Middlesex Mut. Assur. Co. v. Walsh

• Decision Date: 14 May 1991
• Docket Number: No. 14127,14127
• Citation: 590 A.2d 957,218 Conn. 681
• Parties: MIDDLESEX MUTUAL ASSURANCE COMPANY v. Donald F. WALSH, Sr., Administrator (ESTATE OF Donald F. WALSH, Jr.)
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court

Page 957

590 A.2d 957

218 Conn. 681

MIDDLESEX MUTUAL ASSURANCE COMPANY v. Donald F. WALSH, Sr., Administrator (ESTATE OF Donald F. WALSH, Jr.)

No. 14127.

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

Argued Dec. 4, 1990.

Decided May 14, 1991.

Charles A. Deluca, with whom, on the brief, was Holly K. Dustin, Stamford, for appellant-appellee (plaintiff).

Susan M. Cormier, with whom were Wesley W. Horton, Hartford and Melvin L. Bloomenthal, Stamford, for appellee-appellant (defendant).

Before PETERS, C.J., and SHEA, CALLAHAN, GLASS, COVELLO, HULL and BORDEN, JJ.

GLASS, Associate Justice.

This is an appeal by the plaintiff, Middlesex Mutual Assurance Company (Middlesex) from the judgment of the Superior Court confirming a $275,000 uninsured motorist arbitration award in favor of the defendant, Donald F. Walsh, Sr. (Walsh), the administrator of the estate of his son, Donald F. Walsh, Jr. (Donald), and a cross appeal by Walsh from the court's ruling regarding his entitlement to interest on the award. On the appeal, Middlesex claims that the arbitration panel and the trial court improperly determined that: (1) Donald was covered as a "resident of the household" of Walsh within the meaning of the terms of the automobile liability insurance policy issued to Walsh by Middlesex Mutual Automobile, a division of Middlesex; (2) statements made by Walsh on his application for the policy did not constitute material misrepresentations; and (3) the doctrine of estoppel did not bar Walsh from asserting that Donald was a resident of his household as a basis for recovery under the policy. On the cross appeal, Walsh raises the sole claim that the court improperly determined that he was entitled to recover interest on the award only from the date of the judgment confirming the award and not from the earlier date of the award. We affirm the judgment on the appeal, and on the cross appeal, we vacate the judgment and remand the case for further proceedings regarding Walsh's entitlement to interest on the award.

The facts are as follows. While walking across River Street in Bridgeport in the early morning hours of November 2, 1987, Donald was fatally injured by a motor vehicle operated by Steven Rivera, also known as Steven Raslavsky. Rivera had recently stolen the vehicle, and neither he nor the vehicle was insured. Thereafter, Rivera was charged with the crime of murder, but pleaded nolo contendere to manslaughter in the first degree.

As administrator of Donald's estate, Walsh filed a claim under his policy with Middlesex to recover uninsured motorist benefits for the death of Donald. Pursuant to General Statutes § 38-175c(a)(1), ¹ the claim was submitted to compulsory arbitration before a panel of three arbitrators. The panel, one arbitrator dissenting, found in favor of Walsh and awarded $275,000 to Donald's estate on April 3, 1989. Middlesex then moved to vacate the award in the Superior Court pursuant to General Statutes § 52-418(a)(4), ² and Walsh moved to confirm the award pursuant to General Statutes § 52-417. ³ On November 27, 1989, the trial court confirmed the award, and in a subsequent articulation of its decision, ruled that Walsh was entitled to recover interest on the award from the date of the judgment confirming the award rather than from the date of the award as claimed by Walsh. Thereafter, Middlesex appealed to the Appellate Court from the judgment confirming the award and Walsh cross appealed from the court's ruling concerning interest on the award. We transferred the appeal and the cross appeal to this court pursuant to Practice Book § 4023.

I

Middlesex first claims that the arbitration panel and the trial court should not have found that Donald was covered under the policy as a "resident of the household" of Walsh. After reviewing the record of the arbitration proceedings provided by the parties, the court ruled that "substantial evidence" supported the arbitrators' determination that Donald was a resident of Walsh's household. ⁴

Middlesex' challenge to the ruling focuses upon the inferences drawn by the court from the facts pertaining to Donald's residence. Specifically, Middlesex argues that the court "overlooked, misapplied, ignored and gave an improper effect" to certain statements made by Donald to the authorities at medical institutions and to the police indicating that he lived at places other than Walsh's household, or that he was homeless. Middlesex contends that these statements express Donald's belief that he was not a resident of Walsh's household, and thus "point to the sole conclusion that he did not reside at [Walsh's] home." The court's contrary conclusion, according to Middlesex, rested improperly upon "unsupported speculation that [Donald] was delusional on the numerous occasions when he gave his address (or lack of one) to third parties," the testimony of Donald's family that Middlesex characterizes as "conclusory in nature and based more on opinion than fact," and various objective factors that Middlesex claims do not conclusively establish that Donald was a resident of Walsh's household.

Essentially, Middlesex urges us to fashion a new analysis for the determination of whether a person is a resident of a particular household that would lend controlling significance, to the exclusion of other objective factors, to the intent of the person as to where he or she resides. Our prior decisions on the issue of household residence do not support such a restricted analysis. In Griffith v. Security Ins. Co., 167 Conn. 450, 454, 356 A.2d 94 (1975), for example, a case involving uninsured motorist coverage of an alleged household resident under the terms of a policy virtually identical to those at issue here, we construed the unambiguous phrase "resident of the same household" in its common and ordinary sense as defined in Webster's Third New International Dictionary: " 'those who dwell under the same roof and compose a family: a domestic establishment; specif: a social unit comprised of those living together in the same dwelling place.' " In accordance with the two primary elements that emerge from this definition, we considered in Griffith whether the facts were sufficient to establish that the father who claimed to be a resident of his son's household had a close, family-type relationship with the inhabitants of that household, and, in addition, that he actually lived in the household. Id. at 455-57, 356 A.2d 94.

While we found it relevant in the latter respect that the father had testified that he lived in a different place; id. at 457, 356 A.2d 94; we did not suggest that his intent as implied from his statements was dispositive evidence that he was not a resident of his son's household. Rather, we focused primarily upon the objective factors relevant to the dual considerations noted above, including the frequency of the father's contact with the inhabitants of his son's household, that he stayed overnight and ate meals there, that he maintained a separate apartment and kept the bulk of his personal belongings, personal and business records and received mail at his apartment address, and that he used the address of his apartment for formal purposes such as voting, motor vehicle registration and paying income tax. Id. at 455-57, 356 A.2d 94. We considered, moreover, the statements of other witnesses regarding their perception of where the father lived. Id. at 457, 356 A.2d 94. The ultimate determination as to whether the father was a resident of his son's household therefore rested upon our evaluation of a conglomeration of factors. See also Rathbun v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 144 Conn. 165, 169, 128 A.2d 327 (1956).

Furthermore, aside from the possibility that Donald's statements regarding where he lived may have been delusional, we do not agree with Middlesex that his intent evidenced by his statements, or that evidenced by the statements of any other alleged household resident, should control the outcome of the residence determination. Such an approach would inappropriately transform the residence inquiry into a mere weighing of contradictory expressions of intent, thereby diminishing the significance of the objective factors that we have previously found indicative of household residence. See Griffith v. Security Ins. Co., supra, 167 Conn. at 455-57, 356 A.2d 94; Rathbun v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., supra. Certainly, had Donald's statements unanimously expressed his belief that he lived in Walsh's household, Middlesex would not favor the narrow analysis it now urges us to undertake. In neither case would it be appropriate to attach controlling significance to such expressions of intent.

We therefore adhere to the approach to the issue of household residence outlined in Griffith, that is, the statements expressing the intent of a claimed resident as to where he or she lives are merely one factor among many to be considered in determining household residence. Applying the foregoing principles to the facts of this case, we conclude that the court properly determined that the arbitrators were possessed of substantial evidence to support their determination that Donald was a resident of Walsh's household. See Chmielewski v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 218 Conn. 646, 660-61, 591 A.2d 101 (1991).

The record reveals that Donald had suffered from chronic schizophrenia since the early 1970s. As a consequence, he was hospitalized for varying periods from the time that his illness first manifested itself until his death. Those of Donald's siblings who lived at Walsh's household testified that Donald, their oldest brother, was an integral part of Walsh's "close-knit" family notwithstanding his illness and frequent hospitalizations. His sister testified that after he became ill, "it was [her] turn to take care of him." As noted by the court, moreover, Donald "spent a great number of his days and nights during the years prior to his death at his parents' home, listening to music, playing...