Mickens v. Polk County School Bd.

Decision Date04 April 2006
Docket NumberNo. 8:00-cv-1725-T-23TGW.,8:00-cv-1725-T-23TGW.
Citation430 F.Supp.2d 1265
PartiesRon MICKENS, Plaintiff, v. POLK COUNTY SCHOOL BOARD, Defendant.
CourtU.S. District Court — Middle District of Florida

Timothy G. Schoenwalder, Schoenwalder Law Firm, Tallahassee, FL, for Plaintiff.

Charles W. Bridges, II, School Board of Polk County, Legal & Auditing Services, Warren Andrew Crawford, Dabney Loy Conner, Sean Riley Parker, Boswell & Dunlap, LLP, Bartow, FL, for Defendant.

ORDER

MERRYDAY, District Judge.

Polk County School Board ("the School Board") renews its motion (Doc. 253) pursuant to Rule 50(b), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, for judgment as a matter of law on Ron Mickens's ("Mickens") claim under the Americans with Disabilities Act ("the ADA").

In August, 2000, Mickens, an African-American, sued (Doc. 1) the School Board and Superintendent Glenn Reynolds1 for employment discrimination on the basis of race and perceived mental disability. Mickens also alleged that the School Board unlawfully retaliated against him for statements protected by Title VII and the First Amendment and that the School Board violated his equal protection and due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. The School Board timely answered (Doc. 3) and denied any allegation of wrongdoing.

The School Board moved for summary judgment on each of Mickens's claims (Does. 34, 35). A February 7, 2003, order (Doc. 156) adopted Magistrate Judge Thomas G. Wilson's recommendation (Doc. 134) and granted summary judgment in favor of the School Board on Mickens's equal protection and due process claims (which Magistrate Judge Wilson described as "patently meritless") (Doc. 134 at 22) and on that portion of Mickens's ADA claim alleging disability discrimination.

Mickens2 advanced to trial on claims for (1) racial discrimination under Title VII, (2) retaliation under Title VII, (3) infringement of his First Amendment free speech protections under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and (4) violation of the medical examination prohibition of the ADA. Upon the completion of Mickens's case-in-chief, the School Board moved (Doc. 242) pursuant to Rule 50(b) for judgment as a matter of law on all claims. Reserving ruling on the motion until the completion of evidence, the court granted the Rule 50(b) motion on Mickens's claim that the School Board violated his First Amendment right to free speech under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 but denied the motion on Mickens's three remaining claims. The jury returned a verdict (Doc. 247) in favor of the School Board and against Mickens on both Title VII claims (racial discrimination and retaliation) but found in favor of Mickens and against the School Board on the ADA medical examination claim. The jury awarded Mickens nothing for economic loss but $300,000.00 in non-economic damages ("pain and mental anguish").

As framed in the pretrial statement, Mickens's ADA claim alleges that the School Board violated 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(4) by "requiring the Plaintiff to undergo a psychological examination for an unwarranted reason" (Doc. 138 at 2). Renewing its motion for judgment as a matter of law, the School Board argues that Mickens failed to offer sufficient evidence to support submission to the jury of the School Board's alleged liability under the ADA. Specifically, the School Board argues that Mickens (1) failed to prove that he is a "qualified individual with a disability" under the ADA, (2) failed to "present any evidence sufficient to create a jury question on the `job-relatedness' and `business necessity'" of the School Board's request that Mickens undergo a psychological examination, and (3) failed to prove an injury-in-fact, a prerequisite to an award of damages.

A Rule 50(b) motion challenges "whether reasonable jurors could have concluded as this jury did based on the presented evidence." Davis v. Town of Lake Park, Fla., 245 F.3d 1232, 1237 (11th Cir.2001)(citing Quick v. Peoples Bank, 993 F.2d 793, 797 (11th Cir.1993)). A movant under Rule 50(b) must prevail "if the facts and inferences point overwhelmingly in favor of one party, such that reasonable people could not arrive at a contrary verdict." Davis, 245 F.3d at 1237 (citing Carter v. City of Miami, 870 F.2d 578, 581 (11th Cir.1989)). Alternatively, a jury's verdict must stand "if there is substantial evidence opposed to the motion such that reasonable people, in the exercise of impartial judgement, might reach differing conclusions." Davis, 245 F.3d at 1237.

BACKGROUND

The School Board hired Mickens as a teacher in 1988, promoted him to assistant principal in 1993, and demoted him to a teacher in the fall of 1997. The School Board terminated Mickens in January, 1998, because, after he was demoted from assistant principal and offered employment as a teacher, he refused to report for work.

Mickens's employment difficulties began during his tenure as assistant principal for discipline at Boone Middle School. As assistant principal for discipline, Mickens's primary responsibility was to ensure the safety and welfare of the students on campus. On April 25, 1997, a dispute arose between Mickens and Ed Nixon ("Nixon"), a uniformed police officer who served as the school resource officer ("SRO"). Disagreeing with SRO Nixon over a student's discipline, Mickens expelled Nixon from the Boone Middle School campus. Dale McDonald ("McDonald"), the School Board's personnel investigator, subsequently determined that a loud and angry dispute between Mickens and Nixon had occurred in front of the students (although Mickens disputed this characterization at trial). Soon after the dispute with SRO Nixon, Mickens received a written reprimand citing his unprofessional behavior and directing him to seek counseling through the School Board's "employee assistance program."

Denying that the School Board conducted a full and impartial investigation of the incident, Mickens protested the reprimand. On May 8, 1997, Eileen Killebrew ("Killebrew"), the principal of Boone Middle School, visited Mickens in his office to discuss both the reprimand and the precipitating incident with SRO Nixon. Having heard reports that Mickens discussed with others the incident with SRO Nixon, Killebrew reminded Mickens that she had instructed him not to discuss the incident while on the school's campus. Mickens denied that Killebrew ever made the request. When Killebrew asked Mickens whether he was calling her "a liar," he answered affirmatively. Killebrew immediately directed Mickens to leave the school campus for the day.

That same day, Killebrew sent to the School Board's superintendent, R. Glenn Reynolds ("Reynolds"), a letter stating that "[d]ue to Mr. Mickens' insubordinate, disrespectful behavior to me, I am asking that you suspend him ... from his duties as assistant principal ... [and] that you consider reassigning him to another location. Not only has he compromised his working relationship with me, he has also put his effectiveness here at the school in jeopardy by failing to behave in a professional manner" (Doc. 22).

The next day, Mickens received a letter from Reynolds directing Mickens to submit to both a medical and psychological examination. Mickens selected a physician and a psychologist and underwent a medical and psychological examination. Although Mickens authorized release to the School Board of the medical examination's findings (Mickens was in "perfect health"), Mickens denied the psychologist's request for permission to disclose the psychological examination's results to the School Board. William Londeree, the School Board's director of employee relations, repeatedly asked Mickens to release the psychological examination results, but Mickens refused.

On July 23, 1997, the School Board transferred Mickens from assistant principal for discipline at Boone to assistant principal for discipline at McLaughlin Middle School ("McLaughlin"). On the morning of August 5, 1997, Mickens's first day at McLaughlin, Mickens confronted McLaughlin's dean of students, Alan Jostes ("Jostes"), about the duty assignment list. Mickens objected that Jostes had assigned himself certain duties that Mickens considered properly reserved for the assistant principal of discipline. At trial, Jostes described Mickens's demeanor during this encounter as both "volatile" and "threatening" (again, at trial, Mickens disputed this characterization).

At a subsequent meeting between Mickens, Jostes, and McLaughlin's principal, Ronald Rizer ("Rizer"), Mickens informed Rizer that, if Jostes failed to cooperate, Mickens would promptly replace him with someone cooperative. At this meeting, Mickens said to Jostes, "Don't talk down to me." Rizer informed Mickens that he (Rizer) was the principal in charge of the school, to which Mickens responded that he (Mickens) was the assistant principal for administration of the school. Conceding the substance of this exchange at trial, Mickens testified that he nonetheless believed that everyone had resolved their differences and that he would be able to work productively at McLaughlin.

On August 8, 1997, Mickens attended a district-wide meeting of assistant principals SROs, and deans of students. At this meeting, Mickens openly challenged the SROs' authority on school campuses and demanded written clarification of the SROs' proper role in maintaining school discipline. At that same meeting, Mickens recounted in detail his previous confrontation with SRO Nixon at Boone Middle School.

Soon thereafter, Superintendent Reynolds asked Rizer to compile a list of alleged problems with Mickens's behavior during his four days of work at McLaughlin Middle School. Rizer prepared for Reynolds an August 8, 1997, memorandum, in which Rizer reported criticism of Mickens by several other McLaughlin employees. For example, in her August 7, 1997, letter to Rizer, Earline McDonald ("McDonald"), a teacher at McLaughlin Middle School,...

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