Mid Valley Bank v. North Valley Bank
Decision Date | 21 May 1991 |
Docket Number | No. Civ. S-88-1691 LKK.,Civ. S-88-1691 LKK. |
Citation | 764 F. Supp. 1377 |
Parties | MID VALLEY BANK, a California corporation, Plaintiff, v. NORTH VALLEY BANK, etc., et al., Defendants. And Related Third-Party Action. |
Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of California |
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William Hvidsten, Downey, Brand, Seymour & Rohwer, Sacramento, Cal., for plaintiff Mid Valley Bank.
Dale C. Campbell, Weintraub, Genshlea & Sproul, Sacramento, Cal., for North Valley Bank.
Lisa A. Wible Wright, Todd A. Murray, Hefner, Stark & Marois, Sacramento, Cal., for Della Mae Montgomery.
David Larson, Kathleen Clark, Larson & Burnham, Oakland, Cal., for Shell Oil Co.
This matter is before the court on various motions. For the reasons I explain below, (1) all motions for summary judgment are denied;1 (2) defendant North Valley Bank's ("NVB") motion to strike plaintiff's jury demand is granted; (3) plaintiff's motion to withdraw admissions is granted and sanctions are imposed; (4) defendant NVB's motion for sanctions is denied, and defendants Shell Oil Company's ("Shell") and Della Mae Montgomery's ("Montgomery") motions for sanctions are granted.
Summary judgment is appropriate when it is demonstrated that there exists no genuine issue as to any material fact, and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 157, 90 S.Ct. 1598, 1608, 26 L.Ed.2d 142 (1970); Poller v. Columbia Broadcasting System, 368 U.S. 464, 467, 82 S.Ct. 486, 488, 7 L.Ed.2d 458 (1962); Jung v. FMC Corp., 755 F.2d 708, 710 (9th Cir.1985); Loehr v. Ventura County Community College Dist., 743 F.2d 1310, 1313 (9th Cir. 1984).
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2553, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). "Where the nonmoving party will bear the burden of proof at trial on a dispositive issue, a summary judgment motion may properly be made in reliance solely on the `pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file.'" Id. Indeed, summary judgment should be entered, after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial. Id. at 322, 106 S.Ct. at 2552. "A complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party's case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial."
Id. In such a circumstance, summary judgment should be granted, "so long as whatever is before the district court demonstrates that the standard for entry of summary judgment, as set forth in Rule 56(c), is satisfied." Id. at 323, 106 S.Ct. at 2553.
If the moving party meets its initial responsibility, the burden then shifts to the opposing party to establish that a genuine issue as to any material fact actually does exist. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 1355, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986); First Nat'l Bank of Arizona v. Cities Serv. Co., 391 U.S. 253, 288-89, 88 S.Ct. 1575, 1592-93, 20 L.Ed.2d 569 (1968); Ruffin v. County of Los Angeles, 607 F.2d 1276, 1280 (9th Cir.1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 951, 100 S.Ct. 1600, 63 L.Ed.2d 786 (1980).
In attempting to establish the existence of this factual dispute, the opposing party may not rely upon the denials of its pleadings, but is required to tender evidence of specific facts in the form of affidavits, and/or admissible discovery material, in support of its contention that the dispute exists. Rule 56(e); Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586 n. 11; First Nat'l Bank, 391 U.S. at 289; Strong v. France, 474 F.2d 747, 749 (9th Cir.1973). The opposing party must demonstrate that the fact in contention is material, i.e., a fact that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law, Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2510, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986); T.W. Elec. Serv., Inc. v. Pacific Elec. Contractors Ass'n, 809 F.2d 626, 630 (9th Cir.1987), and that the dispute is genuine, i.e., the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party, Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248-49, 106 S.Ct. at 2510-11; Wool v. Tandem Computers, Inc., 818 F.2d 1433, 1436 (9th Cir. 1987).
In the endeavor to establish the existence of a factual dispute, the opposing party need not establish a material issue of fact conclusively in its favor. It is sufficient that "the claimed factual dispute be shown to require a jury or judge to resolve the parties' differing versions of the truth at trial." First Nat'l Bank, 391 U.S. at 289, 88 S.Ct. at 1592; T.W. Elec. Serv., 809 F.2d at 631. Thus, the "purpose of summary judgment is to `pierce the pleadings and to assess the proof in order to see whether there is a genuine need for trial.'" Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587, 106 S.Ct. at 1356 ( ); International Union of Bricklayers v. Martin Jaska, Inc., 752 F.2d 1401, 1405 (9th Cir.1985).
In resolving the summary judgment motion, the court examines the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any. Rule 56(c); Poller, 368 U.S. at 468, 82 S.Ct. at 488; SEC v. Seaboard Corp., 677 F.2d 1301, 1305-06 (9th Cir.1982). The evidence of the opposing party is to be believed, Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255, 106 S.Ct. at 2513, and all reasonable inferences that may be drawn from the facts placed before the court must be drawn in favor of the opposing party, Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587, 106 S.Ct. at 1356 (citing United States v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 655, 82 S.Ct. 993, 994, 8 L.Ed.2d 176 (1962) (per curiam)); Abramson v. University of Hawaii, 594 F.2d 202, 208 (9th Cir.1979). Nevertheless, inferences are not drawn out of the air, and it is the opposing party's obligation to produce a factual predicate from which the inference may be drawn. Richards v. Nielsen Freight Lines, 602 F.Supp. 1224, 1244-45 (E.D.Cal.1985), aff'd, 810 F.2d 898, 902 (9th Cir.1987).
Finally, to demonstrate a genuine issue, the opposing party Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587, 106 S.Ct. at 1356 (citation omitted).
Plaintiff brought suit pursuant to the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act ("CERCLA"), 42 U.S.C. § 9601 et seq. and various state claims. It alleges that defendants, as prior owners or operators of certain real property, are liable under CERCLA for funds plaintiff expended cleaning up hazardous substances found in the soil on the real property. Plaintiff seeks both damages pursuant 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(2)(B) and declaratory relief relative to future costs pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 9613(g)(2).
In CERCLA Congress created a private cause of action against various classes of persons for recovery of certain "response costs" occasioned by the "release" of hazardous waste at a site. 42 U.S.C. § 9607; Ascon Properties, Inc. v. Mobil Oil Co., 866 F.2d 1149, 1152-1153 (9th Cir.1989); see also Wickland Oil Terminals v. ASARCO, Inc., 792 F.2d 887, 890 (9th Cir. 1986). The suit lies "notwithstanding any other provision or rule of law, and is subject only to specified statutory defenses." Id. The suit may seek recovery of costs of response incurred consistent with the national contingency plan. 42 U.S.C. § 9607. The statute creates an additional private right of action for declaratory relief, premised on the party's ability to state a claim for damages. 42 U.S.C. § 9613(g)(2).
There are multiple elements to a cause of action under § 9607. Plaintiff must allege that the site is a "facility" within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 9601(9) and that there has been a "release" or that there is a "threatened release" of a "hazardous substance," id. at § 9607(a)(4). As I explain infra, see § IIE, relative to at least certain claims it appears that plaintiff must also allege a causal element. Finally, plaintiff must allege that the incurred response costs are "consistent with the national contingency plan." Id. at §§ 9607(a)(4) & (a)(4)(B).
Defendants seek summary judgment on the CERCLA causes of action. They contend that because of the so-called petroleum exclusion, and as a matter of fact, plaintiff cannot establish that a release of a hazardous substance occurred. They also contend that plaintiff cannot demonstrate that the cleanup actions were consistent with the national contingency plan ("NCP").
Below I determine that as a matter of statutory interpretation the exclusion does not apply to adulterated waste oil. I then turn to an examination of the various substances allegedly found on the property in order to determine whether claims premised upon the presence of such substances tender viable CERCLA causes of action. Thereafter, I examine the causation element of a CERCLA cause of action, and finally examine the requirement that the cleanup costs be consistent with the National Contingency Plan. I conclude that the existence of material issues of fact precludes the granting of summary judgment for either plaintiff or defendants on the issues tendered relative to the CERCLA claims.
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