Michigan State AFL-CIO v. Miller

• Decision Date: 07 January 1997
• Docket Number: AFL-CIO,Nos. 95-1397,95-1858,s. 95-1397
• Citation: 103 F.3d 1240
• Parties: 154 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2073, 65 USLW 2449, 36 Fed.R.Serv.3d 397 MICHIGAN STATE, a voluntary, unincorporated labor association; International Union, United Automobile, Aerospace & Agricultural Implement Workers of America (UAW), a voluntary, unincorporated labor association; Metropolitan Detroit; Seafarers International Union of North America, a voluntary, unincorporated labor association; Franklin D. Garrison; Edgar A. Scribner, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. Candice MILLER, Secretary of State (95-1858), Defendant-Appellant, Frank J. Kelley, Attorney General, Defendant, Michigan Chamber of Commerce (95-1397), Proposed Intervenor-Appellant.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit

Page 1240

103 F.3d 1240

154 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2073, 65 USLW 2449,

36 Fed.R.Serv.3d 397

MICHIGAN STATE AFL-CIO, a voluntary, unincorporated labor association; International Union, United Automobile Aerospace & Agricultural Implement Workers of America (UAW) a voluntary, unincorporated labor association; Metropolitan Detroit AFL-CIO; Seafarers International Union of North America, a voluntary, unincorporated labor association Franklin D. Garrison; Edgar A. Scribner, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. Candice MILLER, Secretary of State (95-1858), Defendant-Appellant Frank J. Kelley, Attorney General, Defendant, Michigan Chamber of Commerce (95-1397), Proposed Intervenor-Appellant.

Nos. 95-1397, 95-1858.

United States Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit.

Argued May 17, 1996.

Decided Jan. 7, 1997.

Rehearing and Suggestion for Rehearing En Banc Denied in No.

95-1858 March 19, 1997. ^*

Andrew Nickelhoff (argued), Theodore Sachs (briefed), Sachs, Nunn, Kates, Kadushin, O'Hare, Helveston & Waldman, Detroit, MI, for Michigan State AFL-CIO in both cases.

Theodore Sachs (briefed), Sachs, Nunn, Kates, Kadushin, O'Hare, Helveston & Waldman, Detroit, MI, for International Union, United Automobile, Aerospace & Agricultural Implement Workers of America (UAW), Metropolitan Detroit AFL-CIO, Seafarer's International Union of North America, Franklin D. Garrison, Edgar A. Scribner in both cases.

John D. Pirich (argued and briefed), John S. Kane, Honigman, Miller, Schwartz & Cohn, Lansing, MI, for Michigan Chamber of Commerce in No. 95-1397.

Richard P. Gartner, Asst. Attorney Gen. (argued and briefed), Office of the Attorney General of Michigan, Lansing, MI, for Candice Miller in No. 95-1858.

John P. Pirich (argued and briefed), John S. Kane, Honigan, Miller, Schwartz & Cohn, Lansing, MI, for Michigan Chamber of Commerce, Amicus Curiae in No. 95-1858.

Thomas A. Baird, Okemos, MI, Kathleen Corkin Boyle, White, Przybylowicz, Schneider & Baird, Okemos, MI, for Michigan Education Association, Amicus Curiae in No. 95-1858.

Before: WELLFORD, NORRIS, and DAUGHTREY, Circuit Judges.

NORRIS, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which WELLFORD, J., joined. DAUGHTREY, J. (pp. 1253-56), delivered a separate dissenting opinion.

ALAN E. NORRIS, Circuit Judge.

In this consolidated appeal, the Michigan secretary of state challenges the district court's order preliminarily enjoining enforcement of Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 169.255(6) (West 1996), a section of the Michigan Campaign Finance Act requiring labor unions to obtain affirmative consent at least once per year from members utilizing an automatic payroll deduction to make contributions to their union for political purposes. The Michigan Chamber of Commerce appeals the district court's denial of its motion to intervene, either permissively or as of right, as a defendant in order to argue for the constitutionality of § 169.255(6) and of the other statutory provisions contested by plaintiffs. We reverse on both grounds.

I. FACTS

Throughout the latter half of the 1980s, the Michigan Chamber of Commerce (the "Chamber"), a non-profit Michigan corporation whose membership comprises more than six thousand Michigan corporations, litigated the question of whether the Michigan Campaign Finance Act then in effect unfairly discriminated against corporations in favor of labor organizations. The Chamber contended that allowing labor unions, their traditional political adversaries, to make political contributions directly from their treasuries, while at the same time restricting corporate contributions to monies earmarked for statutorily mandated "separate segregated funds," substantially weakened the political influence of corporations vis-a-vis labor unions. In 1990, the Supreme Court ruled that prohibiting corporations, but not labor unions, from making political expenditures from their general treasuries does not violate the Constitution. See Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 660-66, 110 S.Ct. 1391, 1397-1401, 108 L.Ed.2d 652 (1990).

The Chamber then shifted its focus from litigation to legislation, seeking to have the statutory restrictions on corporate political expenditures applied to unions as well. With the Chamber's support, Michigan's legislature in May of 1994 enacted Public Act 117, amending its Campaign Finance Act, Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. §§ 169.201-.282 (West 1996). See 1994 Mich. Pub. Acts 117.

On February 14, 1995, plaintiffs, four labor unions and two union presidents, filed a complaint seeking declaratory and injunctive relief as to four provisions of the 1994 amendments. Plaintiffs contested sections establishing that (1) contributions by all branches, subsidiaries, and local units of a corporation or labor union would be aggregated for purposes of the contribution limit, see § 169.252(9); (2) labor unions would be subject to the proscription, already applicable to corporations, on making contributions from general funds, see § 169.254(1); (3) labor unions would be permitted to solicit donations to their separate segregated fund from only those individuals and entities listed in the statute, see § 169.255(4); and (4) corporations and labor unions would be required to obtain affirmative consent at least once per year from members making contributions to a separate segregated fund by means of an automatic payroll deduction, see § 169.255(6). On February 28, 1995, two weeks after the filing of the complaint and prior to any hearings in the case, the Chamber filed a motion to intervene. Defendants did not oppose intervention.

On March 10, 1995, the district court issued a short order denying the Chamber intervenor status. After quoting the language of Fed.R.Civ.P. 24(a), the order continued as follows: "It is the Court's opinion that the Michigan Chamber of Commerce does not fulfill the necessary requirements for intervention as of right. As to permissive intervention, the court chooses not to exercise its discretion and allow the applicant to intervene pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24(b)." The district court then indicated that it would permit the Chamber to participate as an amicus curiae. The Chamber filed a timely notice of appeal from this order, and we have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1994) and the collateral order doctrine. Stringfellow v. Concerned Neighbors in Action, 480 U.S. 370, 377, 107 S.Ct. 1177, 1182-83, 94 L.Ed.2d 389 (1987); Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 546-47, 69 S.Ct. 1221, 1225-26, 93 L.Ed. 1528 (1949); Purnell v. City of Akron, 925 F.2d 941, 944 & n. 2 (6th Cir.1991).

Also on March 10, 1995, the district court held a hearing on plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction. The Chamber was allowed to present oral argument as an amicus curiae. On March 31, 1995, the day before the 1994 amendments were to become effective, the district court issued an opinion purporting to deny injunctive relief as to § 169.254(1) and to enjoin preliminarily §§ 169.252(9), 169.255(4), and 169.255(6). The district court entered an order on July 19, 1995, formally granting in part and denying in part the preliminary injunction in accordance with its earlier opinion.

The Michigan Secretary of State filed a timely notice of appeal, and we have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1) (1994). The Secretary of State's notice of appeal, as well as the subsequent briefs and oral argument to this court, are limited to challenging the district court's preliminary injunction with respect to § 169.255(6). The Michigan Attorney General has not appealed any aspect of the proceedings before the district court.

After the decisions below and the filing of appellate briefs, Michigan again amended its Campaign Finance Act. See 1995 Mich. Pub. Acts 264. Public Act 264, which went into effect on March 28, 1996, did not materially change any of the statutory language relevant to this case, although it did renumber two of the four provisions at issue. For the sake of clarity, any citations or quotations of the Campaign Finance Act in this opinion refer to the current version, which incorporates the amendments from Public Act 264.

II. INTERVENTION

We first address the district court's denial of intervenor status to the Chamber. "[A] lawsuit often is not merely a private fight and will have implications on those not named as parties." 7C Charles A. Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Mary Kay Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1901 (1986). At stake is more than just the opportunity to present argument to the district court, an interest that can be accommodated by amicus participation. What the Chamber also desires is the ability to seek appellate review in the event that the district court ultimately determines that one or more of the 1994 amendments are unconstitutional and the original defendants fail to appeal that ruling.

A. Intervention of Right

Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, an outsider may intervene as "of right":

(2) when the applicant claims an interest relating to the property or transaction which is the subject of the action and the applicant is so situated that the disposition of the action may as a practical matter impair or impede the applicant's ability to protect that interest, unless the applicant's interest is adequately represented by existing parties.

Fed.R.Civ.P. 24(a). This court has interpreted Rule 24(a) as establishing four elements, each of which must be satisfied before intervention as of right will be granted: (1) timeliness of the application to intervene, (2) the applicant's substantial legal interest in the case, (3) impairment of the applicant's ability to protect that interest in the absence of intervention, and (4) inadequate representation of that interest by parties already before the court. Cuyahoga Valley Ry. Co. v. Tracy, 6 F.3d 389, 395 (6th Cir.1993). We review a district court's determination as to timeliness for an abuse of discretion, and the remaining three elements are...