Mifflin Bridge Co. v. County of Juniata

• Decision Date: 05 October 1891
• Docket Number: 298
• Citation: 144 Pa. 365,22 A. 896
• Parties: MIFFLIN BRIDGE CO. v. COUNTY OF JUNIATA
• Court: Pennsylvania Supreme Court

22 A. 896

144 Pa. 365

MIFFLIN BRIDGE CO. v. COUNTY OF JUNIATA

No. 298

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania

October 5, 1891

Argued May 26, 1891

APPEAL BY DEFENDANT FROM THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF MIFFLIN COUNTY.

No. 298 January Term 1891, Sup. Ct.; court below, No. 16 August Term 1890, C.P.

On April 22, 1889, proceedings were commenced in the Court of Quarter Sessions of Juniata county, under the act of May 8 1876, P.L. 131, and its supplements, for the taking, as a county bridge, of a wooden bridge erected and maintained by the Mifflin bridge company over the Juniata river, at Mifflin in said county, by virtue of an act of incorporation approved March 5, 1828, P.L. 152, and for the assessment of the damages which might accrue to the company by reason of such taking.

While the proceedings were pending, a flood, occurring on June 1 1889, swept away the superstructure of the bridge and damaged the piers. The company having rebuilt the bridge, repairing and enlarging the piers, and placing thereon an iron superstructure, the viewers appointed in said proceeding made a report on January 24, 1890, finding that the bridge should be made free of tolls, and valuing it at $25,000. On February 6, 1890, the report was approved; and it was ordered that the county of Juniata should take possession of the bridge, and that the collection of tolls thereon should cease. On March 11, 1890, the bridge company appealed from the assessment of damages to the Court of Common Pleas, and on the same day applied for a change of venue. The court, after framing an issue between the bridge company as plaintiff, and the county of Juniata as defendant, awarded a change of venue to Mifflin county, and the issue was accordingly certified to the Court of Common Pleas of the latter county.

At the trial, on August 25, 1890, the plaintiff, the bridge company called L. G. Brown, who testified that he was the contracting agent of the King Bridge Company; that on behalf of that company he contracted for the erection of the Mifflin bridge in 1889, and that on an average he made estimates on at least one hundred bridges every year. The plaintiff then offered to prove by the witness "the actual value of the superstructure."

Defendant's counsel objected, "because this witness has testified that he contracted for and built the bridge. We do not object to his testifying as to what the contract price was, and what its actual cost was; but we do object to his testifying to any imaginary value that he may put upon it."

By the court: The measure of damages, in the case on hand, is not to be ascertained and settled by the contract price paid for the bridge by the plaintiff company, because they might pay an excessive price on the one hand, or have obtained it for less than it was actually worth on the other. The witness may state, if he knows, what in his judgment would be a fair price between man and man for the superstructure of the bridge as it was located on the piers at the time the defendant seized and appropriated it to its own use. For these reasons, we overrule the objection and admit the evidence; exception.

The witness then stated that a fair price for the superstructure in the market, as bridges ordinarily sell, would be at least $16,500.

On cross-examination, the witness was asked: "Q. Your company built this bridge? A. Yes, sir. Q. What did it cost the bridge company?"

Objected to, because it is irrelevant and immaterial.

By the court: It looks to us that it is a matter of indifference what the plaintiff company paid for the structure. It is a matter of indifference to the defendant whether it got it for nothing, or whether it got it at a nominal rate, or whether it paid an excessive price. The proper value, after all, is what it was reasonably worth at the time of its seizure and occupancy by the defendant, and for that reason we sustain the objection and reject the evidence; exception.

Defendant's counsel offer to ask the witness "what the contract price was, of the King Bridge Company with the plaintiff, for the erection and construction of this bridge, and what the plaintiff paid the King Bridge Company for it; this, for the purpose of showing what the actual worth of the bridge was, and as a test of the judgment of the witness on the stand as to its actual worth."

Objected to, because it is immaterial to the issue.

By the court: Objection sustained, for the reason given in rejecting the preceding offer; exception.

R. E. Parker, treasurer of the plaintiff company, having testified for the plaintiff that he had superintended the reconstruction of the bridge, after the flood of 1889, and that the masonry put into the piers in repairing and raising them was first-class in quality, defendant's counsel offered to ask the witness, upon cross-examination, what was the actual cost to the company of repairing the abutments and building up the piers, this being offered "as some evidence to show the value of the superstructure, and also to show the number of perches of stone in the superstructure."

Objected to, first, "because these were simply repairs, and we are here to ascertain the value of the whole, both old and new; no separation has been made on the other side between the old and new, and the test is, not what it cost to do the work, but what it was worth when it was done is the criterion of the value."

By the court: Objection sustained, evidence rejected; exception.

In the defendant's case in chief, an offer was made to prove by R. E. Parker and other witnesses what the entire cost of the masonry and stone work was, to repair the damages done by the flood of 1889, and upon which the present bridge superstructure was erected. This was offered "as evidence to show the value of the property taken by the defendant under the act of assembly."

Plaintiff's counsel objected, "because the testimony of witnesses in regard to the value of this masonry per perch is the best evidence; that what it might have cost is not an element or indication of what it is worth, because they may have made a bargain; and that the value of the old bridge would not be taken into account."

By the court: The damages are not to be ascertained by what it cost, but by what it was worth at the time of the seizure. We therefore sustain the objection and reject the evidence; exception.

Defendant's counsel offered certified copies of the returns made by the bridge company to the auditor general, of the value of its capital stock for the years 1881 to 1889 inclusive; this for the purpose of showing the estimate and value of the capital stock of said company, as made by the company itself, under oath by its authorized officers.

From the returns in question, it appeared that the paid-in capital of the company was $15,150, divided into 606 shares of stock, of the par value of $25 each; that in the years 1881 and 1884 the company declared dividends of less than six per cent; in the years 1882 and 1883 no dividends at all, and in each of the years 1885 to 1889, inclusive, dividends in excess of six per cent; and that the treasurer and secretary of the company reported to the auditor general appraisements of the capital stock as follows: 1881 and 1882 at $25 per share; 1883, at $16 per share; 1884, at $20 per share; 1885, at $22 per share; and 1886 to 1889, inclusive, at $25 per share.

The offer was objected to, first, "because it is not evidence for the purpose offered. The value of the property of the bridge company is the actual worth of the superstructure and the franchises; this at best would be but the opinion of the people who made it. The jurors in this case are to determine from all the evidence what is the value of the property and its franchises. We also object because the stock may not have been of any more value, in point of fact, when the returns were made, because this bridge had been carried away by floods at different times, and it was compelled to renew its structure from time to time, involving the company in large expenses and in debt, and until these were paid and out of the way, the stock could not have declared a dividend and might have been of very small value; and therefore the valuation put upon the capital stock is not evidence of the value of the corporation, either as to its physical property or its franchises. We also object, because it shows no appraisement of the value of the present bridge which the defendant took; that the last return made would be whilst the bridge was undergoing reconstruction, by which the company involved itself to the full extent of the cost of the superstructure and the new masonry, and thus the capital stock would be rendered valueless for the time being."

By the court: I am of the opinion that the objections are well taken, and that the returns made by the officers of the company to the auditor general, for the purposes of taxation, are not evidence to fix the value of the corporate property at the time it was taken by the defendant on the sixth day of February, 1890, and therefore reject the evidence; exception.

Defendant then offered, by itself, the appraisement of 1889, sworn to by the treasurer and secretary on November 16, 1889, to show that "at that time these officers, in pursuance of their duty as enjoined on them by the act of assembly, valued and appraised the capital stock of the bridge company at $25 per share, amounting in the aggregate to the sum of $15,150; to be followed by proof that at the time this report and appraisement were made, the contract for the superstructure of the bridge had been entered into and its cost thus ascertained, the piers, abutments and approaches had then been completed, or nearly so, and their cost ascertained, so that the company knew at that time what the value...