Middleton v. Clayton
| Decision Date | 07 November 1984 |
| Docket Number | No. 84-244,84-244 |
| Citation | 128 Ill.App.3d 623,83 Ill.Dec. 851,470 N.E.2d 1271 |
| Parties | , 83 Ill.Dec. 851 James G. MIDDLETON, M.D., Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Gary L. CLAYTON, Director, Department of Registration and Education, State of Illinois, Defendant-Appellee. |
| Court | United States Appellate Court of Illinois |
James G. Middleton, M.D., plaintiff-appellant, pro se.
Neil F. Hartigan, Atty. Gen., Chicago (Susan C. Weidel, Chicago, of counsel), for defendant-appellee.
James G. Middleton (petitioner) appeals from an order of the circuit court which affirmed the decision of the Illinois Department of Registration and Education (Department) denying petitioner's request for restoration of his license to practice medicine in Illinois.
The record discloses the following underlying facts: petitioner was first licensed to practice medicine in 1959 in the State of Missouri. In 1962 he was licensed in Georgia, and in Tennessee. In 1964 he petitioned for licensure in Illinois based on reciprocity with Tennessee. He was licensed in Illinois, on that basis, in 1964.
In 1961 petitioner pleaded guilty to a charge of assault and battery in Ohio. In May 1962 petitioner's Missouri medical license was revoked "on the basis of unprofessional and dishonorable conduct." The Missouri Board of Registration found that petitioner had on two occasions administered certain drugs to a female patient which "rendered her powerless to resist" and then committed sexual acts upon her, without her consent.
In 1971 petitioner's Illinois medical license was revoked by the Department, premised on its findings that petitioner had committed acts which constituted "dishonorable, unethical or unprofessional conduct." The acts found to have been committed by petitioner were: (1) in the years 1968 through 1970, he had injected five different female patients with drugs, rendering them helpless to resist, and then taken sexual liberties with them, without their consent; (2) when applying for an Illinois medical license in 1963, petitioner had failed to advise Illinois authorities that his Missouri medical license had been previously revoked; and (3) when petitioner applied for medical licensure in Georgia in 1962 he was required to respond, under oath, to the question of whether he had ever been "charged or convicted" of a crime. Petitioner answered "no" when, in fact, he had previously pleaded guilty to the Ohio criminal charge, and had been charged in Missouri with the crime of rape by the use of drugs.
The record also demonstrates that petitioner, following his Illinois license revocation, was convicted of a single felony charge of deviate sexual assault in Illinois in 1972, and, in the same year, of a federal felony charge of unlawful possession of firearms.
After serving his prison sentences, petitioner first applied to the Department for restoration of his Illinois medical license in April 1980. Petitioner, who was not then represented by counsel, was denied restoration. In October 1981 petitioner secured counsel, and reapplied for restoration. It is this second application which is involved in the present appeal.
At the administrative hearing before the Illinois State Medical Disciplinary Board (Board), petitioner presented the testimony of Dr. Bernard Shulman, chairman of the Department of Psychiatry at St. Joseph's Hospital in Chicago. He testified that he had examined petitioner for about an hour and one-half, and devoted several additional hours consulting with other doctors who had also examined petitioner, as well as reviewing background documents. In Dr. Shulman's opinion, there was no evidence that petitioner was suffering from any mental or emotional illness. He found no evidence to indicate that petitioner would have any greater trouble than any other practicing physician in avoiding the medical or psychiatric problems relating to the practice of medicine. Dr. Shulman felt it appropriate to restore petitioner's medical license.
On cross-examination, Dr. Shulman acknowledged he was not an "expert" in "cases of deviate sexual behaviour."
Petitioner also presented the testimony of his wife and ten friends, many of whom had been patients of petitioner. Based on their observations of petitioner over the past twelve years they agreed that petitioner was rehabilitated and fit to practice medicine. Many of the witnesses stated that they would again consult petitioner should his medical license be restored.
Petitioner testified that since his release from prison in 1980 he has been active six days per week in continuing medical education, and had earned more than 1,900 hours of credit in such courses. He had attempted to work in medically related fields, but had been unable to do so due to his license revocation. He was "rehabilitated" due to his continuing "socialization" and medical education. He would, if required by the Department, agree to practice medicine in a controlled environment such as a group, rather than solo practice.
With regard to the Department's factual findings which led to his 1971 license revocation in Illinois, petitioner denied having abused any patients. He stated that he did not advise Illinois that his Missouri medical license had been previously revoked because he was not asked that specific question, but admitted he nonetheless should have informed Illinois of that fact. He denied the charges of sexual abuse on which the revocation of his Missouri license was based. He admitted pleading guilty to the Ohio criminal charge, but contended he was "basically" innocent. He denied his guilt of the Illinois deviate sexual assault charge. He admitted his guilt to the federal weapons charge. When asked if he felt "remorse" for the victims of his offenses, petitioner stated that there were no victims "except my wife and myself." He said he felt remorse for the victims to the extent that their personal problems prompted them to make untrue charges against him.
Petitioner told the Board that if he were allowed to resume the practice of medicine, he would not molest patients. He also contended that there is no basis for the theory that an individual's past conduct is determinative of his future conduct.
At the request of the Board, Dr. James Cavanaugh, director of the "Psychiatry in the Law" section of the Department of Psychiatry at Rush-Presbyterian-St. Luke's medical Center in Chicago, examined petitioner. Dr. Cavanaugh testified he spent some 7 hours interviewing petitioner and conducted several psychological and neurological tests of petitioner. If one accepts as true the allegations of petitioner's past misconduct, the likelihood of recidivism is "significant." Petitioner has no psychiatric, psychological or neurologic dysfunction.
It was Cavanaugh's opinion that the ability to predict "future dangerousness" is increased with a history of "prior dangerousness." Cavanaugh has treated 30 to 50 persons charged with deviate sexual behavior, and 80 to 90% of those had repeated such behavior prior to Cavanaugh's treatment.
While Cavanaugh found no major psychiatric problems afflicting petitioner, there were "suggestions" of "personality disorders." If petitioner did in fact commit the acts he denies, Cavanaugh would feel "quite comfortable in saying at a minimum there is a major sociopathic or personality disorder problem" and the likelihood of a recurrence of sexual abuse is great.
On June 15, 1983, the Board issued its decision. It found, inter alia, that petitioner "has not engaged in any form of psychiatric treatment"; that he "continues to deny any wrongdoing and expresses no contriteness" and that the Board "takes notice of the seriousness of the previous charges and accepts them as true." The Board concluded that "petitioner has failed to show sufficient evidence of rehabilitation" and recommended that the Department deny his petition for license restoration. On August 13, 1983, the Department's director issued his Order which adopted the findings, conclusions and recommendation of the Board and denied petitioner's application for license restoration.
Following denial of his motion for rehearing before the Board, plaintiff filed a pro-se complaint for administrative review in the circuit court. He there alleged that the Department's standards for determining "rehabilitation" were impermissibly vague; that the Department erred in requiring that petitioner admit wrongdoing and express contriteness; and that the Board gave insufficient weight to petitioner's witnesses and the evidence of petitioner's rehabilitation. Petitioner also filed with the court additional documents which, he contended, had not been considered by the Board.
The circuit court determined that the Department's decision was supported by the manifest weight of the evidence, and affirmed the decision denying restoration of petitioner's license to practice medicine.
On appeal, petitioner's pro-se briefs appear to raise four issues: (1) whether the Board and trial court considered all of the evidence; (2) whether the trial court employed the correct standard of review; (3) whether the Board incorrectly required petitioner to admit, and express contriteness for, his past misconduct as a basis for restoration of his license; and, (4) whether the standards governing restoration of medical licenses is impermissibly vague. 1
Petitioner's contention that neither the Board nor the trial court considered all of the evidence which favored petitioner is based on his assertion that materials he had sent (apparently by mail) to the Board at some undisclosed time prior to the administrative hearing in this case were "censored" by the Board's attorney. The record is devoid of any factual evidence to sustain such a charge. Other than petitioner's repeated accusations that the Board was somehow prevented from viewing these documents, we find no evidence to indicate that any member of the Board, or Board employee, interfered with pe...
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