MIFAB, Inc. v. Ill. Human Rights Comm'n

Decision Date01 May 2020
Docket NumberNo. 1-18-1098,1-18-1098
Parties MIFAB, INC., Petitioner-Appellant, v. ILLINOIS HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION and Clint Towers, Respondents-Appellees.
CourtUnited States Appellate Court of Illinois

John L. Leonard, of Teeple Leonard & Erdman, and Patrick E. Dwyer III, of Dwyer & Coogan, P.C., both of Chicago, and Richard F. Loritz, of Loritz & Associates, Ltd., of Orland Park, for petitioner.

Kwame Raoul, Attorney General, of Chicago (Benjamin F. Jacobson, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for respondent Illinois Human Rights Commission.

Matthew P. Weems, of Chicago, for other respondent.

JUSTICE HALL delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

¶ 1 Petitioner, MIFAB, Inc. (MIFAB), seeks direct administrative review of a default order entered against it by the Illinois Human Rights Commission (Commission) on Clint Towers'ss charge of race and national origin discrimination. Petitioner also contests the Commission's order awarding Towers damages for back pay, emotional distress and attorney fees. For the following reasons we affirm the Commission's decision.

¶ 2 BACKGROUND

¶ 3 Petitioner, a plumbing supply business, moved its operations to Chicago from Toronto, Ontario, Canada, in mid-June 2006. Towers was hired as a full-time employee later that month to work in the warehouse of the newly opened Chicago plant. He also worked overtime, but those hours began to decrease in September 2006. On November 7, 2006, petitioner fired Towers.

¶ 4 On November 14, 2006, Towers filed a charge of race and national origin discrimination against petitioner with the Illinois Department of Human Rights (Department) alleging that he was paid less than his Hispanic coworkers, denied overtime, and unlawfully terminated.

¶ 5 In early October of 2008, Towers filed a complaint with the Commission. However, the record on appeal does not provide any indication of what transpired between December 2006, and October 2008, when Towers filed his complaint with the Commission.

¶ 6 During a subsequent case management conference on March 10, 2009, the administrative law judge (ALJ) ordered the parties to initiate discovery by April 24, 2009. On June 9, 2009, the ALJ ordered petitioner to initiate discovery, and Towers to supplement discovery by July 10, 2009. In August of 2009, once again, the parties were ordered to complete discovery by September 16, 2009, and appear at the next status hearing on September 23. Petitioner did not appear at the next status hearing and did not complete discovery, and Towers was granted leave to file a motion to compel. In his motion, Towers asserted that petitioner refused to provide adequate and complete responses to his discovery requests.

¶ 7 In October of 2009, during the hearing on the motion to compel, the ALJ ordered the parties to confer and agree, in writing, upon outstanding discovery issues and serve answers by November 30, 2009. Petitioner did not do so. Once again, on April 7, 2010, the ALJ ordered petitioner to answer outstanding discovery by May 7, 2010. She also ordered the parties to engage in a Rule 201(k) conference ( Ill. S. Ct. R. 201(k) (eff. July 1, 2014) and file a statement if issues remained; ordered Towers to file a revised motion to compel by May 27, 2010, if necessary; and ordered the parties to communicate in a timely, respectful and civil fashion to avoid unnecessarily protracted proceedings.

¶ 8 On June 10, 2010, the ALJ ordered the parties to engage in another Rule 201(k) conference and ordered petitioner to respond to Towers's motion to compel. Although Towers responded to petitioner's motion to compel in a timely manner, petitioner did not file a response to Towers's motion to compel. On September 29, 2010, at the hearing on the parties' motions to compel, the ALJ ordered both parties to file revised motions by November 5, 2010. Towers filed a timely motion; however, petitioner filed its motion three days late.

¶ 9 On December 14, 2010, for the second time petitioner failed to appear at a scheduled hearing, and the ALJ ordered petitioner to file a response to Towers's two motions to compel and his motion to strike petitioner's discovery responses by January 2, 2011.

¶ 10 During a status hearing on January 26, 2011, petitioner was ordered to submit complete responses to Towers's second motion to compel discovery responses. Petitioner was also ordered to file a certificate of service of its responses with the Commission no later than February 3, 2011, and prepare courtesy copies of all its responses and bring them to the next status hearing. The ALJ ordered Towers to file an amended complaint to reflect a plain and concise statement of the cause of action and file a certificate of service that he served supplemental answers to petitioner's discovery. Finally, the order also provided that failure to comply would likely result in sanctions.

¶ 11 On February 7, 2011, Towers filed his first amended complaint which the ALJ struck and granted him leave to file a second amended complaint. The ALJ also ordered petitioner to answer the second amended complaint and ordered the parties to appear at the next status hearing on April 12, 2011. The record indicates that petitioner did not answer Towers's second amended complaint.

¶ 12 On April 12, 2011, for the third time, petitioner failed to appear at a status hearing. During the hearing, Towers represented that petitioner's discovery responses were still incomplete, and he allowed the ALJ to review the documents petitioner had produced. Towers also moved for sanctions against petitioner. Presented with Towers's motion for sanctions, the ALJ noted that she had recalled the case to allow sufficient opportunity for petitioner to appear, and that petitioner had yet to comply with her January 26, 2011, order to provide courtesy copies of its discovery responses for her review. The ALJ reasoned that section 5300.750(e) of title 56 of the Illinois Administrative Code (Code) ( 56 Ill. Adm. Code 5300.750(e) (1998) ) authorized sanctions as justice may require, including a recommendation for default where a party fails to appear at a scheduled hearing without requesting a continuance reasonably in advance, or unreasonably refuses to comply with any order entered, or otherwise engages in conduct which unreasonably delays or protracts these proceedings. As such, the ALJ determined that petitioner's conduct caused unreasonable delay, and warranted sanctions, and ordered petitioner to pay Towers's attorney fees for preparation and attendance at the hearing.

¶ 13 The ALJ also ordered petitioner to file a verified answer to Towers's second amended complaint by April 22, 2011. Finally, the ALJ ordered petitioner to comply with the January 26, 2011, order or face the possibility of sanctions, including default judgment.

¶ 14 On May 4, 2011, Towers filed a motion for default against petitioner, asserting that it still had not provided complete responses to his supplemental discovery. On May 9, 2011, petitioner filed its answer to Towers's second amended complaint 17 days late. It also filed its responses to Towers's supplemental interrogatories on May 10 and filed courtesy copies with the ALJ on May 11.

¶ 15 In her May 11 order, the ALJ noted that petitioner had, once again, failed to comply with her orders; namely, petitioner failed to serve its responses to Towers's supplemental interrogatories in a timely manner but served them 18 days late. Petitioner also served no additional production responses as ordered. The ALJ also noted that on two occasions petitioner failed to file courtesy copies with certificates of service to the Commission in a timely manner. The ALJ ordered petitioner to file an answer to Towers's motion for default by May 27, scheduled a hearing on the motion, and encouraged the parties to discuss settlement. On May 17, 2011, petitioner finally produced approximately 400 documents to Towers.

¶ 16 On June 21, 2011, during the hearing on Towers's motion for default, the ALJ noted that, after she had already assessed sanctions, petitioner still failed to comply with her orders and had not presented a good faith reason for its conduct. The ALJ determined that petitioner had engaged in conduct that warranted a sanction of default pursuant to section 5300.750(e) of Title 56 of the Code which provides:

"Should a Party fail to appear at a scheduled hearing without requesting a continuance reasonably in advance, or unreasonably refuse to comply with any Order entered under this Part, or otherwise engage in conduct which unreasonably delays or protracts proceedings, the Administrative Law Judge may file a recommendation of dismissal with prejudice or default or other appropriate Order imposing sanctions as justice may require including requiring the offending Party or attorney to pay the reasonable expenses and attorney's fees incurred by any other Party as a result of the misconduct. In a case proceeding under the alternative hearing procedure, the Administrative Law Judge may issue a Final Order containing any sanction for unreasonable conduct which the Commission may impose under this Section." 56 ll. Admin. Code § 5300.750(e).

Therefore, the ALJ recommended a default against petitioner on the issue of liability for engaging in conduct that unreasonably delayed the proceedings, and a hearing on damages was scheduled. Petitioner subsequently filed a motion to reconsider the ALJ's recommendation of default, which was denied.

¶ 17 On December 6 and 7, 2011, during the damages hearing, petitioner renewed its motion to reconsider the ALJ's recommendation of default, which was, once again, denied. Towers testified during the hearing that, when he began working at MIFAB, he earned $14 per hour for regular pay and $21 per hour for overtime pay. He also received compliments regarding his hard work. Towers testified that in mid-August 2006, during a meeting held with the black employees, his...

To continue reading

Request your trial
3 cases
  • Champaign-Urbana Pub. Health Dist. v. Ill. Human Rights Comm'n
    • United States
    • United States Appellate Court of Illinois
    • April 14, 2022
    ...3d 264, 267, 240 Ill.Dec. 459, 717 N.E.2d 552, 554 (1999) ) or the opposite conclusion is clearly evident ( MIFAB, Inc. v. Illinois Human Rights Comm'n , 2020 IL App (1st) 181098, ¶ 40, 444 Ill.Dec. 677, 164 N.E.3d 1252 ). " ‘If the record contains any evidence supporting the Commission's d......
  • People v. Ruhl
    • United States
    • United States Appellate Court of Illinois
    • September 21, 2021
    ...575, 917 N.E.2d 401 (2009). We would be well within our discretion were we to dismiss this appeal. See MIFAB, Inc. v. Illinois Human Rights Comm'n , 2020 IL App (1st) 181098, ¶ 33, 444 Ill.Dec. 677, 164 N.E.3d 1252. Nevertheless, we decline to do so. Owing to defendant's frequent appeals, w......
  • Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sommerville
    • United States
    • United States Appellate Court of Illinois
    • August 13, 2021
    ...that Sommerville's emotional distress was caused by Hobby Lobby's discriminatory treatment of her. See MIFAB, Inc. v. Illinois Human Rights Comm'n , 2020 IL App (1st) 181098, ¶ 76, 444 Ill.Dec. 677, 164 N.E.3d 1252 (where evidence presented at damages hearing supported the Commission's awar......

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT