Michigan v. Bryant

• Decision Date: 28 February 2011
• Docket Number: No. 09–150.,09–150.
• Citation: 131 S.Ct. 1143,179 L.Ed.2d 93,562 U.S. 344
• Parties: MICHIGAN, Petitioner, v. Richard Perry BRYANT.
• Court: U.S. Supreme Court

562 U.S. 344

131 S.Ct. 1143

179 L.Ed.2d 93

MICHIGAN, Petitioner,

v.Richard Perry BRYANT.

No. 09–150.

Supreme Court of the United States

Argued Oct. 5, 2010.

Decided Feb. 28, 2011.

Lori B. Palmer, for petitioner.

Leondra R. Kruger, for United States as amicus curiae, by special leave of the Court, supporting petitioner.

Peter Jon Van Hoek, appointed by this Court, for respondent.

Kym L. Worthy, Wayne County Prosecuting Attorney, Timothy A. Baughman, Chief of Research, Training, and Appeals, Lori Baughman Palmer, Counsel of Record, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, Detroit, MI, for petitioner.

Peter Jon Van Hoek, Assistant Defender, State Appellate Defender Office, Detroit, MI, for Respondent.

Justice SOTOMAYOR delivered the opinion of the Court.

At respondent Richard Bryant's trial, the court admitted statements that the victim, Anthony Covington, made to police officers who discovered him mortally wounded

in a gas station parking lot. A jury convicted Bryant of, inter alia, second-degree murder. 483 Mich. 132, 137, 768 N.W.2d 65, 67–68 (2009). On appeal, the Supreme Court of Michigan held that the Sixth Amendment's Confrontation Clause, as explained in our decisions in Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 124 S.Ct. 1354, 158 L.Ed.2d 177 (2004), and Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 126 S.Ct. 2266, 165 L.Ed.2d 224 (2006), rendered Covington's statements inadmissible testimonial hearsay, and the court reversed Bryant's conviction. 483 Mich., at 157, 768 N.W.2d, at 79. We granted the State's petition for a writ of certiorari to consider whether the Confrontation Clause barred the admission at trial of Covington's statements to the police. We hold that the circumstances of the interaction between Covington and the police objectively indicate that the "primary purpose of the interrogation" was "to enable police assistance to meet an ongoing emergency." Davis, 547 U.S., at 822, 126 S.Ct. 2266. Therefore, Covington's identification and description of the shooter and the location of the shooting were not testimonial statements, and their admission at Bryant's trial did not violate the Confrontation Clause. We vacate the judgment of the Supreme Court of Michigan and remand.

I

Around 3:25 a.m. on April 29, 2001, Detroit, Michigan police officers responded to a radio dispatch indicating that a man had been shot. At the scene, they found the victim, Anthony Covington, lying on the ground next to his car in a gas station parking lot. Covington had a gunshot wound

to his abdomen, appeared to be in great pain, and spoke with difficulty.

The police asked him "what had happened, who had shot him, and where the shooting had occurred." 483 Mich., at 143, 768 N.W.2d, at 71. Covington stated that "Rick" shot him at around 3 a.m. Id., at 136, and n. 1, 768 N.W.2d, at 67, and n. 1. He also indicated that he had a conversation with Bryant, whom he recognized based on his voice, through the back door of Bryant's house. Covington explained that when he turned to leave, he was shot through the door and then drove to the gas station, where police found him.

Covington's conversation with the police ended within 5 to 10 minutes when emergency medical services arrived. Covington was transported to a hospital and died within hours. The police left the gas station after speaking with Covington, called for backup, and traveled to Bryant's house. They did not find Bryant there but did find blood and a bullet on the back porch and an apparent bullet hole in the back door. Police also found Covington's wallet and identification outside the house.

At trial, which occurred prior to our decisions in Crawford, 541 U.S. 36, 124 S.Ct. 1354, and Davis, 547 U.S. 813, 126 S.Ct. 2266, the police officers who spoke with Covington at the gas station testified about what Covington had told them. The jury returned a guilty verdict on charges of second-degree murder, being a felon in possession of a firearm, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony.

Bryant appealed, and the Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed his conviction. No. 247039, 2004 WL 1882661 (Aug. 24, 2004)(per curiam) . Bryant then appealed to the Supreme Court of Michigan, arguing that the trial court erred in admitting Covington's statements to the police. The Supreme Court of Michigan eventually remanded the case to the Court of Appeals for reconsideration in light of our 2006 decision in Davis . 477 Mich. 902, 722 N.W.2d 797 (2006). On remand, the Court of Appeals again affirmed, holding that Covington's statements were properly admitted because they were not testimonial. No. 247039, 2007 WL 675471 (Mar. 6, 2007)(per curiam) . Bryant again appealed to the Supreme Court of Michigan, which reversed his conviction. 483 Mich. 132, 768 N.W.2d 65.

Before the Supreme Court of Michigan, Bryant argued that Covington's statements to the police were testimonial under Crawford and Davis and were therefore inadmissible. The State, on the other hand, argued that the statements were admissible as "excited utterances" under the Michigan Rules of Evidence. 483 Mich., at 142, and n. 6, 768 N.W.2d, at 70, and n. 6. There was no dispute that Covington was unavailable at trial and Bryant had no prior opportunity to cross-examine him. The court therefore assessed whether Covington's statements to the police identifying and describing the shooter and the time and location of the shooting were testimonial hearsay for purposes of the Confrontation Clause. The court concluded that the circumstances "clearly indicate that the ‘primary purpose’ of the questioning was to establish the facts of an event that had already occurred; the ‘primary purpose’ was not to enable police assistance to meet an ongoing emergency." Id., at 143, 768 N.W.2d, at 71. The court explained that, in its view, Covington was describing past events and as such, his "primary purpose in making these statements to the police ... was ... to tell the police who had committed the crime against him, where the crime had been committed, and where the police could find the criminal." Id., at 144, 768 N.W.2d, at 71. Noting that the officers' actions did not suggest that they perceived an ongoing emergency at the gas station, the court held that there was in fact no ongoing emergency. Id., at 145–147, 768 N.W.2d, at 71–73. The court distinguished the facts of this case from those in Davis, where we held a declarant's statements in a 911 call to be nontestimonial. It instead analogized this case to Hammon v. Indiana, which we decided jointly with Davis and in which we found testimonial a declarant's statements to police just after an assault. See 547 U.S., at 829–832, 126 S.Ct. 2266. Based on this analysis, the Supreme Court of Michigan held that the admission of Covington's statements constituted prejudicial plain error warranting reversal and ordered a new trial. 483 Mich., at 151–153, 768 N.W.2d, at 75–76. The court did not address whether, absent a Confrontation Clause bar, the statements' admission would have been otherwise consistent with Michigan's hearsay rules or due process.¹

The majority's opinion provoked two dissents, both of which would have held Covington's statements admissible because they were made in circumstances indicating that their "primary purpose" was to assist police in addressing an ongoing emergency. Id., at 157, 768 N.W.2d, at 79 (opinion of Weaver, J.); id., at 157–158, 768 N.W.2d, at 79 (opinion of Corrigan, J.). Justice Corrigan's dissent explained that the time and space between "the onset of an emergency and statements about that emergency clearly must be considered in context." Id., at 161, 768 N.W.2d, at 80. Justice Corrigan concluded that the objective circumstances of Covington's interaction with police rendered this case more similar to the nontestimonial statements in Davis than to the testimonial statements in Crawford . 483 Mich., at 164, 768 N.W.2d, at 82.

We granted certiorari to determine whether the Confrontation Clause barred admission of Covington's statements. 559 U.S. –––– (2010).

II

The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment states: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right ... to be confronted with the witnesses against him." The Fourteenth Amendment renders the Clause binding on the States. Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 403, 85 S.Ct. 1065, 13 L.Ed.2d 923 (1965). In Ohio v. Roberts,

448 U.S. 56, 66, 100 S.Ct. 2531, 65 L.Ed.2d 597 (1980), we explained that the confrontation right does not bar admission of statements of an unavailable witness if the statements "bea[r] adequate ‘indicia of reliability.’ " We held that reliability can be established if "the evidence falls within a firmly rooted hearsay exception," or if it does not fall within such an exception, then if it bears "particularized guarantees of trustworthiness." Ibid.

Nearly a quarter century later, we decided Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 124 S.Ct. 1354, 158 L.Ed.2d 177. Petitioner Michael Crawford was prosecuted for stabbing a man who had allegedly attempted to rape his wife, Sylvia. Sylvia witnessed the stabbing, and later that night, after she and her husband were both arrested, police interrogated her about the incident. At trial, Sylvia Crawford claimed spousal privilege and did not testify, but the State introduced a tape recording of Sylvia's statement to the police in an effort to prove that the stabbing was not in self-defense, as Michael Crawford claimed. The Washington Supreme Court affirmed Crawford's conviction because it found Sylvia's statement to be reliable, as required under Ohio v. Roberts. We reversed, overruling Ohio v. Roberts . 541 U.S., at 60–68, 124 S.Ct. 1354 ; see also Davis, 547 U.S., at 825, n. 4, 126 S.Ct. 2266.

Crawford examined the common-law history of the confrontation right and explained that "the principal evil at which the Confrontation Clause was directed was the civil-law mode of criminal procedure, and particularly its use of ex parte examinations as evidence against the...