuit court order that declared modified Civil Service Commission Rule 1-5.7 invalid, permanently enjoined defendants from enforcing it, and granted plaintiffs' motion for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10). In that same order, the circuit court denied defendants' motion for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(1), (5), and (8). We reverse and remand.

This case involves the interpretation of Civil Service Rule (CSR) 1-5.7, as modified effective July 14, 1988, and consideration of its validity when applied to various union leave programs that involve partisan political activity.

Before July 14, 1988, CSR 1-5.7, relating to political activities, provided:

1-5.7 Prohibited During Work Hours. Activities permitted under sections 1-5.1 and 1-5.5 shall not be engaged in by a classified employee during the hours the employee is on actual duty. ¹ Effective July 14, 1988, the rule was amended by adding the following language:

Actual duty includes the employee's scheduled work hours and overtime. Off duty includes all time outside scheduled work hours and overtime, annual leave, unpaid leave of absence, lost time and leave granted to the employee to become a full time employee of an employee organization holding exclusive representation rights, pursuant to an approved collective bargaining agreement. For purposes of this rule, employees released from their regular state workplace for union activities, union business or any other employee organization purpose under any leave arrangement, including "annual leave buyback" provisions, shall be considered to be on actual duty, released by the employer to take part in union activities deemed to be in the best interests of the state and not including partisan political activity.

The modification was apparently adopted in response to a training seminar on election campaign strategies held December 1-3, 1987. The session was sponsored jointly by the United Auto Workers--Community Action Program (UAW-CAP) and the Michigan Democratic Party. A handbook on political campaign techniques prepared by the National Democratic Committee was used as a training manual at the seminar. Although the Director of the Office of State Employer knew the three-day seminar was an event sponsored by the UAW-CAP, he did not know that it was a seminar that was patently political.

Approximately fifty-six employees who were members of UAW Local 6000 attended the seminar. Seventeen invoked the union officer leave provision of their collective bargaining agreement, one used the Administrative Leave Bank 1 provision of that agreement, and one attended without utilizing any union leave arrangement. ² On August 19, 1988, plaintiffs filed a verified complaint challenging the validity of the modified rule. The individual plaintiffs are employed by the State of Michigan in the classified civil service. Plaintiff La Clair is Vice President of the American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees (AFSCME), Local 576. Plaintiff Hajduk-Emmons is a member of Local 6000, AFL-CIO (UAW). The remaining plaintiffs are all labor organizations that are collective bargaining agents for different groups of state employees in the classified civil service. Each qualifies as an "Employee Organization " under CSR 6-2.1(11) having as its purpose "to deal with the employer concerning grievances and terms and conditions of employment." Each has an agreement with the state incorporating leave provisions similar to those in the Local 6000 contract. The plaintiff unions claim that they collectively represent approximately 41,700 classified employees, totaling approximately sixty-seven percent of all employees in the classified civil service.

The remaining[191 Mich.App. 541] thirty-seven were union members who used the administrative leave buyback program, which was not negotiated as part of a collective bargaining agreement but gained recognition over a period of time. ³

Plaintiffs claim that defendants, by adopting the modification of CSR 1.5-7, exceeded their authority to restrict political activities under the Michigan Constitution and under Sec. 4 of 1976 PA 169, the Political Activities of Public Employees Act, M.C.L. Sec. 15.404; M.S.A. Sec. 4.1702(4), which provides in part:

The activities permitted by sections 2 and 3 [MCL 15.402, 15.403; MSA 4.1702(4), 4.1702(3) ] shall not be actively engaged in by a public employee during those hours when that person is being compensated for the performance of that person's duties as a public employee.

The complaint contains three counts: count I asserts violations of plaintiffs' constitutional rights to free speech and association, Const.1963, art. 1, Sec. 5; count II asserts violation of 1976 PA 169, M.C.L. Sec. 15.401 et seq.; M.S.A. Sec. 4.1702(1) et seq., in that the commission exceeded its authority to regulate the political activities of state classified employees under Const.1963, art. 11, Sec. 5; and count III asserts violations of constitutional guarantees of equal protection and due process, Const.1963, art. 1, Secs. 2 and 17. Plaintiffs requested a declaratory judgment invalidating CSR 1-5.7 and injunctive relief enjoining defendants from promulgating and enforcing the modified rule.

On August 25, 1988, the commission suspended enforcement of the new language adopted in the modification of CSR 1-5.7 pending a ruling by the court. Plaintiffs claim that before the adoption of the amendment, no classified employees were disciplined for engaging in political activity while on negotiated leave. However, the record does not indicate whether the commission had ever been confronted with a situation where the unions had utilized administrative leave time for political activities. The parties agree that no union employee has been disciplined or penalized in any way for attending the December 1988 training session, nor has the modified rule been enforced against any employee.

On September 16, 1988, the circuit court entered a preliminary injunction enjoining defendants from enforcement of CSR 1-5.7 as modified. Subsequently, defendants filed a motion for summary disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(1), (5), and (8). Plaintiffs filed a cross-motion for summary disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(10).

Following a hearing on the motions for summary disposition and for permanent injunctive relief, the circuit court found that all plaintiffs had standing and that they were entitled to relief under count II. The court, however, declined to rule on the constitutional issues.

On October 28, 1988, the circuit court entered an order that granted plaintiffs' motion for summary disposition, declared modified CSR 1-5.7 invalid, and permanently enjoined its enforcement. The trial court also denied defendants' request for relief. On appeal, defendants raise only two issues: (1) whether the plaintiffs lack standing because of their failure to allege facts that give rise to an actual controversy for the court to decide and (2) whether the Civil Service Commission exceeded its constitutional authority or violated Sec. 4 of 1976 PA 169 by adopting CSR 1-5.7 as modified. ⁴

I

Defendants first contend that the plaintiffs lack standing to seek declaratory judgment because they have failed to plead facts or offer proof that any named plaintiff was the subject of any enforcement action, or that any plaintiff intends to engage in activity that would fall within the purview of newly adopted CSR 1-5.7 as modified. Therefore, defendants claim that there is no justiciable controversy as required by MCR 2.605(A)(1). ⁵

Although the plaintiffs and the defendants have argued federal rulings in support of their respective positions, we need not rely on federal law to resolve standing issues in our courts, particularly when the complaint specifically addresses violations of the Michigan Constitution and a state statute. House Speaker v. State Administrative Bd., 190 Mich.App. 260, 475 N.W.2d 440 (1991); Killeen v. Wayne Co. Road Comm., 137 Mich.App. 178, 357 N.W.2d 851 (1984).

Under Michigan law, standing is required to insure that only those who have a substantial interest in a dispute will be allowed to come into court to complain. Saginaw Library Bd. v. 70th Dist. Judges, 118 Mich.App. 379, 325 N.W.2d 777 (1982); St. John's-St. Luke Evangelical Church v. Nat'l Bank of Detroit, 92 Mich.App. 1, 283 N.W.2d 852 (1979). The standing doctrine recognizes that litigation should be conducted only by a party having "an...