Michigan State Highway Commission v. Sandberg, 28

Decision Date09 March 1970
Docket NumberNo. 28,28
Citation383 Mich. 144,174 N.W.2d 761
PartiesMICHIGAN STATE HIGHWAY COMMISSION, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Robert R. SANDBERG et al., Defendants-Appellants.
CourtMichigan Supreme Court

Frank J., Kelley, Atty. Gen., by Bruce S. King, Sp. Asst. Atty. Gen., Lansing, for Michigan State Highway Commission.

H. James Starr, Lansing, for respondents-appellants.

Before the Entire Bench.

DETHMERS, Justice.

This is a condemnation proceeding under P.A.1925, No. 352, as amended (C.L.1948, § 231.171 et seq. (Stat.Ann.1958 Rev. and Cum.Supp. § 8.171 et seq.)). On April 7, 1965, the Michigan State highway commission made its determination of necessity for the taking of a triangular piece of land containing 2.7 acres. The taking was total. The subject property is located in Ingham county at the southeast corner of Kipp Road, which runs east and west, and U.S. 127, running north and south at this juncture. It is at grade with Kipp Road, to which it has access and on which it has frontage of 350 feet, and it runs from the corner for 500 feet south along U.S. 127. Before this taking, U.S. 127 was a major State trunk line running from the Indiana line north to the Straits of Mackinac. The taking of this adjacent trangular piece in 1965 was for the purpose of the physical conversion of this trunk line highway into a limited access highway.

In 1952, before construction of trunk line U.S. 127 at this point, the land on which it later was laid out and now exists was owned by Elmer D. Franklin and Katie I. Franklin, husband and wife. They conveyed, by warranty deed dated May 9, 1952, a strip 200 feet in width to the State highway commission of the State of Michigan, as right of way for the proposed trunk line U.S. 127. This deed was duly and promptly recorded. The typewritten portion of the deed in question, in describing the property conveyed, made no mention of right of access thereto or therefrom to the lands retained by the Franklins which included the 2.7 acres involved in the instant proceedings. Immediately following the typewritten description, however, there was stamped apparently by rubber stamp, these words:

'First party acknowledges notice that said lands may be used for limited access highway purposes.'

The above stampted portion of the deed was especially initialed by the husband and wife Franklins, who were the grantors. At that time C.L.1948, § 252.51 (Stat.Ann.1958 Rev. § 9.1094(1)), of which the grantors must be deemed to have had knowledge, provided in part:

'For the purposes of this act, limited access highways are defined as highways specially designed for through traffic, and over, from or to which owners or occupants of abutting land have no easement or right of light, air or access by reason of such abuttal.'

In May of 1953 the highway commissioner and Elmer D. Franklin, unmarried and as survivor of Elmer D. Franklin and Katie I. Franklin, husband and wife, exchanged deeds of even date covering the land conveyed to the former by the latter in the May 9, 1952, deed. These two 1953 deeds expressly stated that they were given and exchanged to accomplish correction of an error in the description of the May 9, 1952, deed but did not state that the stamped portion thereof was such error or in error at all.

Soon after the conveyance from the Franklins to the highway commission the latter erected a fence separating the conveyed strip from the remaining Franklin farm and thus from the 2.7 acre piece which was part of the farm.

Defendants-appellants became the last successors in chain of title from the Franklins of the latter's farm, including the 2.7 acre piece involved in this matter.

At long last we come to the nub of the controversy herein. As so often the case in litigation, it is money. In considering the amount of the award to be made to defendants, the landowners, what are the interests involved that the commissioners were to take into consideration in determining the value of the 2.7 acres of land? If its use is limited to agricultural purposes, its value would be one thing, but perhaps considerably more if useable for such things as a gasoline station, motel, restaurant or other type of business. For these last mentioned purposes, access to and from U.S. 217 would be highly important. Defendants claim that such right of access attached to the 2.7 acre piece, belonged to them, and should be considered by the commissioners in fixing the amount of the award to be paid by the highway commission for the 2.7 acres of land. Plaintiff highway commission, on the other hand contends that the piece the access only to Kipp Road but none to intersecting U.S. 127.

Since the date of the deed of May 9, 1952, from the Franklins to the highway commission, conveying a strip of land for highway purposes, did the owners of the remaining abutting 2.7 acre piece of land have and retain a right of access attaching thereto for ingress and egress therefrom to U.S. 127? That is the controlling question in this cause. The circuit judge instructed the commissioners that the answer is no. A majority of the members of the Court of Appeals, passing on the question in an appeal there, held to affirm the circuit court. The cause is now here on leave to appeal granted defendants by this...

To continue reading

Request your trial
4 cases
  • Trust v. Babel
    • United States
    • Supreme Court of Michigan
    • December 29, 2010
    ...it is well settled that this right of access constitutes a property right that adds value to the land. See State Hwy. Comm. v. Sandberg, 383 Mich. 144, 149, 174 N.W.2d 761 (1970) ("That right of access ordinarily attaches to property abutting a public highway and that this constitutes a pro......
  • Carney v. Department of Transp.
    • United States
    • Court of Appeal of Michigan (US)
    • December 26, 1985
    ...wide. The owner of the abutting property has a right of access to the land itself from the highway. State Highway Comm. v. Sandberg, 383 Mich. 144, 148-149, 174 N.W.2d 761 (1970). [145 MICHAPP 698] Under current law, the state has regulatory authority over such driveways, M.C.L. Sec. 247.32......
  • Nash v. Sears, Roebuck & Co.
    • United States
    • Supreme Court of Michigan
    • March 9, 1970
    ......Protective Service, Inc., a Michigan Corporation,. Defendants-Appellants,. and. Art ... matter is of the first impression in this State, we do not consider this case to be the proper ......
  • Scholma v. Ottawa Cnty. Rd. Comm'n
    • United States
    • Court of Appeal of Michigan (US)
    • October 24, 2013
    ...art. 7, § 29. Although a property owner has the right to access his or her property from public highways, State Hwy. Comm. v. Sandberg, 383 Mich. 144, 149, 174 N.W.2d 761 (1970), a property owner is not entitled to access at all points, Grand Rapids Gravel Co. v. William J. Breen Gravel Co.......

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT