Mignone v. Fieldcrest Mills, 87-494-A

• Decision Date: 15 March 1989
• Docket Number: No. 87-494-A,87-494-A
• Citation: 556 A.2d 35
• Parties: Karen MIGNONE v. FIELDCREST MILLS et al. ppeal.
• Court: Rhode Island Supreme Court

Page 35

556 A.2d 35

Karen MIGNONE v. FIELDCREST MILLS et al.

No. 87-494-Appeal.

Supreme Court of Rhode Island.

March 15, 1989.

John J. Nugent, Jr., Ronald J. Resmini, Ronald J. Resmini LTD. Law Offices, Providence, for plaintiff.

Dennis J. McCarten, Hanson, Curran & Parks, Mark P. Dolan, John F. Dolan, Rice, Dolan & Kershaw, Providence, for defendants.

OPINION

KELLEHER, Justice.

The plaintiff in this Superior Court civil action, Karen Mignone, is before us on an appeal challenging the grant of each of the defendants' motions for summary judgment in this tort action in which the plaintiff seeks damages for injuries she sustained while in the performance of her duties as a firefighter employed by the town of Barrington. In late March 1986 the plaintiff filed a complaint in Providence County Superior Court against defendants Fieldcrest Mills and Halley Brothers Company. Subsequently she filed an amended complaint adding Margaret Hitchcock as a defendant. After lengthy discovery, Fieldcrest Mills, Halley Brothers Company, and Margaret Hitchcock all moved for summary judgment. The trial justice ruled that the plaintiff's claims were barred by the "firemen's rule" and granted summary judgment for all three defendants. The plaintiff now appeals. Hereafter we shall refer to the litigants as Mignone, Fieldcrest, Halley, and Hitchcock.

The facts are undisputed. On March 31, 1983, Mignone, along with other members of the Barrington fire department, responded to a fire that took place at Hitchcock's residence. According to Mignone, the fire was caused by a faulty electric blanket and fueled by flammable materials Hitchcock stored under her bed. Mignone claims that she was injured when she fell down a flight of stairs while fighting the fire. The direct and actual cause of her fall is unknown. Shortly before her fall Mignone had walked up the stairs without incident and did not see any obvious safety hazards on the stairs. However, she was aware that there was water on the stairs and "thought that the floor was swishy." On the way down the stairs, before her fall, she did not notice any defects or worn spots in the stair carpeting. When asked in her deposition what it was that caused her to fall down the stairs, Mignone responded, "I don't know * * * I just fell. I believe that there was water everywhere, but I did not look at the stairs and I don't remember particularly--I remember everything being soaked."

Mignone's complaint alleged that Fieldcrest negligently manufactured the blanket, breached warranties of fitness and merchantability flowing to Mignone, and was strictly liable, as the seller of the defective blanket, for all her consequential damages. She also lodges similar claims against Halley as the seller of the blanket. Finally Mignone claims that Hitchcock was liable because she negligently maintained her premises in a dangerous and "unsafe condition," which caused Mignone to fall down the stairs. The "unsafe condition," according to Mignone, was the fact that Hitchcock had "bedding, and material stored under the bed which had it not been there, the fire would not have occurred." Mignone does not contend that the stairs were defective or negligently maintained or that she was injured by the electric blanket itself. The essence of Mignone's suit is her claim that she would not have fallen down the stairs and sustained an injury had there been no fire at the Hitchcock residence.

This is not a situation in which a firefighter has been injured directly by some defective condition or product on the premises. Simply stated, the issue before us is whether a firefighter may recover in a tort action for damages from either a negligent homeowner--or a manufacturer or seller of a defective product--for causing a fire but for which the firefighter would not have sustained an injury while in the discharge of his or her duties. The Superior Court justice, relying on the firefighter's rule, ¹ answered this question in the negative, cited Cook v. Demetrakas, 108 R.I. 397, 275 A.2d 919 (1971), and entered an order for summary judgment against Mignone. It is from this decision that Mignone now appeals.

Although an order for summary judgment is a drastic remedy and should be cautiously applied, the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law when there is no issue of material fact and the law is in his or her favor. People's Trust Co. v. Searles, 486 A.2d 619, 620 (R.I.1985). On appeal we review the propriety of the summary-judgment order entered by the same standards as the trial justice, which review includes an examination of the pleadings and affidavits viewed in a light most favorable to the party opposing the motion. Rustigian v. Celona, 478 A.2d 187, 190 (R.I.1984).

With respect to Hitchcock, the homeowner, Mignone argues that the trial justice erroneously entered an order for summary judgment because the determination and application of the proper standard of care owing to her presents a material issue for the trier of fact. We do not agree. The existence and extent of a duty of care are questions of law, not fact, and only whether such duty has been breached and whether proximate cause exists are the questions for the factfinder. Federal Express Corp. v. State of Rhode Island Dept. of Transportation, 664 F.2d 830, 835 (1st Cir.1981).

Second, Mignone contends that Rhode Island judicial decisions and legislative action have abolished the firefighter's rule in Rhode Island and that, therefore, the trial justice erred by relying on that rule in granting summary judgment. The so-called firefighter's rule negates any liability to a firefighter by one whose negligence causes or contributes to the fire that in turn causes injury or death of the firefighter. Buchanan v. Prickett & Son, Inc., 203 Neb. 684, 687, 279 N.W.2d 855, 858 (1979). This rule of law is almost universally accepted across this nation. England v. Tasker, 129 N.H. 467, 529 A.2d 938, 939 (1987). Although not by name, Rhode Island has adhered to the principle of law that gave rise to the firefighter's rule in that Rhode Island case law provides that a homeowner owes a limited duty to firefighters of not knowingly letting them run upon a hidden peril or not willfully causing him or her harm. See Cook, 108 R.I. at 402, 275 A.2d at 922; see also Beehler v. Daniels, Cornell & Co., 18 R.I. 563, 29 A. 6 (1894). Mignone recognizes the Rhode Island case law subscribing to this rule of law but points out that these cases were premised on the traditional, and now antiquated, property concepts of entrant classifications. She argues that the rule is no longer valid in light of our decision in Mariorenzi v. Joseph DiPonte, Inc., 114 R.I. 294, 333 A.2d 127 (1975).

Mariorenzi was a wrongful-death action brought against the owner of a piece of real estate for the death of a five-year-old boy who drowned while playing on the defendant's property. The trial justice in that case classified the boy as a trespasser and granted the defendant's motion for a directed verdict on the ground that a landowner owes no duty to a trespasser other than to refrain from willfully or wantonly injuring him or her. 114 R.I. at 298, 333 A.2d at 129. On appeal we noted the trend in other jurisdictions to reject the traditional property concepts of entrant status and ruled that the common-law status of an entrant onto the land of another would no longer be determinative of the degree of care owed by the owner. Mariorenzi, 114 R.I. at 307, 333 A.2d at 133. We vacated the trial justice's order for a directed verdict, holding that evidence of an entrant's status may have some relevance to the question of liability but it will no longer be conclusive and that the question to be resolved is whether the owner had used reasonable care for the safety of all persons reasonably expected to be upon his or her premises. Id.

Mignone asserts that because Mariorenzi abolished the historic and artificial entrant categories, the rationale for the rule in Rhode Island that firefighters are owed only a limited duty of care has been abrogated and that, "[i]n short, Mariorenzi eliminated the Fireman's Rule" in Rhode Island. We do not agree.

The firefighter's rule is deeply rooted in the common law and the rule does owe part of its genesis to the now-antiquated property concepts of entrant classification. England v. Tasker, 529 A.2d at 939. Traditionally firefighters who have entered upon one's premises in the discharge of their duties had, in the absence of a statute or an express or implied invitation, the status of a licensee. Cook, 108 R.I. at 401, 275 A.2d at 922. As a licensee, the occupant of the premises owed the firefighters only the limited duty of not knowingly letting them run upon a hidden peril or not willfully causing them harm. See Id. This rationale for the rule is currently without justification in jurisdictions, such as ours, that have rejected the common-law entrant classifications as controlling the degree of care owed by the owner of property. England v. Tasker, 529 A.2d at 939; Mariorenzi, 114 R.I. at 307, 333 A.2d at 133.

The rule has, however, found support and vitality in the doctrine of "primary" assumption of risk and considerations of public policy. England v. Tasker, 529 A.2d at 940. It must be pointed out that assumption of the risk differs from the doctrine of comparative negligence in that assumption of the risk is concerned with "knowingly" encountering a danger whereas comparative negligence is concerned with "negligently" encountering a danger. See Kennedy v. Providence Hockey Club, Inc., 119 R.I. 70, 76, 376 A.2d 329, 333 (1977). Where one "knowingly" accepts a dangerous situation, he or she essentially absolves the defendant from creating the risk, or to put it another way, the duty the defendant owes the plaintiff is terminated. Id. In addition the doctrine of "primary" assumption of risk must be distinguished from "secondary" assumption of risk. "Se...