Mickens v. U.S., 97-2734
| Court | United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (2nd Circuit) |
| Writing for the Court | KEARSE |
| Citation | 148 F.3d 145 |
| Parties | Thomas MICKENS, Petitioner-Appellant, v. UNITED STATES of America, Respondent-Appellee. |
| Docket Number | No. 97-2734,97-2734 |
| Decision Date | 24 June 1998 |
Page 145
v.
UNITED STATES of America, Respondent-Appellee.
Second Circuit.
Decided June 24, 1998.
Page 146
Jonathan Shapiro, Alexandria, VA, for Petitioner-Appellant.
Stuart Altman, Assistant United States Attorney, Brooklyn, NY (Zachary W. Carter, United States Attorney for the Eastern District of New York, Susan Corkery, Assistant United States Attorney, Brooklyn, NY, on the brief), for Respondent-Appellee.
Before: KEARSE and MINER, Circuit Judges, and POLLACK, District Judge *.
KEARSE, Circuit Judge:
Until 1996, a federal prisoner was allowed to file an initial application challenging his sentence on federal grounds "at any time." 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1994). Effective April 24, 1996, however, § 105 of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA" or the "Act"), Pub.L. No. 104-132, § 105, 110 Stat. 1214, 1220 (to be codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2255), imposed a one-year limitations period on the filing of such applications. In the present case, federal prisoner Thomas Mickens appeals from a judgment of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York, Thomas C. Platt, Judge, dismissing his motion under 28 U.S.C.A. § 2255 (West 1994 & Supp.1998), filed within one year after AEDPA's effective date but more than five years after his conviction became final, as time-barred by AEDPA. For the reasons stated below and in Ross v. Artuz, 150 F.3d 97 (2d Cir.1998), also decided today, we conclude that motions filed pursuant to § 2255 within one year after the effective date of AEDPA are not time-barred under the Act.
Mickens was convicted of various conspiracy, money laundering, and other narcotics-related offenses in 1989, and was sentenced principally to 35 years' imprisonment. His conviction was affirmed on appeal, and the Supreme Court denied his petition for certiorari in January 1992. He filed the present motion challenging his sentence on April 23, 1997. The government moved for the dismissal of Mickens's motion on the ground that it was untimely under AEDPA because it was filed more than one year after his conviction had become final.
In an Order dated July 18, 1997 ("District Court Order"), the district court, relying on language in this Court's decision in Peterson v. Demskie, 107 F.3d 92, 93 (2d Cir.1997), granted the government's motion to dismiss, concluding that Mickens did not file his motion within a reasonable time after the effective date of AEDPA's limitations period. The district court stated that AEDPA's one-year limitations period on the filing of motions pursuant to § 2255 was "virtually identical" to the one-year limitations period imposed by the Act on habeas corpus petitions filed by state prisoners pursuant to 28 U.S.C.A. § 2254 (West 1994 & Supp.1998), District Court Order at 2, and the court found that with respect to § 2254 petitions, Peterson v. Demskie had "resolved" the question of
whether a Section 2254 petition concerning a State judgment finalized more than a year before the AEDPA's effective date properly may be filed at any point within a year after that date ..., ruling that such petitions may be filed within a reasonable time after the effective date, but are not entitled to the full year,
District Court Order at 2-3. Finding "no principled reason to distinguish between the two," the court held that "the Peterson ruling regarding Section 2254 petitions [was] equally applicable to Section 2255 petitions." District Court Order at 3. Since Mickens's conviction had become final some four years before AEDPA's enactment and Mickens did not file his § 2255 motion until the day before the first anniversary of the effective date of AEDPA's limitations period, the court dismissed the motion as untimely, stating that "[o]ne year, a far cry from the seventy two days deemed reasonable in Peterson,
Page 147
... is not 'reasonable time.' " District Court Order at 3-4.Mickens sought reconsideration pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b), contending, inter alia, that the government's motion to dismiss was contrary to a policy adopted by the Department of Justice that § 2255 motions should be viewed as timely if filed within one year of AEDPA's effective date. The government responded that
such policy, if any, yields to the court's interpretation of the AEDPA. In this...
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Chrysler v. Guiney, Case No. 07-CV-8474 (KMK)
...to apply Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 6(a) to the limitations-period calculation under § 2244(d)(1). See Mickens v. United States, 148 F.3d 145, 148 (2d Cir. 1998). Under Rule 6(a), "[w]hen the [statutory time] period is stated in days or a longer unit of time," the court must "exclude t......
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Reynolds v. Cambra, No. CV977048CBMAJW.
...1135 (8th Cir.1999) (§ 2255 case); Flanagan v. Johnson, 154 F.3d 196, 200-202 (5th Cir.1998) (§ 2254 case); Mickens v. United States, 148 F.3d 145, 148 (2d Cir.1998) (§ 2255 case). That is, those courts applied Rule 6(a), which provides, in relevant part, that "the day of the act, event, or......
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Lewis v. Philip Morris Inc., No. 01-6174.
...must show that it competes with the favored purchaser, and the competition must be in the same geographic area. George Haug Co., Inc., 148 F.3d at 145 (stating, in relation to section 2(d) and 2(e) claims, "[t]he plaintiff must demonstrate that the goods or commodity apply only to offers to......
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Chrysler v. Guiney, Case No. 07–CV–8474 (KMK).
...to apply Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 6(a) to the limitations-period calculation under § 2244(d)(1). See Mickens v. United States, 148 F.3d 145, 148 (2d Cir.1998). Under Rule 6(a), “[w]hen the [statutory time] period is stated in days or a longer unit of time,” the court must “exclude th......
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Ramirez v. U.S., CV 97-2608(ADS).
...was reversed by the Second Circuit which remanded the case for further consideration based on its decision in Mickens v. United States, 148 F.3d 145 (2d Cir.1998) (under the provision of the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, a petition filed within one year after the a......
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Chrysler v. Guiney, Case No. 07-CV-8474 (KMK)
...to apply Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 6(a) to the limitations-period calculation under § 2244(d)(1). See Mickens v. United States, 148 F.3d 145, 148 (2d Cir. 1998). Under Rule 6(a), "[w]hen the [statutory time] period is stated in days or a longer unit of time," the court must "exclude t......
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Reynolds v. Cambra, CV977048CBMAJW.
...1135 (8th Cir.1999) (§ 2255 case); Flanagan v. Johnson, 154 F.3d 196, 200-202 (5th Cir.1998) (§ 2254 case); Mickens v. United States, 148 F.3d 145, 148 (2d Cir.1998) (§ 2255 case). That is, those courts applied Rule 6(a), which provides, in relevant part, that "the day of the act, event, or......
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Lewis v. Philip Morris Inc., 01-6174.
...must show that it competes with the favored purchaser, and the competition must be in the same geographic area. George Haug Co., Inc., 148 F.3d at 145 (stating, in relation to section 2(d) and 2(e) claims, "[t]he plaintiff must demonstrate that the goods or commodity apply only to offers to......
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Federal Price Discrimination Law
...Prods. Ref. Co. v. FTC, 144 F.2d 211, 219 (7th Cir. 1944); R.H. Macy & Co. v. FTC, 326 F.2d 445, 450 (2d Cir. 1964). 496. George Haug , 148 F.3d at 145 (noting that “neither 2(d) or (e) has any built-in defensive matter, as does § 2(a) . . . . The only escape Congress has provided for discr......