Michigan v. Chesternut

• Decision Date: 13 June 1988
• Docket Number: No. 86-1824,86-1824
• Citation: Michigan v. Chesternut, 486 U.S. 567, 108 S.Ct. 1975, 100 L.Ed.2d 565 (1988)
• Parties: MICHIGAN, Petitioner v. Michael Mose CHESTERNUT
• Court: U.S. Supreme Court

486 U.S. 567

108 S.Ct. 1975

100 L.Ed.2d 565

MICHIGAN, Petitioner

v Michael Mose CHESTERNUT.

No. 86-1824.

Argued Feb. 24, 1988.

Decided June 13, 1988.

Syllabus

Observing the approach of a police car on routine patrol, respondent began to run.The police followed him "to see where he was going," and, after catching up with him and driving alongside him for a short distance, observed him discarding a number of packets.Surmising that the pills subsequently discovered in the packets contained codeine, the police arrested him and, after a search of his person revealed other drugs and a hypodermic needle, charged him with possession of controlled substances in violation of Michigan law.At a preliminary hearing, a Magistrate dismissed the charges on the ground that respondent had been unlawfully seized during the police pursuit preceding his disposal of the packets.The trial court upheld the dismissal, and the Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed.Applying state precedents interpreting the Fourth Amendment to the Federal Constitution, the latter court ruled that any "investigatory pursuit" amounts to a seizure under Terry v. Ohio,392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889, since the defendant's freedom is restricted as soon as the officers begin their pursuit.The court also concluded that respondent's flight from the police was insufficient, by itself, to give rise to the particularized suspicion necessary to justify this kind of seizure.

Held: The officers' pursuit of respondent did not constitute a "seizure" implicating Fourth Amendment protections.Thus, the charges against him were improperly dismissed.Pp. 572-576.

(a) No bright-line rule applicable to all investigatory pursuits can be fashioned.Rather, the appropriate test is whether a reasonable man, viewing the particular police conduct as a whole and within the setting of all of the surrounding circumstances, would have concluded that the police had in some way restrained his liberty so that he was not free to leave.Pp. 572-574.

(b) Under this test, respondent was not "seized" before he discarded the drug packets.One officer's characterization of the police conduct as a "chase," standing alone, is insufficient to implicate the Fourth Amendment, since the police conduct—which consisted of a brief acceleration to catch up with respondent, followed by a short drive alongside him—would not have communicated to the reasonable person an attempt to capture him or otherwise intrude on his freedom of movement.The record does not reflect that the police activated a siren or flashers; commanded respondent to halt or displayed any weapons; or operated the car aggressively to block his course or to control his direction or speed.Thus, the police conduct was not so intimidating that respondent could reasonably have believed that he was not free to disregard the police presence and go about his business.The police therefore were not required to have a particularized and objective basis for suspecting him of criminal activity, in order to pursue him.Pp. 574-576.

157 Mich.App. 181, 403 N.W.2d 74, reversed and remanded.

BLACKMUN, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.KENNEDY, J., filed a concurring opinion, in which SCALIA, J., joined, post, p. ----.

Andrea L. Solak, Detroit, Mich., for petitioner.

Carole M. Stanyar, Detroit, Mich., for respondent.

Justice BLACKMUNdelivered the opinion of the Court.

In this casewe review a determination by the Michigan Court of Appeals that any "investigatory pursuit" of a person undertaken by the police necessarily constitutes a seizure under the Fourth Amendment of the Constitution.We conclude that the police conduct in this case did not amount to a seizure, for it would not have communicated to a reasonable person that he was not at liberty to ignore the police presence and go about his business.

I

Early on the afternoon of December 19, 1984, four officers riding in a marked police cruiser were engaged in routine patrol duties in Metropolitan Detroit.As the cruiser came to an intersection, one of the officers observed a car pull over to the curb.A man got out of the car and approached respondentMichael Mose Chesternut, who was standing alone on the corner.When respondent saw the patrol car nearing the corner where he stood, he turned and began to run.As Officer Peltier, one of those in the car, later testified, the patrol car followed respondent around the corner "to see where he was going."App. 25.The cruiser quickly caught up with respondent and drove alongside him for a short distance.As they drove beside him, the officers observed respondent discard a number of packets he pulled from his right-hand pocket.Officer Peltier got out of the cruiser to examine the packets.He discovered that they contained pills.While Peltier was engaged in this inspection, respondent, who had run only a few paces farther, stopped.Surmising on the basis of his experience as a paramedic that the pills contained codeine, Officer Peltier arrested respondent for the possession of narcotics and took him to the station house.During an ensuing search, the police discovered in respondent's hatband another packet of pills, a packet containing heroin, and a hypodermic needle.Respondent was charged with knowingly and intentionally possessing heroin, tablets containing codeine, and tablets containing diazapam, all in violation of Mich.Comp.Laws § 333.7403(2)(1980).

At a preliminary hearing, at which Officer Peltier was the only witness, respondent moved to dismiss the charges on the ground that he had been unlawfully seized during the police pursuit preceding his disposal of the packets.The presiding Magistrate granted the motion and dismissed the complaint.¹Relying on People v. Terrell,77 Mich.App. 676, 259 N.W.2d 187(1977),² the Magistrate ruled from the bench that a police "chase" like the one involved in this case implicated Fourth Amendment protections and could not be justified by the mere fact that the suspect ran at the sight of the police.App. 31-35.Applying a clearly-erroneous standard to the Magistrate's ruling, the trial court upheld the dismissal order.Id., at 2-10.

The Michigan Court of Appeals"reluctantly" affirmed, 157 Mich.App. 181, 184, 403 N.W.2d 74, 76(1986), noting that "although we find the result unfortunate, we cannot say that the lower court's ruling was clearly erroneous under the present law or the facts presented."Id., at 183, 403 N.W 2d, at 75.Like the courts below it, the Court of Appeals rested its ruling on state precedents interpreting the Fourth Amendment.³The court determined, first, that any "investigatory pursuit" amounts to a seizure under Terry v. Ohio,392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889(1968)."As soon as the officers began their pursuit,"the court explained, "defendant's freedom was restricted."157 Mich.App., at 183, 403 N.W.2d, at 75.The court went on to conclude that respondent's flight from the police was insufficient, by itself, to give rise to the particularized suspicion necessary to justify this kind of seizure.Because "the police saw [respondent] do absolutely nothing illegal nor did they observe other suspicious activity,"the court determined that the investigatory pursuit had violated the Fourth Amendment's prohibition against unreasonable seizures.Id., at 184, 403 N.W.2d, at 76.

After the Michigan Supreme Court denied petitioner leave to appeal,⁴ App. to Pet. for Cert. 9a, petitioner sought review here.We granted a writ of certiorari, 484 U.S. 895, 108 S.Ct. 226, 98 L.Ed.2d 185(1987), to consider whether the officers' pursuit of respondent constituted a seizure implicating Fourth Amendment protections, and, if so, whether the act of fleeing, by itself, was sufficient to constitute reasonable suspicion justifying that seizure.Because we conclude that the officers' conduct did not constitute a seizure, we need not reach the second question.

II

A.

Petitioner argues that the Fourth Amendment is never implicated until an individual stops in response to the police's show of authority.Thus, petitioner would have us rule that a lack of objective and particularized suspicion would not poison police conduct, no matter how coercive, as long as the police did not succeed in actually apprehending the individual.Respondent contends, in sharp contrast, that any and all police "chases" are Fourth Amendment seizures.Respondent would have us rule that the police may never pursue an individual absent a particularized and objective basis for suspecting that he is engaged in criminal activity.

Both petitioner and respondent, it seems to us, in their attempts to fashion a bright-line rule applicable to all investigatory pursuits, have failed to heed this Court's clear direction that any assessment as to whether police conduct amounts to a seizure implicating the Fourth Amendment must take into account " 'all of the circumstances surrounding the incident' " in each individual case.INS v. Delgado,466 U.S. 210, 215, 104 S.Ct. 1758, 1762, 80 L.Ed.2d 247(1984), quotingUnited States v. Mendenhall,446 U.S. 544, 554, 100 S.Ct. 1870, 1877, 64 L.Ed.2d 497(1980)(opinion of Stewart, J.).Rather than adopting either rule proposed by the parties and determining that an investigatory pursuit is or is not necessarily a seizure under the Fourth Amendment, we adhere to our traditional contextual approach, and determine only that, in this particular case, the police conduct in question did not amount to a seizure.

B

In Terry v. Ohio,the Court noted:

"Obviously, not all personal intercourse between policemen and citizens involves 'seizures' of persons.Only when the officer, by means of physical force or show of authority, has in some way restrained the liberty of a citizen may we conclude that a 'seizure' has occurred."392 U.S., at 19, n. 16, 88 S.Ct., at 1879, n. 16.

A decade later in United States v. Mendenhall, Justice Stewart, writing for himself and...