Mid-Louisiana Gas Co. v. Sanchez
| Decision Date | 05 June 1973 |
| Docket Number | MID-LOUISIANA,Nos. 5324--5332,s. 5324--5332 |
| Citation | 280 So.2d 406 |
| Parties | GAS COMPANY v. John E. SANCHEZ et al.GAS COMPANY v. Minerva P. BRIGNAC.GAS COMPANY v. Edward MARTIN et al.GAS COMPANY v. Earl J. MARTIN.GAS COMPANY v. Harry M. MARTIN.GAS COMPANY v. Louis MARTIN.GAS COMPANY v. Amilcar POLLET et al.GAS COMPANY v. Dorrel POCHE et al.GAS COMPANY v. Michel MARTIN, Jr., et al. |
| Court | Court of Appeal of Louisiana — District of US |
Vernon W. Woods, Patrick H. Baker, New Orleans, and Martin, Himel & Peytavin, Lutcher, for plaintiff-appellee.
Leach, Grossel-Rossi & Paysse, F. A. Courtenay, Jr., and Monroe & Lemann, Eugene G. Taggart, New Orleans, for defendants-appellants.
Before REDMANN, LEMMON and GULOTTA, JJ.
These are consolidated suits for the expropriation of subsurface strata 1 for the underground storage of offsite natural gas. The subsurface area in the consolidated cases before us comprises 92 acres of a total 616.80 acres. No surface area is to be taken. From a judgment ordering the expropriation 2 and the payment of the sum of $80.00 per acre, the defendant landowners appeal. 3
It is the contention of defendants that there is no specific statutory authority authorizing the expropriation of subsurface strata for the storage of natural gas. 4 They argue that Acts 208 of 1906 and 123 of 1910 and LSA-R.S. 19:2 5 (the general expropriation statute) which authorize the expropriation by utility companies 'for the piping and marketing of natural gas for the purpose of supplying the public with natural gas' does not include the right to expropriate underground storage areas. In support of their contention, they rely on that line of jurisprudence which states that expropriation statutes must be strictly construed. 6
Furthermore, according to defendants, no force of law should be given to the acts of 1906 and 1910 as well as to LSA-R.S. 19:1 et seq because the source acts of these revised statutes are broader in scope than are the titles. Specifically, they complain that the titles of Act 208 of 1906 and 123 of 1910 (source acts) allow expropriation for laying Pipeline, while the body of those acts include expropriation for the Piping and marketing of natural gas for the purpose of supplying the public.
Finally, while the landowners do not question the need for underground storage areas by public utilities, they argue, in the instant case, there is no need to take their property because under LSA-R.S. 30:22(B)(1)(b) 7 the gas company has the right of use of the entire area (including that of defendants), once they have acquired the right of use of 75 percent of the entire area. This, they argue, the gas company has done.
Alternatively, defendants insist that $80.00 per acre is not sufficient and just compensation, and they should be awarded $1,738.00 per acre for the taking. They suggest that under no circumstances should they be paid less than $372.84 per acre.
Plaintiffs, on the other hand, take the position that while the acts of 1906 and 1910 and revised statutes relied on by the defendant are not explicit in authorizing expropriation for storage or reservoir purposes, there is no prohibition against expropriation for the purposes sought herein. They contend, moreover, the storage of offsite natural gas is consistent with the 'piping and marketing of natural gas for the purpose of supplying the public' as set forth in the acts. This, according to plaintiff, has been recognized by the Legislature in the adoption of LSA-R.S. 30:22(B) providing for authorization by the Commissioner of Conservation for the use of underground storage of offsite natural gas. 8
While it is true there is no specific statutory authority which particularizes that a corporation created for the piping and marketing of natural gas has the right to expropriate subsurface strata for storage or reservoir purposes, nevertheless these statutes encompass within their intent and meaning utilization of property by these corporations for the purposes sought herein. It is significant that the language contained in the body of Act 208 of 1906 and Act 123 of 1910 as well as in LSA-R.S. 19:2(7) authorizes expropriation by corporations created not only for the Piping of natural gas as suggested by the defendant but also the 'marketing' of natural gas for the purpose of supplying the public. There is evidence that public utilities are faced with a shortage of fuel. In order to meet the demands of the particular area to be serviced by plaintiffs, it is necessary that the natural gas be extracted in time of less need (summer) and to be stored in reservoirs to be used during a time of need (winter). It appears, therefore, that, according to plaintiffs, the utilization of underground storage area and reservoirs is necessary for the marketing of natural gas and supplying the public requirements. We cannot accept the restricted and limited meaning of the statutes, as suggested by the defendants (that expropriation is available only for Pipeline use), to defeat a meaning consistent with the development of technology in a progressive era. Statutory construction cannot be so interpreted.
Furthermore, LSA-R.S. 30:22 adopted in 1962 specifically provides for the issuance by the Commissioner of Conservation authority for the gas company to utilize the property for the underground storage of natural gas. It provides further that prior to the use of any underground reservoir or other exercise of the right of eminent domain by the public utility, the Commissioner must have found that the reservoir is suitable and feasible. Other requirements are set forth in the act pertaining to the use of property for this purpose. In this respect, the statute is restrictive. Before the broad right of expropriation may be exercised under LSA-R.S. 19:1 et seq, the conditions and requirements set forth in LSA-R.S. 30:22 must be met. Nevertheless, it is clear that the language of LSA-R.S. 30:22 presuppose the right of a public utility to expropriate property in this situation. Were we to hold otherwise, the effect of LSA-R.S. 30:22 would be completely nugatory. This is untenable. We simply cannot adopt an interpretation which would lend to a conclusion that the legislature would pass statutes which are completely vain and useless. Moreover, LSA-R.S. art. 17 provides:
'Laws in pari materia, or upon the same subject matter, must be construed with a reference to each other; what is clear in one statute may be called in aid to explain what is doubtful in another.'
When we interpret LSA-R.S. 19:1 et seq in Pari materia with LSA-R.S. 30:22, our conclusion is strengthened that a corporation created for the piping and marketing of natural gas has the right under LSA-R.S. 19:2 to expropriate underground reservoirs for the marketing of natural gas and supplying the public, provided the need exists.
But defendants insist that while they do not contest a Need exists for storage of natural gas, nevertheless, in the instant case, they do contest the need to expropriate the remaining 92 acres owned by them, since under LSA-R.S. 30:22(B) the public utility is entitled to the use of the entire underground reservoir including the area owned by the defendants when the utility company has acquired 75 percent of the area. We find no merit to this contention. As herein before pointed out, LSA-R.S. 30:22(B) does not confer the right of expropriation nor the right of Use. It presupposes that these rights are conferred from some other source. The right to expropriate is conferred in LSA-R.S. 19:1 and 19:2. In this case, the right of use is gained when the right of expropriation is exercised provided the conditions set forth under LSA-R.S. 30:22, subd. B(1)(b) are met. The right of use was acquired by contract from all of the property owners exclusive of the defendants. Without the acquisition of the right of use from the defendants by agreement and without statutory authority providing for the right of use (we have been cited none, nor can we find any), this right is acquired through expropriation. Without the right to expropriate in this case, there can be no right of use.
We further find no merit to defendant's suggestion that because the body of Acts 102 of 1906 and 123 of 1910 (the source acts for LSA-R.S. 19:1 et seq) is broader than the title, they are not to be afforded force of law. The issue before us is not whether the source acts and LSA-R.S. 19:1 et seq are unconstitutional but whether these provisions should be interpreted in light of the intent of the source acts.
In this respect, the titles of Act 208 of 1906 and Act 123 of 1910 describe an act 'relating to * * * the expropriation of property for the Laying of Pipelines for natural gas for supplying the public with natural gas.' (emphasis ours) However, the body of these acts creates the power of expropriation of land necessary 'for the Piping and Marketing of natural gas for the purpose of supplying the public with natural gas.' (emphasis ours)
Arguably, the wording in the title of these source acts indicates the intention of the legislature to grant the power of expropriation for the sole purpose of laying pipelines. Nevertheless, the substantive intent of the source acts is to confer the power of expropriation on certain corporations for the purpose of supplying the public with natural gas. Although the title indicated only one facet of the overall purpose, it is unreasonable to limit an interpretation of legislative intent to the facet indicated in the title when the body clearly provides the overall purpose. While the title includes the right to expropriate property for the laying of pipelines, this is only one phase of the entire process resulting in the marketing and supplying the public with the use of natural...
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