Migliore v. Shelby Cnty.

• Decision Date: 25 March 2022
• Docket Number: 2:20-cv-02841-JDB-jay
• Parties: CINDY MIGLIORE, Plaintiff, v. SHELBY COUNTY, TENNESSEE, and TEMIIKA D. GIPSON, Individually, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Western District of Tennessee

CINDY MIGLIORE, Plaintiff,
v.
SHELBY COUNTY, TENNESSEE, and TEMIIKA D. GIPSON, Individually, Defendants.

No. 2:20-cv-02841-JDB-jay

United States District Court, W.D. Tennessee

March 25, 2022

ORDER ADOPTING MAGISTRATE JUDGE'S REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION AND

DENYING DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR PARTIAL JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS

J. DANIEL BREEN UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

This matter is before the Court on objections by Defendants, Shelby County, Tennessee, and Temiika D. Gipson, to the Report and Recommendation (“R&R”) issued by United States Magistrate Judge Jon A. York denying Defendants' motion for partial judgment on the pleadings. (Docket Entry (“D.E.”) 35.)

I. Background

Plaintiff, Cindy Migliore, initiated this action against Defendants on November 18, 2020, for violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 201 (“FLSA”). (D.E. 1.) In her lawsuit, Migliore stated that Shelby County hired her as a Deputy Circuit Court Clerk on April 3, 2017, at which time she was classified as a non-exempt employee. (D.E. 1 at PageID 2-3.) Plaintiff claimed that Shelby County was responsible for establishing pay policies, including pay classification and overtime rates. (D.E. 26 at PageID 195-96.) According to these policies, employees were to receive compensatory time for hours worked in excess of 37.5 hours per week. (D.E. 1 at PageID 3.) Migliore further asserted that Gipson was hired as the Circuit Court Clerk for Shelby County on or about September 1, 2018. (D.E. 1 at PageID 5.)

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The crux of Plaintiff's complaint is that she was allowed to “work off the clock” but was later told that she would not be paid for that work. (D.E. 26 at PageID 196.) A few weeks after Gipson was hired, she had a meeting with Plaintiff to “counsel” her regarding her overtime. (D.E. 1 at PageID 5-6.) When Migliore complained about the calculation of her compensatory time, Gipson wrote an email which, Plaintiff alleges, included misrepresentations and threatened disciplinary action. (D.E. 26 at PageID 196.) On or about September 23, 2019, Migliore avers that she was constructively discharged, and, at that time, she had accumulated substantial compensatory hours worked for which Defendants refused to pay. (D.E. 1 at PageID 3.) Plaintiff alleged that such conduct by Defendants was willful and knowing. (D.E. 1 at PageID 3.)

Prior to initiating this lawsuit, Migliore filed a civil warrant against Shelby County, Tennessee in the Shelby County General Sessions Court on June 17, 2020, for “[r]etirement/award of all earned and accrued comp time owed to Plaintiff on account of working more [] than 40 hours per week.” (D.E. 26-1 at PageID 209.) She non-suited the General Sessions suit on April 1, 2021. (D.E. 26 at PageID 203, n.2).

II. Standard of Review

The Federal Magistrate Judges Act allows the district court to designate magistrate judges to issue “proposed findings of facts and recommendations for the disposition” of a motion for judgment on the pleadings. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B). Within fourteen days of the issuance of the recommendation, either party may file objections. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C). Those parts of the report objected to are reviewed by the district judge de novo. Id.

After reviewing the evidence, the District Judge is free to accept, reject, or modify the findings or recommendations of the magistrate judge. Id. The Court need not review, under a de novo or any other standard, those aspects of the R&R to which no specific objection is made.

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Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 150 (1985). Instead, the Court may adopt such unobjected findings and rulings of the magistrate judge. Id. at 151.

III. Discussion

In their motion seeking partial judgment, Defendants submit two arguments. First, they aver that Plaintiff has not set forth sufficient facts to make out a claim under the FLSA. (D.E. 21-1 at PageID 179-81.) Specifically, Defendants contend that Plaintiff's allegations are too vague because she did not state when she allegedly worked or when Defendants refused to pay her. (D.E. 21-1 at PageID 179-81.) Thus, Migliore has not established that any violation occurred within the applicable statute of limitations. (D.E. 21-1 at PageID 179-81.) Second, Defendants argue that Gipson cannot be individually liable under Title VII, the Americans with Disabilities Act, the Family and Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”), or the FLSA.^[1] (D.E. 21-1 at PageID 181.) More specifically, Defendants insist that liability arises under the FLSA only when the individual sued qualifies as an “employer” and argue that Gipson does not fall under that definition. (See D.E. 21-1 at PageID 181-84.)

Magistrate Judge York concluded in his R&R that Migliore's allegations did meet the pleading standards for a FLSA claim and that she sufficiently pled facts for a willful and knowing violation. (D.E. 35 at PageID 236.) As for Defendants' second argument, Judge York determined that there were questions of fact as to whether Gipson was responsible for establishing pay policies which could place her within the definition of an “employer” and thus, subject her to liability under the FLSA. (D.E. 35 at PageID 238-39.) Accordingly, the magistrate judge recommended that Defendant's motion be denied. (D.E. 35 at PageID 239.)

A. The Statute of Limitations

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The FLSA contains a two-year statute of limitations to recover unpaid overtime. 29 U.S.C. § 255(a); Elwell v. Univ. Hosps. Home Care Servs., 276 F.3d 832, 842 (6th Cir. 2002). The statute extends the filing period to three years if the defendant's violation was determined to be willful. 29 U.S.C. § 255(a).

Defendants urge the Court to find that the running of the statute of limitations began from the date this lawsuit was filed in federal court-November 18, 2020-and not from the date of the filing of the General Sessions warrant-June 17, 2020. (D.E. 36 at PageID 241.) More specifically, Defendants object to Judge York's finding that the wording of the Civil Warrant was sufficient to put Defendants on notice of a FLSA claim. (D.E. 36 at PageID 241.) Defendants also contend Migliore brought her General Sessions claim as one for breach of contract, not under the FLSA. (D.E. 36 at PageID 241-42.)

Plaintiff concedes that any FLSA claims that occurred between April 3, 2017, the date of her hire, and June 17, 2017, three years before the General Sessions suit, would be barred by the three-year statute of limitations. (D.E. 26 at PageID 203.) However, she insists that any violations of the FLSA after June 17, 2017, would fall within the applicable limitations period. (D.E. 26 at PageID 203.)

Migliore also avers that Gipson could be held individually liable under the FLSA by way of the willful conduct exception, which extends the filing deadline for FLSA claims to three years. (D.E. 41 at PageID 258.) According to Plaintiff, whether Gipson engaged in willful conduct is a question of fact, and as such, is inappropriate for the Court to determine at this point. (D.E. 41 at PageID 258.)

The Court agrees with Judge York's finding that Plaintiff has met the pleading standard for a FLSA claim. Some circuits require FLSA complaints to allege additional facts to meet this

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standard. See e.g. Davis v. Abington Mem'l Hosp., 765 F.3d 236, 241-42 (3d Cir. 2014); Landers v. Quality Commc'ns, 771 F.3d 638, 641-45 (9th Cir. 2014); Lundy v. Catholic Health Sys. of Long Island, 711 F.3d 106, 113-14 (2d Cir. 2013); Pruell v. Caritas Christi, 678 F.3d 10, 14-15 (1st Cir. 2012). The Sixth Circuit has not detailed the FLSA pleading standards it requires, but has emphasized that Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 550 (2007) does not require a heightened fact pleading standard. See Gibbs v. Sedgwick Claims Mgmt. Servs., Inc., No. 2:21-CV-2153-SHM-CGC, 2022 WL 36688, at *2 (W.D. Tenn. Jan. 3, 2022) (citing Z Techs. Corp. v. Lubrizol Corp., 753 F.3d 594, 597 (6th Cir. 2014) (“The Sixth Circuit has not addressed FLSA pleading standards, but has emphasized that Twombly does not require heightened fact pleading of specifics.”).

Although the Sixth Circuit has not explained the pleading requirements for an FLSA overtime claim, district courts within this circuit “have been clear that [an] extensively detailed factual pleading is not required in the context of an FLSA claim, so long as a defendant is given sufficient notice of the prima facie claim that it is being asked to defend.” Roberts v. Corr. Corp. of Am., No. 3:14-CV-2009, 2015 WL 3905088, at *7 (M.D. Tenn. June 25, 2015). For overtime claims, a plaintiff need not allege...