Middleton v. SelecTrucks of Am., LLC
| Decision Date | 04 February 2022 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action 3:17-cv-602-RGJ |
| Parties | MELISSA MIDDLETON Plaintiff v. SELECTRUCKS OF AMERICA, LLC D/B/A SELECTRUCKS OF LOUISVILLE, ET AL. Defendants |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of Kentucky |
Defendant Daimler North America Corporation (“DNAC”) moves to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2) and 12(b)(3) [DE 105]. Defendants, SelecTrucks of America, LLC (“SelecTrucks”) and Daimler Trucks North America (“DTNA”) (collectively, the “Defendants”) move for summary judgment [DE 107] and for leave to file excess pages [DE 106]. Plaintiff Melissa Middleton (“Middleton”) responded to the Motion to Dismiss [DE 112] and Motion for Summary Judgment [DE 111] and Defendants replied [DE 113]. Briefing is complete, and the matter is ripe. For the reasons below, the Court GRANTS DNAC's Motion to Dismiss [DE 105], GRANTS Defendants' Motion for Leave to File Excess Pages [DE 106], and DENIES Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment [DE 107].
SelecTrucks is a used semi-truck retailer headquartered in Fort Mill, South Carolina. [DE 107 at 920]. SelecTrucks is wholly owned by Daimler Trucks Remarketing Corporation (“DTR”), a subsidiary of DTNA. [DE 105 at 853]. SelecTrucks employed Middleton from 2002 to 2017. [DE 39 at 38]. Initially hired as an inventory controller, Middleton was promoted in 2014 to “General Manager of the Louisville Center of SelecTrucks.” [Id. at 385]. As General Manager, Middleton was responsible for “overseeing the truck center, dealing and buying trucks, and managing people who reported to her.” [Id.]. Middleton was also responsible for developing an annual business plan for the Center and presenting the plan to a senior manager at DTR at an annual meeting. [DE 107 at 921].
From February to June 2015, Middleton took approved medical leave to “repair her damaged ACL.” [DE 39 at 386]. She claims that her supervisor, Perry Burnetti, took no issue with her leave. [Id.]. In August 2015, Bryan Howard (“Howard”) became Middleton's supervisor. [Id.]. In January 2016, Middleton took leave under the Family Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”), 29 U.S.C. § 2601, to have her gallbladder removed and returned to work two weeks later on February 9, 2016. [Id. at 387-88]. The next day, Howard placed Middleton on a Performance Improvement Plan (“PIP”). [Id. at 388]. From late-February to mid-March 2016, Middleton again took FMLA leave to have surgery on her left thyroid. [Id.]. In July 2016, Middleton sent a formal letter to Nickole White (“White”), Human Resources Manager for DNAC, requesting workplace accommodations to aid her disabilities, which included depression and migraines and problems with her ACL/knee, thyroid, and gallbladder. [Id.]. On September 29 she received a response advising that certain accommodations would be granted while others denied. [DE 111 at 1480]. White traveled to Louisville in October to personally discuss Middleton's request for accommodations. [Id.]. Middleton submitted another request for FMLA leave related to another knee surgery on October 25, 2016. [DE 107 at 932]. Middleton called off and used her vacation time from October 25 to the start of her FMLA leave on November 14. [Id. at 932-33]. Middleton's approved FMLA leave continued until April 2017. [Id.]. On the day Middleton returned from FMLA leave, she was terminated by Howard, in consultation with his supervisors. [Id. at 933].
Middleton filed suit against SelecTrucks, alleging claims of retaliation in violation of the FMLA, 29 U.S.C. § 2601, and unlawful gender discrimination and retaliation in violation of the Kentucky Civil Rights Act (“KCRA”), KRS § 344.010. [DE 1]. In her Amended Complaint, Middleton added DNAC and DTNA as parties [DE 39] and DNAC and DTNA moved to dismiss. [DE 48]. The Court issued an order denying DNAC and DNTA's Motion to Dismiss without prejudice until Plaintiff could conduct jurisdictional discovery. [DE 58]. Now that discovery related to jurisdiction has concluded, DNAC moves to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction and improper venue. [DE 105]. SelecTrucks and DTNA also move for summary judgment on Plaintiff's FMLA and KCRA claims. [DE 107].
DNAC moves the Court to dismiss this action against it for lack of personal jurisdiction and improper venue. [DE 105]. Without objection by Plaintiff [DE 112 at 1539], DNAC's motion to dismiss is GRANTED.
Defendants move this Court for leave to file in excess of the 25-page limitation required by Local Rule 7.1(d). [DE 106]. Without objection, DNAC's motion to dismiss is GRANTED.
Defendants move for summary judgment on Middleton's retaliation and gender discrimination claims. [DE 107]. Defendants argue that Middleton failed to meet sales goals and center expectations after several unsuccessful opportunities. [Id. at 921-22]. According to Defendants, Middleton has failed to produce evidence that her termination was the result of anything other than “her uniquely poor performance” [Id.].
Summary judgment is required when “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). The moving party bears the burden of specifying the basis for its motion and showing the lack of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). Once the moving party satisfies this burden, the nonmoving party must produce specific facts showing a material issue of fact for trial. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986). Factual differences are not considered material unless the differences are such that a reasonable jury could find for the party contesting the summary judgment motion. Id. at 252.
The Court must view the evidence and draw all reasonable inferences in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Williams v. Int'l Paper Co., 227 F.3d 706, 710 (6th Cir. 2000). But the nonmoving party must do more than show some “metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). Instead, the nonmoving party must present specific facts showing that a genuine factual issue exists by “citing to particular parts of materials in the record” or by “showing that the materials cited do not establish the absence . . . of a genuine dispute[.]” Shreve v. Franklin Cnty., Ohio, 743 F.3d 126, 136 (6th Cir. 2014). “The mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the [nonmoving party's] position will be insufficient; there must be evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the [nonmoving party].” Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 252.
Rule 56(c)(1) requires that a “party asserting that a fact . . . is genuinely disputed must support the assertion by . . . citing to particular parts of materials in the record, including depositions, documents, electronically stored information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations (including those made for purposes of the motion only), admissions, interrogatory answers, or other materials.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)(1)(A).
A plaintiff may establish a claim of FMLA retaliation “either by introducing direct evidence of retaliation or by proffering circumstantial evidence that would support an inference of retaliation.” Imwalle v. Reliance Med. Products, Inc., 515 F.3d 531, 543 (6th Cir. 2008). Without direct evidence of retaliation, the Court must apply the McDonnell Douglas discrimination burden-shifting framework to analyze retaliation claims at the summary judgment stage. Skrjanc v. Great Lakes Power Serv. Co., 272 F.3d 309, 313 (6th Cir. 2001) (). The burden-shifting framework requires the plaintiff to put forth a prima facie case. See McDonnell Douglass Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973). If the plaintiff succeeds, the burden then shifts back to the employer to put forth a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse employment action. See Id. Finally, the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to establish that the employer's justification for the adverse employment action was pretextual. See Id. at 804.
To support her claim of FMLA retaliation, Middleton cites the timing of her termination in conjunction with her use of intermittent FMLA leave, comments made to Middleton by her supervisor Howard, and the difference in disciplinary treatment between Middleton and similarly situated general managers for the same failure to meet sales goals. [See DE 39, 107]. The parties both adopt the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework in their arguments. [DE 107 at 9351; DE 111 at 1489]. Because Middleton offers only circumstantial evidence of retaliation, the Court analyzes her claim under the McDonnell Douglas framework.
To establish a prima facie claim for FMLA retaliation, Middleton must show that (1) she was an eligible employee for FMLA benefits, (2) she knew that she was exercising her rights under the FMLA, (3) after learning of Middleton's exercise of her FMLA rights, Defendants took an employment action adverse to her, and (4) there was a causal connection between the protected FMLA activity and the adverse employment action. Donald v. Sybra, Inc., 667 F.3d 757, 761 (6th Cir. 2012). If Middleton establishes a prima facie case of retaliation, the burden shifts to Defendants to present a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for their adverse employment...
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