Mid-Fla Coin Exchange, Inc. v. Griffin

Decision Date16 December 1981
Docket NumberNo. 81-188-Civ-Oc.,81-188-Civ-Oc.
PartiesMID-FLA COIN EXCHANGE, INC., a Florida Corporation, and Antonio Arjibay, Jr., Plaintiffs, v. Noel E. GRIFFIN, Jr., in his official capacity as Sheriff of Lake County, Florida, Ronald K. Graffis, individually, Charles S. Dean, in his official capacity as Sheriff of Citrus County, Florida, G. W. Simpson, individually, and Jim Smith, in his official capacity as Attorney General of the State of Florida, Defendants.
CourtU.S. District Court — Middle District of Florida

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Kevin V. Canipelli, Hal Castillo, Jacksonville, Fla., for plaintiffs.

Julius F. Parker, Tallahassee, for defendants Graffis and Simpson.

Gerald B. Curington, Jacksonville, Fla., for State of Fla.

OPINION

CHARLES R. SCOTT, Senior District Judge.

This is an action challenging the constitutionality of Florida Statutes § 812.049 and § 812.051 (1981), effective October 1, 1981.1 These statutes are aimed at regulating Florida's secondhand precious metal businesses.2 They impose numerous restrictions and prohibitions upon persons transacting purchases or sales of secondhand precious metals, including: (1) a requirement that dealers keep detailed records of each purchase transaction, including a photograph or fingerprint of the seller; (2) a requirement that purchased goods be retained within the county in an unaltered condition by the dealer for a period of 15 days following the transaction; (3) a requirement that the dealer submit all records of purchase transactions to the county sheriff and municipal police department within 24 hours of the transactions; (4) a provision that the dealers' records shall be subject to inspection by all law enforcement officers and shall be preserved for a period of three years; (5) a provision prohibiting a dealer from purchasing any item of precious metal from a person under the age of 18 years. Failure to comply with the provisions of the statutes constitutes a first degree misdemeanor.

Plaintiffs are engaged in the interstate and intrastate business of buying and selling precious metals, junk, coins, scrap metal and jewelry.3 Defendants are the Florida Attorney General and various sheriffs and deputy sheriffs charged with enforcing the laws of the state of Florida in the geographic area surrounding plaintiffs' businesses.

In Count I of the complaint, plaintiffs seek a temporary restraining order, preliminary injunction and declaratory relief. Count II is a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against defendants Ronald K. Graffis, a deputy sheriff of Lake County, Florida, and G. W. Simpson, a deputy sheriff of Citrus County, Florida. The Section 1983 claim is grounded in the allegation that the defendants Graffis and Simpson have informed plaintiffs that the challenged statutes will be enforced against them.

ABSTENTION

By order entered October 20, 1981, plaintiffs' motion for a temporary restraining order was denied. A hearing on the application for preliminary injunction was held November 6, 1981, at which time the Court raised the threshold question of whether the Pullman abstention doctrine is properly applicable to this case. Railroad Commission of Texas v. Pullman, 312 U.S. 496, 61 S.Ct. 643, 85 L.Ed. 971 (1941). The parties had been directed in the order denying plaintiffs' motion for a temporary restraining order to arrive at the preliminary injunction hearing prepared to argue the applicability or non-applicability of the Pullman doctrine. Having considered the matter thoroughly, the Court is convinced that it should not abstain from hearing and deciding this matter.

The law is clear that a federal court should abstain from deciding a case in which a state statute is challenged as un-constitutional where resolution of an unsettled question of state law would eliminate or materially alter the federal constitutional question. Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 402, 94 S.Ct. 1800, 1806, 40 L.Ed.2d 224 (1974); Harman v. Forssenius, 380 U.S. 528, 534, 85 S.Ct. 1177, 1181, 14 L.Ed.2d 50 (1965); see generally 17 A. Wright & C. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 4242 (1978).

The essential prerequisite to the applicability of Pullman abstention is the existence of "an unsettled question of state law" that, if resolved, would avoid the need for a federal constitutional adjudication. Procunier v. Martinez, supra, 416 U.S. at 402, 94 S.Ct. at 1806. Where this essential element is absent, abstention is not a proper course to adopt. As the Supreme Court stated in Harman v. Forssenius, supra:

The doctrine, however, contemplates that deference to state court adjudication only be made where the issue of state law is uncertain. citing cases If the state statute in question, although never interpreted by a state tribunal, is not fairly subject to an interpretation which will render unnecessary or substantially modify the federal constitutional question, it is the duty of the federal court to exercise its properly invoked jurisdiction. citing case Thus, `recognition of the role of state courts as the final expositors of state law implies no disregard for the primacy of the federal judiciary in deciding questions of federal law.'

380 U.S. at 534-35, 85 S.Ct. at 1181-82, quoting England v. Louisiana State Board of Medical Examiners, 375 U.S. 411, 415-16, 84 S.Ct. 461, 464-65, 11 L.Ed.2d 440 (1964).

In the case sub judice, the challenged statutes, copies of which are attached hereto as Appendix A, are attacked on several grounds as being violative of the federal constitution. It is alleged that the statutes violate, inter alia, the interstate commerce clause, the Fourth Amendment guarantee against unreasonable search and seizure, the Fifth Amendment protection against compelled self-incrimination, and the equal protection and due process clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment.

This is not a case that turns upon the construction or clarification of a particular question of state law, the resolution of which would obviate the need for a federal constitutional adjudication. The defendants have not pointed to any provision in the legislation which leaves "reasonable room for a construction by the ... Florida courts which might avoid in whole or in part the necessity for federal constitutional adjudication, or at least materially change the nature of the problem." Harman v. Forssenius, supra, 380 U.S. at 536, 85 S.Ct. at 1182, quoting Harrison v. NAACP, 360 U.S. 167, 177, 79 S.Ct. 1025, 1030, 3 L.Ed.2d 1152 (1959).

The plaintiffs have raised manifold doubts as to the constitutionality of the challenged statutes. The alleged infirmities, which pervade the entire content of the legislation, strike at the very heart of the Constitution. It would be impossible, in the Court's opinion, to construe the statutes in a way that would avoid the necessity of ruling upon the constitutional questions raised in the plaintiffs' complaint.

Defendants contend that abstention is mandatory simply because one prong of the constitutional attack on the statutes is that they are void for vagueness under the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Apparently, defendants construe Harman v. Forssenius, supra, as mandating abstention whenever there is a vagueness challenge to a state statute. That case does not stand for any such proposition. The question of whether or not Pullman abstention is appropriate in actions attacking a state statute on vagueness grounds was discussed in Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360, 84 S.Ct. 1316, 12 L.Ed.2d 377 (1964).

In Baggett, the Supreme Court distinguished two types of vagueness challenges. Where the question is whether the statute is applicable to a particular person or a well defined course of conduct, abstention may be appropriate because a single state decision could possibly resolve the ambiguity. Where, however, the statute is challenged on the basis that persons to whom it clearly applies cannot understand what is required of them and do not wish to refrain from all activity arguably within the purview of the vague terms, abstention is not required. 377 U.S. at 378, 84 S.Ct. at 1326.

It is unnecessary, however, to decide into which of these categories the instant vagueness challenge fits, for the Supreme Court has made it clear that where the challenged statute is constitutionally deficient for some reason other than, or in addition to, vagueness, the fact that it may also be vague does not require that a district court abstain from hearing the case. Procunier v. Martinez, supra, was a class action challenging state regulations relating to the censorship of prisoners' incoming and outgoing mail. One of the grounds raised by plaintiffs was that the regulations were void for vagueness. The defendants contended that whenever there is a vagueness challenge to an uninterpreted state statute or regulation, the case is a proper one for abstention. After noting that not every vagueness attack upon a state statute or regulation warrants abstention (discussing Baggett v. Bullitt, supra), the court went on to state:

But we need not decide whether appellants' contention is controlled by the analysis in Baggett, where the short answer to their argument is that these regulations were neither challenged nor invalidated solely on the ground of vagueness. Appellees also asserted, and the District Court found, that the rules relating to prisoner mail permitted censorship of constitutionally protected expression without adequate justification. In light of the successful First Amendment attack on these regulations, the District Court's conclusion that they were also unconstitutionally vague hardly `constitutes a compelling reason for abstention.'

Id. at 402, 94 S.Ct. at 1806. Thus, the fact that certain provisions of a challenged statute may be unconstitutionally vague is not an adequate justification for a federal court to abstain from ruling upon the matter where other provisions of the statute are violative of the ...

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