Mieher v. Brown

• Citation: 301 N.E.2d 307,54 Ill.2d 539
• Decision Date: 04 June 1973
• Docket Number: No. 45065,45065
• Parties: Esther MIEHER, Admr., Appellee, v. Kenneth L. BROWN et al. Appeal of INTERNATIONAL HARVESTER COMPANY.
• Court: Supreme Court of Illinois

Page 307

301 N.E.2d 307

54 Ill.2d 539

Esther MIEHER, Admr., Appellee, v. Kenneth L. BROWN et al. Appeal of INTERNATIONAL HARVESTER COMPANY.

No. 45065.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

June 4, 1973.

Rehearing Denied Sept. 27, 1973.

Hoagland, Maucker, Bernard & Almeter, Alton, and Lord, Bissell & Brook, Chicago (Robert B. Maucker, Alton, Gordon R. Close, and Richard E. Mueller, Chicago, of counsel), for appellant.

Phelps, Russell & Kasten, Carlinville (Carl E. Kasten, Carlinville, of counsel), for appellee.

RYAN, Justice.

Kathryn Mieher, while driving east on State Highway 140 near Old Ripley, Illinois, collided with the right rear corner of an International Harvester truck which was also going east and which was making a right turn off of the highway. Kathryn Mieher died as a result of injuries received in the accident. The plaintiff, Esther Mieher, as administrator of Kathryn Mieher's estate, filed a two-count action in the circuit court of Montgomery County against Kenneth L. Brown, the driver of the truck. Later, the plaintiff amended her complaint and added counts III and IV claiming damages against International Harvester Company (hereinafter defendant) for the wrongful death of the decedent, and for funeral, hospital and medical bills, alleging that the truck with which the decedent collided was negligently designed. On motion of the defendant, counts III and IV were stricken. Plaintiff appealed to the appellate court, which reversed the trial court (3 Ill.App.3d 802, 278 N.E.2d 869), and we granted leave to appeal.

The amended complaint alleged that the defendant had negligently designed the truck in that it did not attach to the rear of it a bumper, fender or shield. The plaintiff alleged that the absence of a bumper, fender or shield made the truck unsafe in that a vehicle colliding with the rear of it would be allowed to proceed unimpeded under the bed of the truck. From the allegations, it appears that the plaintiff's decedent sustained fatal injuries when her automobile ran under the rear of the truck and the truck bed penetrated the windshield of the car which she was driving.

The amended complaint had been considered by both parties in the trial court and in the appellate court as being based on the theory of strict liability. However, the appellate court held that it did not state a cause of action on the theory of strict liability in that it did not allege that the truck was in the same condition when it left the possession of the defendant as it was at the time of the accident which caused decedent's death. (See Williams v. Brown Manufacturing Co., 45 Ill.2d 418, 432, 261 N.E.2d 305.) The appellate court held, however, that the amended complaint did state a cause of action based on common-law negligence on the basis of the allegation of negligent design and it reversed. the trial court's dismissal.

The appellate court correctly concluded that the amended complaint failed to state a cause of action for strict liability. We shall therefore examine the amended complaint as one based on common-law negligence. In doing so we must test the amended complaint by the traditional requirements of such an action: the existence of a duty owed by the defendant to the decedent, the breach of that duty and the injury proximately resulting from this breach. (Prosser, Handbook of the Law of Torts (4th ed. 1971), sec. 30.) The determination of the question of duty--whether the defendant and the decedent stood in such a relationship to one another that the law imposed upon the defendant an obligation of reasonable conduct for the benefit of the decedent--is an issue of law for the determination of the court. (Prosser, Law of Torts (4th ed. 1971), sec. 45; Restatement (Second) of Torts, sec. 328B.) Since we are here determining the propriety of the trial court's dismissal of the amended complaint, we are concerned only with that question of law presented by the pleading.

In concluding that under the facts alleged in the amended complaint the defendant owed the plaintiff's decedent the duty to exercise reasonable care in designing its motor vehicle, the appellate court placed substantial reliance on Larsen v. General Motors Corp. (8th cir. 1968), 391 F.2d 495, and other cases which followed the Larsen rationale. (Badorek v. General Motors Corp. (1971), 11 Cal.App.3d 902, 90 Cal. Rptr. 305; Grundmanis v. British Motor Corp. (E.D.Wis.1970), 308 F.Supp. 303; Mickle v. Blackmon (1969), 252 S.Ct. 202 166 S.E.2d 173; Dyson v. General Motors Corp. (E.D.Pa.1969), 298 F.Supp. 1064.) The reasoning in this line of cases, as stated in Larsen, is: 'While automobiles are not made for the purpose of colliding with each other, a frequent and inevitable contingency of normal automobile use will result in collisions and injury-producing impacts.' (391 F.2d at 502.) These cases finding that such injury-producing impacts are foreseeable conclude that the manufacturer is under a duty to design its vehicle to avoid subjecting the user to an unreasonable risk of injury in the event of collision.

The appellate court acknowledged that there is a considerable amount of authority to the contrary. The leading case supporting the contrary view is Evans V. General Motors Corp. (7th cir. 1966), 359 F.2d 822, cert. denied 385 U.S. 836, 87 S.Ct. 83, 17 L.Ed.2d 70. Cases which accepted and followed Evans are: Schemel v. General Motors Corp. (7th cir. 1967), 384 F.2d 802, cert. denied, 390 U.S. 945, 88 S.Ct. 1030, 19 L.Ed.2d 1134; Shumard v. General Motors Corp. (E.D. Ohio 1967), 270 F.Supp. 311; Walton v. Chrysler Motor Corp. (Miss.1969), 229 So.2d 568. This line of cases holds that the intended use of an automobile does not include its participation in collisions despite the manufacturer's ability to foresee the possibility that such collisions may occur. These cases hold that the manufacturer's duty extends only to insure that the vehicle is reasonably safe for its intended use.

Naturally the plaintiff in this case urges the foreseeability test of Larsen in our determination of whether the defendant owed to the plaintiff's decedent a duty to use reasonable care in designing its vehicle to avoid subjecting the decedent to an unreasonable risk. Just as naturally, the defendant argues against the application of the foreseeability doctrine as defined in Larsen and asserts that the defendant owed no duty to the decedent. The defendant likewise argues that the cases which adhere to the Larsen reasoning are factually different from the case now before this court and are of no help in its determination.

Both the Larsen cases and the Evans cases involve so-called 'second collision' injuries by the occupants of the alleged defective vehicles. In these cases, after the original collision, the occupants were injured due to an alleged defect in the vehicle in which they were riding. Recovery was sought against the manufacturer of the vehicle in which the injured party was riding. Our case differs substantially, although it may be, in fact, a 'second collision' case to the extent that the plaintiff claims that the decedent received fatal injuries occasioned by the defective design in the truck after the original...