Middleton v. Greeson

• Decision Date: 24 March 1886
• Docket Number: 12,725
• Citation: 5 N.E. 755,106 Ind. 18
• Parties: Middleton et al. v. Greeson, Trustee, et al
• Court: Indiana Supreme Court

5 N.E. 755

106 Ind. 18

Middleton et al. v. Greeson, Trustee, et al

No. 12,725

Supreme Court of Indiana

March 24, 1886

From the Howard Circuit Court.

The judgment is reversed, at the costs of appellees, and the cause is remanded, with instructions to the court to overrule the demurrer to the complaint.

J. C Blacklidge, W. E. Blacklidge and B. C. H. Moon, for appellants.

J O'Brien and C. C. Shirley, for appellees.

OPINION

Zollars, J.

This action was commenced by appellants against appellees, on the 24th day of August, 1885. The material averments of the complaint are correctly stated in appellant's brief, as follows:

"Appellants are taxpayers of Harrison School Township, in Howard county Indiana, and are owners of property situate therein, which is subject to taxation. Appellee Greeson is the trustee of such school township, and is about to enter into a contract with the appellee Armantrout for the construction of a school-house in District No. 4, at the price of $ 2,960. There is now a good brick house in such district. The special school fund of such township is now indebted $ 2,000, or more. If said house is built, it will increase the indebtedness chargeable to such fund to an amount at least $ 2,000 in excess of the amount now on hand belonging to such fund, and the amount to be derived from taxation for the year 1885. It is further alleged that said trustee had not procured an order from the board of commissioners of Howard county authorizing him to contract such indebtedness. Prayer for an injunction."

A demurrer to the complaint was sustained, and final judgment was rendered against the plaintiffs. The error assigned here is, that the court below erred in sustaining the demurrer.

The controlling question, and the only one we need decide, is can the trustee of the school township, without an order from the board of county commissioners authorizing it, contract a debt for the building of a school-house, which will make the aggregate debts chargeable to the special school fund exceed the amount of that fund on hand, and to be derived from the tax assessed against the township for the year 1885, being the year in which the trustee was about to incur the debt for the building of the house?

It is claimed by counsel for appellants, that he can not. This claim rests, in part, upon the contention that if he has authority to contract debts in any case, that authority is limited by, and must be exercised under, the act of 1875. Acts 1875, p. 162; R. S. 1881, sections 6006, 6007.

The substance of those sections is, that township trustees can not contract debts on behalf of their township in excess of the fund on hand to which such debts are chargeable, and of the fund to be derived from the tax assessed against their townships for the year in which such debts are to be incurred, without first procuring an order from the board of county commissioners authorizing them to contract such debts; and that, in order to procure such an order, they shall file a petition, setting forth the object for which the debts are to be incurred, and give twenty days notice of the filing of such petition.

It is further contended by appellants' counsel, that whatever doubt there might have been as to the intent and meaning of the above sections, that doubt has been settled in favor of their contention by a legislative interpretation, as expressed by the act of 1883. Acts 1883, p. 114. The title of that act is, "An act touching the duties of township trustees with reference to liquidating and contracting indebtedness of townships in certain cases."

The preamble recites that many townships had become indebted in excess of their present ability to pay and keep up the current expenses with the tax levy authorized by law.

The substance of the first section is, that in any such township, the trustee thereof may levy an additional tax of twenty cents on each one hundred dollars valuation of taxable property in such township, etc., for the debt of the school township, and a like amount for the civil township.

The substance of the second section is, that if any township trustee shall contract any debt on behalf of any civil or school township of which he may be trustee, contrary to the provisions of the above sections 6006 and 6007, he shall be liable personally, and upon his official bond, to the holder of the contract.

It is contended by counsel for appellees, that the above sections 6006 and 6007 have reference only to the trustee of the civil townships, and hence do not limit the authority of the trustee of the school township in the contracting of debts; and further, that as they have no reference to the trustees of school townships, the act of 1883, supra, is not sufficiently specific and declarative to make them apply to such trustees.

In the case of City of Valparaiso v. Gardner, 97 Ind. 1 (6) (49 Am. R. 416), in speaking of the rules of construction, this court said: "While it is our duty to yield to the words of the Constitution, still, in determining what meaning they were intended to have, it is proper to consider the circumstances under which the provision was adopted and the object it was intended to accomplish. Cooley Const. Lim. (5th ed), 78, 79."

In the case of Mayor, etc., v. Weems, 5 Ind. 547, it was said: "'When the words of a law are susceptible of two different senses, the court will adopt that sense which will not lead to an absurdity.' Smith Com. 664. Again, 'it is the duty of the courts to execute all laws according to their true intent and meaning: that intent when collected from the whole and every part of a statute must prevail, even over the literal import of terms, and control the strict letter of the law, when the latter would lead to possible injustice and contradictions.' Smith Com. 662; 1 Kent Com. 462." See, also, Board, etc., v. Cutler, 6 Ind. 354; Stayton v. Hulings, 7 Ind. 144.

In the case of Maxwell v. Collins, 8 Ind. 38, it was said: "It is a settled rule of interpretation of statutes, that the application of the words of a single statute may be enlarged or restrained to bring the operation of the act within the intention of the Legislature, when violence will not be done by such interpretation to the language of the statute." See, also, State, ex rel., v. Mayor, etc., 28 Ind. 248; Baker, Governor, v. Kirk, 33 Ind. 517.

In the case of Hedrick v. Kramer, 43 Ind. 362, this court quoted with approval the following from Kent's Commentaries: "When the words are not explicit, the intention is to be collected from the context, from the occasion and necessity of the law, from the mischief felt, and the objects and the remedy in view; and the intention is to be taken or presumed, according to what is consonant to reason and good discretion. These rules, by which the sages of the law, according to Plowden, have ever been guided in seeking for the intention of the Legislature, are maxims of sound interpretation, which have been accumulated by the experience, and ratified by the approbation of ages." 1 Kent Com. 462.

In the case of State, ex rel., v. Denny, 67 Ind. 148 (155), the following, from Blackstone's Commentaries, was quoted with approval: "There are three points to be considered in the construction of all remedial statutes; the old law, the mischief, and the remedy."

In the case of Taylor v. Board, etc., 67 Ind. 383 (384), it was said: "It is a settled principle that, in construing a statute, the intention of the Legislature must govern. To ascertain this intention, we must look to the letter of the statute, to other statutes upon the same subject, * * * to their spirit and purpose, and harmonize what may appear to be conflicting, so as to bring them into concord with a general and uniform system."

In Prather v. Jeffersonville, etc., R. R. Co., 52 Ind. 16, it was said: "So in case of doubt or uncertainty, acts in pari materia, passed before or after, and whether repealed or unrepealed, may be referred to in order to discern the intent of the Legislature in the use of particular terms; and, within the same rule and the reason of it, contemporaneous legislation, although not precisely in pari materia, may be referred to for the same purpose."

In the case of State, ex rel., v. Forkner, 70 Ind. 241, it was said: "The chief thing to be explored is the intention. This the judiciary is to seek in the history of legislation; in the objects contemplated, the evils to be corrected, and the remedies provided." See, also, Houk v. Barthold, 73 Ind. 21.

In the case of Bell v. Davis, 75 Ind. 314, it was said: "The whole statute, together with its objects, the occasion and necessity which led to its enactment, the mischief intended to be remedied, and all like matters are to be considered in determining what construction it shall receive."

In the case of Krug v. Davis, 87 Ind. 590, it was said: "In giving a construction to a statute, we must always keep in view the palpable or presumable object the Legislature had in enacting it, and endeavor, so far as practicable, to make such an application of its provisions as will best promote the object of its enactment." See, also, Smith v. Moore, 90 Ind. 294; Humphries v. Davis, 100 Ind. 274 (50 Am. R. 788); Hedderich v. State, 101 Ind. 564 (51 Am. R. 768); Storms v. Stevens, 104 Ind. 46, 3 N.E. 401. See especially the discussion in the case of Clare v. State, 68 Ind. 17.

In the case of State v. Canton, 43 Mo. 48, it was said: "The point to be determined, in giving practical application and construction to a statute, is to look at the mischief or defect which existed at the passage of the act and see what provision the law-making power has made to afford a remedy; and it is the province of the courts to so construe the law as to advance...