Midwest Med. Records Ass'n, Inc. v. Brown

• Decision Date: 01 February 2018
• Docket Number: No. 1–16–3230,1–16–3230
• Citation: 97 N.E.3d 125,2018 IL App (1st) 163230
• Parties: MIDWEST MEDICAL RECORDS ASSOCIATION, INC. ; Renx Group, LLC, f/k/a Big Blue Capital Partners, LLC; and Tomica Premovic, Individually, and on Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated, Plaintiffs–Appellants, v. Dorothy BROWN, Clerk of the Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois; Maria Pappas, Treasurer of Cook County, Illinois; and Cook County, Illinois, a Body Politic and Corporate, Defendants–Appellees.
• Court: United States Appellate Court of Illinois

2018 IL App (1st) 163230

97 N.E.3d 125

MIDWEST MEDICAL RECORDS ASSOCIATION, INC. ; Renx Group, LLC, f/k/a Big Blue Capital Partners, LLC; and Tomica Premovic, Individually, and on Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated, Plaintiffs–Appellants,

v.Dorothy BROWN, Clerk of the Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois; Maria Pappas, Treasurer of Cook County, Illinois; and Cook County, Illinois, a Body Politic and Corporate, Defendants–Appellees.

No. 1–16–3230

Appellate Court of Illinois, First District, FOURTH DIVISION.

February 1, 2018

Myron M. Cherry & Associates, LLC (Myron M. Cherry and Jacie C. Zolna, of counsel), Zimmerman Law Offices, P.C. (Thomas A. Zimmerman Jr., of counsel), Larry D. Drury, Ltd. (Larry D. Drury, of counsel), and John H. Alexander & Associates, P.C. (John H. Alexander, of counsel), all of Chicago, for appellants.

Kimberly M. Foxx, State’s Attorney, of Chicago (Chaka M. Patterson, Paul. A Castiglione, and James S. Beligratis, Assistant State’s Attorneys, of counsel), for appellees.

OPINION

JUSTICE BURKE delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

¶ 1 Plaintiffs, Midwest Medical Records Association, Inc., Renx Group, LLC, and Tomica Premovic, appeal following the circuit court's dismissal of their consolidated class action complaint challenging the practice of defendant, Dorothy Brown, Clerk of the Circuit Court of Cook County (Clerk), charging a fee for filing a petition or motion to reconsider, vacate, or modify interlocutory judgments or orders in the circuit court. In granting defendants' motion to dismiss the complaint under section 2–615 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Code) ( 735 ILCS 5/2–615 (West 2014) ), the circuit court held that plaintiffs' claims were barred by the voluntary payment doctrine and that no private right of action existed under section 27.2a(g) of the Clerks of Courts Act (or Act) ( 705 ILCS 105/1 et seq. (West 2014)).

¶ 2 I. BACKGROUND

¶ 3 Section 27.2a(g) of the Clerks of Courts Act imposes a fee for filing a petition to vacate or modify "any final judgment or order of court." 705 ILCS 105/27.2a(g) (West 2014). Under this section, plaintiffs were each charged a $60 filing fee for filing motions to reconsider interlocutory orders in their separate underlying cases pending in the circuit court of Cook County. Plaintiffs paid these fees but not under protest. Plaintiffs then individually instituted lawsuits against defendants.¹ The lawsuits were subsequently all transferred as related to the same docket.

¶ 4 Plaintiffs filed a consolidated amended class action complaint against defendants on May 5, 2016, for equitable and monetary relief. Plaintiffs alleged that they brought suit on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated who paid a fee for filing a motion to reconsider an interlocutory order in the circuit court of Cook County under section 27.2a(g)(1) and (2) of the Act from November 19, 2010, to the present. Plaintiffs asserted that the filing fee was unauthorized under section 27.2a(g), but they paid the fees involuntarily and under duress because they would have been denied their constitutional right to challenge the interlocutory orders and suffered detrimental consequences and adverse judgments against them if they had not paid the fees.

¶ 5 In count I, plaintiffs sought a declaratory judgment that the practice of collecting the filing fee for motions or petitions to reconsider, vacate, or modify interlocutory orders was unlawful under section 27.2a(g), and requested equitable and monetary relief and reasonable attorney fees and expenses. Count II alleged that plaintiffs had an implied private cause of action under the Clerks of Courts Act based on the Clerk's violation of section 27.2a(g), and requested equitable and monetary relief, restitution of the unlawful fees they paid, and reasonable attorney fees and expenses. Count III alleged unjust enrichment based on the unlawful imposition of filing fees. Count IV prayed for injunctive relief prohibiting charging or collection of the fees.

¶ 6 Defendants moved to dismiss the complaint pursuant to sections 2–615 and 2–619 of the Code. 735 ILCS 5/2–615, 2–619 (West 2014). Defendants argued that (1) the claim was barred by the involuntary payment doctrine, (2) the filing fees were appropriately charged as section 27.2a(g) applies to nonfinal orders, (3) count II should be dismissed on grounds that the Clerks of Courts Act does not provide for a private right of action, and (4) the claim was collaterally stopped. Defendants also argued that although plaintiffs requested attorney fees in all four counts, there was no legal basis for such relief, as a court cannot order the government to pay plaintiffs' attorney fees absent statutory authority or an agreement to create a common fund where a plaintiff advances a legal theory in tort or contract.

¶ 7 On September 15, 2016, the circuit court granted the motion to dismiss under section 2615 but denied the motion as to section 2–619. Concerning count I, the circuit court rejected plaintiffs' claim that they paid the filing fees under duress because they would have lost the opportunity to contest the rulings of the court unless they paid the fees. The circuit court concluded that plaintiffs failed to adequately plead duress, they did not sufficiently show that they were denied access to a service that was necessary or essential, and plaintiffs were represented by counsel when they paid the fees. With respect to count II, the circuit court held that there was no implied private cause of action under section 27.2a(g) as plaintiffs were not members of the class intended to be benefited by the statute and plaintiffs failed to show that a private right of action was necessary to provide an adequate remedy, as plaintiffs could have simply paid the fees under protest and then pursued their remedies. The circuit court also dismissed counts III and IV as they depended on counts I and II. The court dismissed the consolidated amended class action complaint without prejudice.

¶ 8 Plaintiffs filed a motion to reconsider, which the circuit court denied. Plaintiffs then filed a second amended consolidated class action complaint. Defendants made an oral motion to dismiss. The parties agreed to rely on their prior briefs submitted in defendants' motion to dismiss the amended consolidated class action complaint and plaintiffs' motion to reconsider.

¶ 9 On November 23, 2016, the circuit court granted defendants' motion "on grounds of voluntary payment and other reasons set forth in" the court's September 15, 2016, order, and it dismissed the complaint with prejudice. Plaintiffs timely appealed the circuit court's September 15 and November 23, 2016, orders.

¶ 10 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 11 A. Standard of Review

¶ 12 This court reviews motions to dismiss under section 2–615 of the Code de novo . Kean v. Wal–Mart Stores, Inc. , 235 Ill. 2d 351, 361, 336 Ill.Dec. 1, 919 N.E.2d 926 (2009). The question presented by a section 2–615 motion is "whether the allegations of the complaint, when taken as true and viewed in a light most favorable to the plaintiff, are sufficient to state a cause of action upon which relief can be granted." Turner v. Memorial Medical Center , 233 Ill. 2d 494, 499, 331 Ill.Dec. 548, 911 N.E.2d 369 (2009). We consider only those facts apparent from the face of the pleadings, matters of which this court may take judicial notice, and judicial admissions in the record. Pooh–Bah Enterprises, Inc. v. County of Cook , 232 Ill. 2d 463, 473, 328 Ill.Dec. 892, 905 N.E.2d 781 (2009). Any exhibits attached to the complaint "are considered part of the pleading for every purpose." Dratewska–Zator v. Rutherford , 2013 IL App (1st) 122699, ¶ 14, 375 Ill.Dec. 95, 996 N.E.2d 1151. "Mere conclusions of law or facts unsupported by specific factual allegations in a complaint are insufficient to withstand a section 2–615 motion to dismiss." Ranjha v. BJBP Properties, Inc. , 2013 IL App (1st) 122155, ¶ 9, 370 Ill.Dec. 608, 988 N.E.2d 964.

¶ 13 Additionally, this case involves the construction of statutory language, which presents an issue of law we review de novo . People v. Perez , 2014 IL 115927, ¶ 9, 385 Ill.Dec. 41, 18 N.E.3d 41. In construing statutory language, this court's "primary objective is to ascertain and give effect to the legislature's intent, keeping in mind that the best and most reliable indicator of that intent is the statutory language itself, given its plain and ordinary meaning." Id. We consider a statute as a whole and construe its language in light of other statutory provisions. Id.

¶ 14 On appeal, "this court reviews the judgment, not the reasoning, of the trial court, and we may affirm on any grounds in the record, regardless of whether the trial court relied on those grounds or whether the trial court's reasoning was correct." Coghlan v. Beck , 2013 IL App (1st) 120891, ¶ 24, 368 Ill.Dec. 407, 984 N.E.2d 132.

¶ 15 B. Section 27.2a(g)

¶ 16 Section 27.2a(g) of the Clerks of Courts Act provides, in pertinent part:

"The fees of the clerks of the circuit court in all counties having a population of 3,000,000 or more inhabitants in the instances described in this Section shall be as provided in this Section. In those instances where a minimum and maximum fee is stated, the clerk of the circuit court must charge the minimum fee listed and may charge up to the maximum fee if the county board has by resolution increased the fee. The fees shall be paid in advance and shall be as follows:

* * *

(g) Petition to Vacate or Modify.

(1) Petition to vacate or modify any final judgment or order of court, except in forcible entry and detainer cases and small claims cases or a petition to reopen an estate, to modify, terminate, or enforce a judgment or order for child or spousal support, or to modify, suspend, or terminate an order for withholding, if filed before 30 days after the entry of the judgment or order, a minimum of $50 and a maximum of $60.

(2) Petition to vacate or modify any final

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