Middleton v. Pratt
| Decision Date | 31 August 2022 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action 21-cv-2301 (RC) |
| Parties | James B. Middleton, et al. Plaintiffs, v. Larry Pratt, et al. Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Columbia |
James B. and Marvise Middleton (“Plaintiffs”) proceeding pro se, brought claims against various defendants in connection with the impending foreclosure of their Washington, D.C. property. Defendants removed the case from D.C. Superior Court and filed motions to dismiss. Plaintiffs filed a motion to remand alleging procedural defects in the removal and challenging this Court's jurisdiction. Because the Court finds no procedural defect in the removal and is persuaded that it has jurisdiction, the Court denies Plaintiffs' Motion to Remand. In addition, because the Court finds that Plaintiffs fail to state any claims against the Defendants who have moved to dismiss,[1] the Court grants those motions to dismiss.
The court gleans the following facts from the pleadings, motions, and associated filings. On or around April 5, 2005, pro se Plaintiffs James B. and Marvise Middleton “issued a Promissory Note (‘Note') to facilitate a loan in the amount of $229,600.000 to” Defendant First Savings Mortgage Corporation (“First Savings”) and pledged a Deed of Trust (“Deed”) on their home in Washington, D.C. (the “Property”). See Superior Court Record (“Sup. Ct. R.”) at ECF pp. 35, 42, ECF No. 4.
The Deed contains sections relevant to the instant decision. The Deed grants the Trustee “power of sale” over the Property in the event Plaintiffs do not meet their obligations on the Note. See Deed of Trust at ECF p. 4, ECF 3-3. The Deed also contains a Release clause, which reads, Id. at ECF p. 14.
The Deed names Defendant Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. (“MERS”) nominee-beneficiary for First Savings. Id. at ECF p. 3. On August 22, 2012, MERS, acting as nominee for First Savings, transferred First Savings' interest in the Deed to Defendant Bank of New York Mellon Trust Company (“Mellon”).[3] Exhibit C to Defs.' Mot. to Dismiss Pls.' Am. Compl. (“Assignment of Deed”) at ECF p. 2, ECF No. 3-4.
On July 14, 2021, Plaintiffs filed their first complaint (“Complaint”) against Defendants First Savings Mortgage Corporation; Residential Asset Mortgage Products, Inc.; JPMorgan Chase Bank, NA; Residential Funding Corporation; MERS; and Does 1-100 asserting wrongful foreclosure, breach of contract, quiet title, and slander of title claims in relation to the impending foreclosure of the Property. Sup. Ct. R. at ECF pp. 34-49, ECF No. 4.[4] Plaintiffs sought injunctive, declaratory, and compensatory relief. Id. at ECF p. 36. Plaintiffs later filed their Amended Complaint. Id. at ECF p. 26-31.
The Amended Complaint differs notably from the original Complaint in several ways. Unlike the Complaint, Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint appears to have been typed into a court-provided form and does not assert any new claims, nor does it restate the claims from the Complaint. See id. The Amended Complaint also does not name any of the original Defendants, and under the pre-set heading “Additional Party Names and Addresses,” Plaintiffs list seven new defendants: “Larry Pratt CEO for [First Savings],” “Glen Messina for Ocwen Financial Corporation,” “Alvaro G[.] de Melina CEO for GMAC LLC Corporate Office,” “Bruce J. Paradis CEO for Residential Funding LLC,” “B[aron] Silverstein CEO for [NewRez]-PHH Mortgage Services,” “James Dimon CEO for JPMorgan Chase,” and “Thomas P. Gibbons for The Bank of [New York] Mellon.”[5] Compare id. at ECF p. 34 with id. at ECF pp. 26-28. It is unclear if Plaintiffs name these new Defendants as individual officers, the entities they represent, or both. Id. at ECF pp. 26-28.[6] Finally, Plaintiffs requested, in addition to their previous prayers for relief, that their “credit be repaired.” Id. at ECF p. 30.
On August 30, 2021, Defendants Mellon, Ocwen, Messina, NewRez, and Silverstein (the “moving Defendants”) removed this case from D.C. Superior Court. Not. of Removal, ECF No. 1. The moving Defendants allege that none of them were served with the original Complaint, and that only Ocwen received the Amended Complaint. Id. at 3; see also Am. Not. of Removal at 5. The Court's examination of the record from the Superior Court reveals a number of summonses for the Defendants, see Sup. Ct. R. at ECF pp. 68, 79-80, 103-108, but only Ocwen appears to have received the pleadings by certified mail, id. at ECF p. 53.
The moving Defendants allege that Plaintiffs are citizens of either Maryland or the District and that no Defendant is a citizen of either. Not. of Removal ¶¶ 5-6; Am. Not. of Removal at 4-8. Defendants do not support their allegations with affidavits or other forms of evidence. Id. Defendants ultimately assert that each Defendant is diverse from Plaintiffs, that the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000, and that therefore this Court has diversity jurisdiction to hear the case. Am. Not. of Removal at 2.
On September 7, 2021, the moving Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss. Defs.' Mot. to Dismiss Pls.' Am. Compl. (“Mot. to Dismiss”), ECF No. 3. On September 28, 2021, the Court ordered Plaintiffs to respond to the Motion to Dismiss by October 28, 2021. Order (“First Fox/Neal Order”), ECF No. 5. Plaintiffs filed a Motion to Remand on October 27, 2021, but did not address the substantive arguments made in the moving Defendants' Motion to Dismiss. Pls.' Mot. to Remand Defs. Notice of Removal and Mot. to Dismiss. (“Mot. to Remand.”), ECF No. 7. Plaintiffs allege “one of the Defendant(s)” is not diverse, but do not identify which defendant is not diverse or explain why. Id. at 2.
On November 10, 2021, the moving Defendants filed their Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion to Remand and argued that their Motion to Dismiss should be granted as conceded. Defs.' Opp'n to Pls.' Mot. to Remand Defs. Notice of Removal and Mot. to Dismiss, ECF No. 8. Defendants again asserted that each Defendant is diverse, and identified the states in which they are citizens. See Defs. Mem. Supp. Opp'n to Pls.' Mot. to Remand (“Opp'n.”) at 5-7, ECF No. 8-1.
On January 6, 2022, Defendant Larry Pratt, individually, filed a Motion to Dismiss.[7] Def. Larry Pratt's Mot. to Dismiss Pls.' Am. Compl., or Alt., Mot. for Summ. J. (“Pratt Mot. to Dismiss”), ECF No. 11. At this point, all Defendants had filed or joined in motions to dismiss except Dimon, Gibbons, Paradis, and Molina, and the businesses for which they are officers (the “non-moving Defendants”). Like the other motion to dismiss, Pratt's motion did not cite any affidavits or other evidence to establish that Pratt was diverse from Plaintiffs. See id. The same day that Pratt filed his motion to dismiss, this Court ordered Plaintiffs to respond to it by February 7, 2022. Order (“Second Fox/Neal Order”), ECF No. 12. On February 3, 2022, Plaintiffs filed their Opposition to Pratt's Motion to Dismiss. Mem. Opp'n to Defs.' Mot. to Dismiss (“Mem.”), ECF No. 13. Plaintiffs reasserted their jurisdictional challenge without specifying which Defendant is allegedly not diverse and without addressing any arguments raised by the moving Defendants. Id. at 1.[8]
On April 8, 2022, the Court granted leave for the moving Defendants to cure defects in their jurisdictional allegations, which had relied on the individual officer Defendants' residencies to plead diversity of citizenship. See Order, ECF No. 14. On April 15, 2022, the moving Defendants filed their Amended Notice of Removal which alleged diversity of citizenship on the basis of the individual officer's domiciles. Am. Not. of Removal at 4-8, ECF No. 15.
Plaintiffs make two arguments for remand: 1) Defendants failed to “agree or give consent to . . . removal,” and 2) this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction because “all of the parties fall under the diversity jurisdiction except for one of the Defendant(s).” Mot. to Remand at 1-2.
The moving Defendants respond that 1) Defendants were not required to give unanimous consent because only Ocwen was served, see Opp'n. at 8-9, 2) Plaintiffs' Motion to Remand should be dismissed, in total, as untimely, id. at 3-4, and 3) this Court has subject matter jurisdiction because all Defendants are diverse, id. at 4-5; Not. of Removal ¶¶. 21-22; Am. Not. of Removal at 3. The Court finds it has jurisdiction over the claims against the moving Defendants and denies Plaintiffs' Motion to Remand.
Generally a defendant in a civil action brought in state court may remove the action to a federal district court if the action is one over which the federal district courts have original jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). The Superior Court for the District of Columbia is considered a state court for this purpose. See id. § 1451(1). The D.C. Circuit has explained, “[w]hen it appears that a district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over a case that has been removed from a state court, the district court must remand the case.” Republic of Venez. v. Philip Morris Inc., 287 F.3d 192, 196 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c)). Because removal implicates “federalism concerns,” the court “strictly construes the scope of its removal jurisdiction.” Downey v. Ambassador Dev., LLC, 568...
To continue reading
Request your trial